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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is about the quality of the work of external auditors as part of the broader 
corporate governance frame. It contributes new evidence to the U.S.’s Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection research literature on 
the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and audit quality, as well 
as between PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ internal control systems 
and internal corporate governance. In hypothesising these relationships, agency 
theory and signalling theory are invoked.  
No prior research has directly tested the above associations with PCAOB inspection 
outcomes.  This study focuses on two rounds of PCAOB inspections to identify 
change that have occurred in these inspection outcomes and their practical 
implications for medium-to-small auditor firms and their business clients’ managers 
and investors. This study is motivated by the mandatory regulation requirements 
imposed on audit firms in the U.S. audit market. These requirements include the 
creation of PCAOB, the requirement for all auditors of public companies to register 
with the PCAOB and the conduct of inspections by the PCAOB annually or 
triennially. These regulations affect both U.S.-based and foreign accounting firms 
who intend to issue their audit reports to client firms. The regulations are considered 
to improve auditor independence and audit quality after numerous high profile 
accounting scandals.  
Three sets of hypotheses are generated in this study. Hypothesis one examines the 
association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and abnormal audit fees paid 
to auditors by client firms measured by the difference between the actual audit fees 
and estimated audit fee. Hypothesis two tests the association between the PCAOB 
xiv 
 
inspection outcomes and client firms’ effective internal controls. Lastly, hypothesis 
three investigates the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and 
client firms’ internal corporate governance.  
A quantitative research method is applied in this study. The sample in this study 
consists of 806 inspection reports and is drawn through the following stages. The 
first stage of sampling involves collecting the PCAOB inspection reports between 
August 2004 and December 2010. The next stage is to match client firms’ financial 
data with their auditors’ inspection reports within the study period. The third stage is 
engaged in data collection to estimate abnormal audit fees, collecting internal control 
opinions and gathering client firms’ corporate governance data. Therefore, the final 
sample in this study reduced to 1567 observations.  
They are several findings from this study. First, in relation to the association between 
the PCAOB inspection outcomes and abnormal audit fees paid to auditors by client 
firms used to test the first hypothesis, the result suggests if there is an increase in 
abnormal audit fees then there will be an increased probability of obtaining a 
deficiency report. Thus there is a chance of reducing a probability of obtaining a 
favourable PCAOB inspection outcome. 
In terms of the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client 
firms’ effective internal controls used to test the second hypothesis, the result 
suggests if there is an improvement in client firms’ internal controls then auditors 
will have a decreased chance of obtaining a deficiency report. In other words, if 
client firms’ internal control system is effective then client firms’ auditors are more 
likely to have a favourable PCAOB inspection outcome.  
xv 
 
With regard to the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client 
firms’ internal corporate governance applied to test the third hypothesis in this study. 
This result suggests if client firms’ internal corporate governance is stronger thus 
client firms’ auditors are more likely to have a favourable PCAOB inspection 
outcome. However, the result is insignificant, while in the hypothesised direction, 
can not be claimed as supporting the third hypothesis.  
In conclusion, the findings of this study have important theoretical and practical 
implications. Agency and signalling theories are found to be contradictory 
explanations of the finding for hypothesis one, but complementary explanations for 
hypotheses two and three. In terms of practical implications for regulators, investors 
and managers, the results reveal impacts of PCAOB inspection reports on client 
firms’ management and investors, and on the audit firm itself. This study highlights 
the significant association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and positive 
abnormal audit fees paid to auditors by client firms and client firms’ effective 
internal controls as well. Finally, this study contributes to current PCAOB literature 
by examining the direct association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and 
audit quality, client firms’ internal controls and client firms’ internal corporate 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
The U.S. auditing industry has been experienced from audit deregulation under the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)’s peer review required by 
the U, S. government to audit regulation overseen by the independent and private 
organization of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) overseen 
under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within the past over 30 
years. Kinney (2005) conducts a research on the U.S. auditing industry focused on the 
past 25 years from 1981 to 2005. In the study he concludes that there were three 
“constants” within the past 25 years, and three “external” development or “shocks” that 
“dramatically affected audit regulation activity”. Furthermore, he points out the 
“conditions”, “constants” and “shocks” made a significant contribution to the change of 
auditing from the self-regulation conducted by the AICPA’s peer review to the 
independent regulation by the PCAOB overseen by the U.S. SEC. 
 
In his paper, he concludes that the four “conditions” are included as follows. First, the 
removal of Code of Professional Conduct bans on competitive bidding for and uninvited 
solicitation of new audit clients and restrictions on other practices, for example 
contingent fees, advertising, and commissions. Second, the Public Oversight Board 
(POB) oversees activities of a newly established SEC Practice Section. Third, the 
government is concerned audit firms’ nonaudit services and auditor independence. 
Fourth, the adoption of reporting material weaknesses was required by the external 
auditors when conducting their client firms’ internal controls over financial reporting. 
Then, he defines the three sets of factors having an influence on audit profession’s 
“constantbility” as the value of audited financial reporting, the financial reporting users’ 
expectation gap and business cycle, and the basic organization of audit firms and audit 
contracts. Finally, he mentions that there are three external “shock”, such as industry 
deregulation, the increased social importance of audited financial reporting and the 
development of information technology.      
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Peer review has been integrated with the AICPA program for a number of years. The 
purpose of adopting the peer review is to improve audit quality in the auditing 
profession. Zhang and Gunny (2007) report 92 percent of peer reviews were conducted 
by another auditor between 1997 and 2003. There are only 7 percent and 1 percent 
conducted by a private association and an AICPA-appointed team respectively within 
the same period mentioned above. Normally, auditors with SEC clients were monitored 
through mandatory reviews every three years under this AICPA peer review. These peer 
reviews are involved with assessing the quality control system in five different 
perspectives, namely independence, personnel management, client acceptance, 
engagement performance and monitoring (AICPA 1996). Under the AICPA peer review, 
firms are allowed to be reviewed by one of the following choices: (1) another auditor (2) 
a private CPA association (3) a team appointed by the AICPA. Peer reviewers would 
issue a summary report including the following opinions, such as clean, unmodified, 
modified or adverse as well as a letter of comments. The peer reviewers issue clean or 
unmodified opinions regarding some or relatively minor weaknesses identified in their 
audit work. If they find serious weaknesses in their auditing then they issues modified 
opinions. Further, if they believe the weaknesses are extremely serious then they would 
issue adverse opinions (Hillary and Lennox 2005). 
     
Peer review was initially adopted in 1970s and intends to improve audit quality through 
identifying significant weaknesses within the auditing of their client firms and 
communicating those weaknesses to the reviewers in order to correct the mistakes 
during the auditing process (White et al. 1988; AICPA 2004). Peer review in accounting 
has been criticized for the lack of audit independence (Fogarty 1996; Coffee 2001; 
Public Oversight Board 2002 and Williams 2002). In addition, Anantharaman (2013) 
states that the allegations of criticism on the lack of audit independence mentioned by 
above academics contributed to the demise of self-regulation for US accounting firms.         
 
In 2002, the U. S. Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in response to 
high profile accounting scandals including Enron. One of the main features of SOX was 
the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) under the 
Section 101. The PCAOB, a private and non- profit organisation aims at overseeing the 
auditors of public companies due to the fact that the U. S. Congress is not considered 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) peer review for public 
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auditors to be an effective oversight mechanism. The main purpose of creating PCAOB 
is to protect investors and further the public interest by promoting informative, fair, and 
independent audit reports (PCAOB 2006). The PCAOB is overseen by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), but the members of the PCAOB are not federal 
employees. PCAOB has the following four functions, namely registration, regulation, 
inspection and enforcement. According to DeFond (2010) PCAOB inspection is 
considered as the central feature of the accounting profession’s shift from self-
regulation to independent regulation. Therefore the understanding of the PCAOB 
inspection process and its influence on the audit industry is quite important. Former 
PCAOB Board member Daniel Goelzer (2005) states the importance of the inspection 
process as follows: 
 
The engagement inspections are the key to the Board’s impact on auditing. The 
knowledge that, in the case of any particular audit, PCAOB inspectors who are 
themselves experienced auditors but who are not ‘peers’ may review the work-papers 
and form their own judgment on how well the audit was conducted has had a very 
significant effect on how auditors do their work. While there is a place for enforcement 
proceedings and a place for liability to private parties who are injured by bad auditing, 
in my view a well-thought-out inspection is more likely to improve the day-to-day 
quality of auditing than are those others, blunter tools.  
     
The main differences between the PCAOB inspections and AICPA peer reviews are 
distinguished from the following aspects. First, the PCAOB has more power of 
enforcement compared to the AICPA peer reviews. This enforcement includes 
conducting investigations, disciplinary proceedings, imposing sanctions as well as 
referring deficiencies to regulatory agencies. Second, regarding the confidential 
information the PCAOB is allowed to access all client information, interview clients’ 
audit committee members or directors. However, the peer reviews conducted by the 
AICPA is lack of granting peer reviewers to access their clients’ information if their 
clients disagree with the disclosure.   
     
According to Anantharaman (2013) the accounting profession in the U. S. had 
conducted self-regulation under the AICPA Peer Review Program (PRP) prior to the 
oversight by PCAOB. This self-regulatory framework for accounting was initially 
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developed after the public audit failures in the 1970s. In 1977, the AICPA developed 
the Division for CPA firms consisting of the SEC Practice Section and the Private 
Companies Practice Section. Further, peer reviews are focused on quality control 
system, manuals and checklists (Sepp 1983). Under this program an accounting firm is 
required to seek another firm to review its quality control procedures and performance 
of audit engagements. Generally, reviewers have a good understanding of their client 
firms’ quality control policies and procedures as well. Then, they select a sample of 
engagements for which work papers were walked through.  The results of an overall 
opinion are summarized in a report supported by a letter of comments. 
          
Section 102 of SOX requires auditors including the U.S.-based and foreign accounting 
firms of public companies to register with the PCAOB, and also requires the PCAOB to 
inspect those auditors annually or triennially, as well as discipline the auditors. PCAOB 
adopts a risk-based approach and selects engagements for inspection based on some 
undisclosed criteria and the audit firm is not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence 
the selection process. The inspection teams identify audits for review based on an 
evaluation of the risks of misstatements or omissions in financial reporting (PCAOB, 
2005).  
 
The PCAOB inspection teams inspect potential audit deficiencies in audit firm’s quality 
control systems and audit engagements. The results of the inspection, along with 
information on the organization of the public accounting firm, are publicly available 
from the PCAOB website. The PCAOB inspection reports contain two outcomes: (1) no 
deficiencies and (2) deficiencies. Audit deficiencies include items, such as “failed to 
perform sufficient substantive tests” or “failure to identify a departure from GAAP” 
and/or that a particular deficiency resulted in a “restatement” of the financial statements 
(PCAOB 2005). Big audit firms with more than 100 public companies are subject to 
annual inspections by PCAOB, and small audit firms with 100 public companies or less 
are subject to triennial inspections by PCAOB. 
 
The prior research on PCAOB inspections is limited and the results are mixed (Gunny 
et al. 2007; Hermanson et al. 2007; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Daugherty and Tervo 
(2010), Carcello et al. 2011; Daugherty, Dickins and Tervo (2011); Gramling et al. 2011; 
Landis et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2013; Gunny and Zhang 2013). Further, the findings of 
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prior research are mixed. For instance, Hillary and Lennox (2005) conducted a study 
using large-sample archival data show that audit firms gained clients after receiving 
favourable opinions from their peer reviewers and lost clients after giving modified or 
adverse opinions. Their results indicate that audit clients considering peer review 
opinions as a credible signal of audit quality. However, Abbott et al. (2013) claim that 
PCAOB inspection reports have created a powerful public signal of perceived audit 
quality because of the objectivity, specificity, variation and visibility of these reports. 
1.2 Objectives of this study and its significance   
The objectives of this study and the significance are as follows: 
 
1. To investigate the relation between the PCAOB inspection report outcomes issued to 
auditors and the audit quality provided to their client firms.  
 
A number of papers have addressed the relationship between audit quality and the         
abnormal fees paid to auditors, which are considered as residuals of the actual audit fees 
and normal audit fees paid to auditors by client firms. The results are mixed (Frankel et 
al. 2002; DeFond et al. 2002; Kinney and Libby 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003). This 
research intends to explore further the relation between audit quality and audit fees paid 
to auditors under the new PCAOB inspection which replaces the old peer reviews 
conducted under the AICPA in the US. Further, the prior research of audit quality on the 
non-Big 4 auditors is also quite limited (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986; Beasley et al. 
1999; Beneish 1999; Glass Lewis & Co. 2006). According to Hermanson et al. (2007) 
small audit firms have more deficiency reports, less professionals, numerous issuer 
clients, and are growing faster than other audit firms. Yet they received no deficiency 
reports under the peer review system.    
 
2. To identify the association between the PCAOB inspection report outcomes and the 
effectiveness of client firms’ internal control system. 
 
One important aspect of SOX is that it has two sections that are focused on internal 
control issues related to financial reporting. SOX section 302 requires management to 
disclose all material weakness in internal control, when they certify the annual and 
quarterly financial reports. SOX Section 404 requires management to provide an 
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assessment of internal controls, and requires auditor to provide an opinion on 
management’s assessment as well.  Since the client firms’ internal control is quite 
important to external auditor, which is applied by external auditors to assess the 
potential audit risks resulting in evaluating the planned detection risk and planned        
audit evidence. Additionally, if the client firms’ internal control is considered as 
effective then external auditors could rely on it and reduce the relevant substantive tests, 
thus external auditors may allocate staff to other assignments in order to increase the 
audit efficiency. 
 
3. To examine the influence of client firms’ internal corporate governance on the 
PCAOB inspection report outcomes issued to client firms’ auditors.   
   
Section 104 of SOX authorizes PCAOB legal permission to conduct investigations and 
access all client information, interview client’s audit committee members and directors. 
PCAOB targets the most challenging audit issues and evaluate financial reporting risks 
applying a risk model and other tools. Board and audit committee are placed to monitor 
management’s opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, an effective audit committee is more 
likely to question whether management has exercised sufficient diligence in ensuring 
proper controls. Additionally, the board is placed to monitor top management, approve 
the corporation’s strategy and controls, and ensure the quality of financial reports. 
1.3 Motivations for this study 
This study is motivated by the new regulation requirements imposed on audit firms in 
the U. S. audit market. These requirements include the creation of PCAOB under the 
Section 101 of SOX (2002), a private and non-profit organisation and being legislated 
by SOX. Section 102 of SOX requires all auditors of public companies to register with 
the PCAOB as well as Section 104 of SOX which also requires the PCAOB to conduct 
inspections annually or triennially regarding the size of audit firms. PCAOB inspects 
large audit firms who have more than 100 audit clients every year while PCAOB 
inspects small accounting firms who have equal or less than 100 audit clients every 
three years. Further, the PCAOB can impose sanctions on auditing firms and 
communicate the results regarding their inspections to regulatory and relevant law 
enforcement agencies. In particularly, U.S.-based and foreign accounting firms who 
intend to issue their audit reports to client firms are required to register with the PCAOB. 
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Additionally, the PCAOB adopts a risk-based approach and conduct inspections on the 
engagements of the auditor’s clients, and the audit firm is not allowed to limit or have 
an influence on the selection process (PCAOB 2005). 
 
In Australia, the Australian Securities Investments Commission (ASIC) is responsible 
for conducting investigation, surveillance and enforcement of the financial reporting 
and auditing requirements under the Corporations Act 2001. The purpose of audit 
inspection program is to promote high external audit quality of financial reports under 
the Corporations Act 2001. Meanwhile, this audit inspection program also intends to 
raise the standard of conduct in the auditing profession. Finally, this program ensures a 
greater confidence in financial reports. Moreover, ASIC’s inspections are focused on 
improving audit quality and promoting compliance with the requirements of the 
Corporations Act 2001, Auditing Standards and Professional and Ethical Standards. 
Regarding the inspection audit firms are selected based on certain criteria focused on 
firms auditing publicly listed or public interest entities and these firms include both 
large and small firms. The audit inspection process consists of the following three main 
steps, including planning, performance and reporting. In planning step, ASIC mainly 
focuses on having a good understanding of the structure and governance arrangements 
of the audit firms and the information from these audit firms’ key clients. Then, ASIC 
reviews the notice material completed by audit firms and selects audit firms’ clients 
based on the onsite assessment. Finally, ASIC prepares a private and confidential report 
for the inspected firms. These reports consist of the inspection process, observations and 
findings as well as remedy actions (ASIC 2012). Since ASIC only prepares and 
provides inspection reports without identifying the audit firms’ details, such as names 
therefore the information value of these inspection reports is considered as limited. 
Consequently, this study is not focused on Australia’s inspection program conducted by 
ASIC.                     
 
This study is also intended to add contributions to the PCAOB inspection research 
literature on the association between the PCAOB inspection report outcomes and audit 
quality, client firms’ internal control system as well as client firms’ internal corporate 
governance. Furthermore, this study focuses on two rounds of PCAOB inspections and 
intends to contribute to regulators, investors and managers through addressing the 
impact of PCAOB inspection reports on client firms by implication, or the investors in 
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those client firms and the audit firm itself. The prior research on PCAOB inspections is 
limited (Gunny et al. 2007; Hermanson et al. 2007; Hermanson and Houston 2008; 
Lennox and Pittman 2010; Daugherty and Tervo 2010, Daugherty et al. 2011; Gramling 
et al. 2011; Landis et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2013; Gunny and Zhang 2013). In 
particularly, the prior research of PCAOB inspections on small audit firms is extremely 
limited (Roybark 2006; Hermanson et al. 2007; Hermanson and Houston 2008; 
Hermanson et al. 2010; Daugherty and Tervo 2010, Daugherty et al. 2011; Gramling et 
al. 2011; Landis et al. 2011).  
 
In addition, there is evidence showing that small audit firms have more audit deficiency 
reports and are highly associated with audit failures (Hermanson et al. 2007). Since 
PCAOB only publicly discloses how many engagements they scrutinize in their 
inspections of small audit firms (with 100 or less issuers). However, this information is 
unavailable for inspections of Big accounting firms (with more than 100 issuers). 
Furthermore, there were only 47 inspection reports for big audit firms out of total 1071 
inspection reports issued between August 26, 2004 and December 16, 2010. Within 
these two rounds of PCAOB inspections all big audit firms received unfavourable 
PCAOB inspection reports. 
1.4 The research Scope 
This research is focused on small audit firms with 100 or less client firms registered 
with the U. S Securities and Exchange Commission and the PCAOB inspection reports 
issued to these small audit firms within a two- round period from August 26, 2004 and 
December 16, 2010.  
 
An initial sample of 806 PCAOB inspection reports was downloaded from the PCAOB 
official website from August 2004 to December 2010. These PCAOB inspection teams 
started releasing the inspection reports for small audit firms in January 2005. The 
purpose of obtaining these inspection reports is to gather small audit firms’ information 
in order to match with their PCAOB inspection report outcomes. This information 
consists of the auditors’ name, dates when the field work was conducted and the 
outcome, including deficiencies and non-deficiencies. Since these inspection reports 
only document the deficiencies discovered during the inspection instead of releasing 
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audit clients’ details therefore these reports are considered as auditor-specific reports 
rather than client specific. 
 
Auditors’ PCAOB Form 2 (Annual report form) obtained from PCAOB official website 
aims to identify auditors’ client firms. In this form, PCAOB starts releasing auditors and 
their client firms’ details, including auditors’ name, country, address, and contact phone 
numbers as well as client firms’ details, such as clients’ names also called issuers’ 
names in this form, Central Index Key (CIK) and the dates of the audit reports. To 
identify audit fees paid to auditors by their client firms DEF14A Forms were 
downloaded from the market brief’s official website. This form release audit fees, non-
audit fess, total fees and auditors in a financial year. To estimate normal audit fees an 
OLS regression model is applied. The relevant financial data regarding client firms were 
gathered from the OSIRIS database. After matching client firms’ financial data and 
audit fees paid to their auditors the sample reduced to 164 small audit firms with 328 
PCAOB inspection reports. After further collecting client firms’ internal controls data 
and internal corporate governance data the final sample consists of 1,567 auditor-client 
observations from 2004 to 2010.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives a detailed explanation with regard 
to this thesis, including the background, objectives and significances, motivations of 
this research as well as the scope of this research. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review 
of academic literature. This chapter consists of the following aspects, including the 
comparison between the prior AICPA peer reviews and the current PCAOB inspections. 
It then follows by a discussion of the influence of audit fees paid to auditors on audit 
quality provided to client firms, particularly on the influence of abnormal audit fees on 
audit quality. Regarding the client internal control system this chapter is emphasised on 
findings of the prior research, particularly the effectiveness of the internal control on the 
improvement of audit quality. Finally, this chapter provides an analysis of corporate 
governance and its influence on audit quality over financial reporting. Chapter 3 
describes theories applied in this research and the hypotheses as well. Chapter 4 
discusses the relevant research models which are applied to examine the three 
hypotheses in this study. Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive analysis and discussion of 
the empirical results of this research. Chapter 6 provides a summary of this research and 
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draws a conclusion regarding the main findings as well. It also considers the 
implications for future research and lists limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature related to the association between 
the PCAOB inspection outcomes and audit quality, client firms’ levels of controls and 
governance. This chapter reviews previous studies in detail, identifies the gaps in the 
literature and provides theoretical constructs and the scope of research. The rest of this 
chapter is organised into sections. The first section discusses the audit regulation. The 
second section discusses auditor independence. The third section discusses the PCAOB 
inspections. The fourth section discusses audit quality and abnormal audit fees as well 
as client firms’ internal controls. The fifth section discusses audit quality and client 
firms’ internal corporate governance. The last section of this chapter draws a conclusion.               
2.2 Peer reviews 
Peer review has been integrated with the AICPA program for a number of years and has 
been criticized for the lack of audit independence (Fogarty 1996; Coffee 2001; Public 
Oversight Board 2002 and Williams 2002). The effectiveness of the AICPA’s peer 
review has also been challenged by some academics (Mautz 1984; Kaiser 1989; Felix 
and Prawitt 1993). For instance, Wallace and Cravens (1994) claim that peer reviews 
only identify relatively few weaknesses in reviewed firms. Hillary and Lennox (2005) 
state that almost all peer review engagements are unmodified reports. Further, Fogarty 
(1996) finds that most audit failures are related to peer-reviewed firms. Additionally, 
Grumet (2005) and Anantharaman (2013) believe that peer review can not be 
considered as effective because of lack of independence among reviewers and 
reviewees.  
 
Atherton (1989) and Austin and Lanston (1981) also point out that the formality of the 
process, particularly the development of explicit compliance plans based on charts and 
checklists that have no impact on the conduct of audits. For instance, Wallace (1991) 
considered as the first one who examines the information provided in peer-review 
reports and the relevant letter of comments. The results indicate that 90 percent of 
reports filed between 1980 and 1986 were unmodified, and the average weaknesses of 
27 
 
per engagement are 3.47. Further, the number of weaknesses is constant to the type of 
reviewer, type of reviewee, or the year of review. Therefore, she concludes that there is 
no relationship between size or Big n status and peer review outcomes within the period 
from 1980 to 1986. 
  
Later, Fogarty (1996) points out that the self-regulated peer review program has been 
criticized for its reluctance to impose punitive sanctions on low-quality audit firms and 
for allowing the firm to select its own reviewer, which typically is another audit firm. 
He argues that the AICPA’s peer review program may be nothing more than 
“ceremonial logic” based on the facts: (1) the program was initially created by a trade 
organization to maintain the profession’s image rather than improving audit quality; (2) 
their reviews are mainly focused on the quality-control process and documentation of 
that process instead of making proper audit decisions and improving actual audit quality.  
However, Hillary and Lennox (2005) find that larger firms and firms that review other 
firms are most likely to receive better peer reviews, and firms obtained clean or negative 
peer review opinions gain or lose clients afterwards. They examine reports filed from 
1997 to 2003 and find that most reports continue to be unmodified at 95 percent, and the 
average weaknesses identified decreased sharply over time. Their research designs to 
measure the information content of peer review reports through the audit and market 
reactions regarding the reports. They summarize that firms received unmodified reports 
without letter of comments gain clients following the review compared to firms 
received modified or adverse reports lose clients. Therefore they conclude that peer-
review reports are related to the perceived audit quality. 
 
Consequently, there is rising an argument that how to judge the relationship between 
audit quality and peer review. Does peer review provide an effective signal of audit 
quality? To answer this question it is necessary to understand that how to define the 
actual audit quality. Since audit quality is usually unobservable on specific audits 
(O’Keefe et al. 1994). Russell and Armitage (2006) conducted a survey on accounting 
firm partners and their result indicates that many firms took the advantages of loopholes 
of peer review in order to obtain better opinions, for example the reviewers of firms 
allowed these firms to self-select the engagements to be reviewed. Casterella et al. 
(2009) conducted a study on the association between peer review opinions and actual 
audit quality because prior research has been focused on examining the association 
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between perceived audit quality and peer review reports. The findings indicate that there 
is a relation between the number of weaknesses identified in a firm’s peer review report 
and the likelihood of having audit failure. Further, they find that there is a relation 
between the type of weaknesses identified in the report and audit failure.  
 
In addition, they examine the relation between the number of weaknesses identified in 
the peer review reports and some specific firm indicators. They also find that there is a 
link between peer review findings and the firm specific indicators of potentially weak 
quality control or risky practices within accounting firms. These audit quality control 
problems identified in these per review reports include overworking staff and accepting 
risky clients. Lennox and Pittman (2010) claim that PCAOB inspection process is 
stricter than peer review regarding the detecting and reporting audit firms’ issues. 
Anantharaman (2013), using PCAOB inspection outcomes as an independent 
benchmark of audit quality, finds that an audit firm’s peer review opinion is likely to be 
more favourable if the reviewed firm is large, it reviews other firms or it is reviewed by 
a non-competitor.  
 
Summary 
Peer reviews conducted by the AICPA have been widely critised by prior studies due to 
lack of audit independence and lack of effectiveness. However, prior research by Hillary 
and Lennox (2005) fins that peer reviewed reports are related to the perceived audit 
quality. Their finding is supported by Casterella et al. (2009). Therefore, the finding of 
prior research on peer reviews is mixed. The following Table 1 gives more details on 
the findings of the AICPA peer review in prior research. 
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Table 1: Prior research findings on AICPA peer review 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Hilary, G & 
Lennox, C. 
(2005)  
Tests whether 
the opinions 
issued by the 
peer reviewers 
program lacked 
credibility  
Data on the SEC Practice 
Section (SECPS) firms 
were gathered from the 
AICPA’s Public File. The 
final sample consists of 
1001 reviews including 14 
reviews by AICPA teams, 
73 reviews by CPA 
association and 914 
reviews. 
 A quantitative research 
method is applied to test 
hypotheses.  
Find that audit firms gained clients 
after receiving clean opinions from 
their reviewers and lost clients after 
receiving modified or adverse 
opinions. This result indicates that 
peer review opinions provided 
credible information about quality 
differences between audit firms 
 
Casterella, J. 
R., Jensen, 
K.L. & 
Knechel, W.R. 
(2009) 
Examines if 
peer reviews 
conducted 
under the 
AICPA’s self-
regulatory 
model have 
been effective 
at signalling 
audit quality. 
The sample consists of 14 
of the largest 100 CPA 
firms (Public Accounting 
Report 1999).  The final 
sample includes 158 
observations.  
A regression model is used 
to estimate the link 
between audit failures 
(low quality) and peer 
review findings. An 
ordered logit regression 
model is applied to 
predict the association 
between peer review 
outcomes and firm-
specific attributes 
indicative of audit firm 
risk or audit quality. 
Find that peer review findings are 
indeed useful in predicting audit 
failure and that certain types of 
findings are particularly useful in this 
regard. Additionally, peer review 
findings are associated with other 
firm-specific indicators of potentially 
weak quality control or risky 
practices within accounting firms. 
Overall, their findings indicate that 
self-regulated per review does 
provide effective signals with regard 
to audit firm quality.   
First, various proxies for quality 
were used when interpreting the 
results to indicate that peer review 
outcomes are associated with actual 
audit quality. Second, it requires 
judgement in interpreting the 
underlying common factors. Third, 
the number of weaknesses 
identified in peer review reports is 
low. Fourth, the audit firms in this 
study are all insured by the same 
company.  
 
Further research may consider 
developing more effective self-
regulatory model under the aid of 
the audit profession.                                
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Table 1 continue  
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Russell, J & 
Armitage, J. 
(2006) 
 
Assesses per 
review 
effectiveness by 
identifying 
potential 
loopholes that 
would allow 
reviewed firms 
to pass their 
peer review 
when they 
should not pass. 
The total 200 responses 
were gathered, including 
133 responses to the first 
mailing and 67 responses to 
the second mailing. The 
total response rate was 40 
percent. 
A questionnaire was 
mailed to a random sample 
of peer reviewed firms in 
October 2003 and second 
requests were mailed after 
3 months. The 
questionnaire consists of 7 
yes-no research questions.   
Find that many loopholes discussed 
in this research are not supported by 
results showing large percentages of 
firms violating the substance of the 
peer review standards, these results 
suggest that there are serious 
problems in the peer review process. 
Many of the violations are so 
significant, further even the few 
violations could have damage on the 
profession.    
The potential respondent bias is 
considered as the major limitation 
because the sample in this research 
may not be representative of all 
firms receiving peer reviews. Then, 
the inadequate answers from the 
respondents are existed due to fear 
some form of backlash from 
answering the questions truthfully.    
Anantharaman, 
D. (2013) 
Compares 
outcomes from 
self-regulation 
and statutory 
regulation by 
the Public 
Company 
Accounting 
Oversight 
Board 
(PCAOB). 
Peer review reports for 
1001 firms were gathered 
from 1997 to 2003. First-
time PCAOB inspection 
reports were available for 
460 firms. The final sample 
consists of 407 
observations. Each audit 
firm appears only once in 
the sample.   
A logistic regression model 
is developed to test 7 
hypotheses 
Find that firms choosing their own 
reviewers, and firms choosing 
reviewers likely to be connected 
through prior relationships, tend to 
receive peer review opinions more 
favourable than their subsequent 
PCAOB reports. Regarding PCAOB 
inspection, firms that inspected later 
tend to receive PCAOB reports more 
favourable than their peer reviews.   
The study is subject to the 
following limitations. First, there is 
relatively little variation in reviewer 
type. Second, the research design is 
non-experimental. Third, there is no 
objective benchmark for the “right” 
number of deficiencies expected 
from any review from both PCAOB 
and peer review regimes.  
 
Future research may consider 
examining the effectiveness of peer 
review in other settings where it 
continues to be the principal 
regulatory mechanism. Moreover, 
future research may also continue 
the debate between the PCAOB 
inspections and self-regulation. 
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2.3 Auditor independence 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was enacted by the US Congress due to a number 
of accounting scandal, including Enron. The creation of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considered as the critical part in SOX. The 
PCAOB replaced prior peer review conducted by the AICPA due to the concerns by the 
US Congress and Government that the audit independence is compromised within the 
AICPA peer reviews.   
 
Auditor independence is normally described as the probability that an auditor will report 
a discovered breach in the financial reports (Watts and Zimmerman 1983, 1986). This is 
consistent with the finding by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managers have 
incentives to reduce agency costs through hiring independent auditors. DeAngelo 
(1981a) argues that auditors’ ability of maintaining independence is directly related to 
their ability to retain the client in order to cover their initial start-up costs of auditing, in 
particularly “low ball” the initial audit fee. DeAngelo believes that auditors’ ability to 
retain their clients in order to cover the initial costs has an influence on auditor 
independence and may impair auditor independence in the current period due to the 
concern of securing audit and nonaudit service fees in the following period. Simunic 
(1984) states that management advisory services provided by auditors can produce 
economic rents based on the fact that “knowledge spillovers” produced by performing 
the auditing to their clients could benefit auditors through reducing auditing costs. 
Simunic (1984) examines the relation between this knowledge spillovers and audit fees 
and finds that audit fess are higher when auditors also provide non-audit services. Later, 
Palmrose (1986a) provides evidence that audit fees are higher even when the auditors 
are not incumbent.  
 
In the U. S. the SEC and the AICPA took actions to improve auditor independence in 
the 1970s and 1980s, however issues resulting in providing nonaudit services to clients 
and the likelihood of impairment of auditor independence become have attracted more 
concerns in the 1990s. Prior research on the influence of nonaudit fees on auditor 
independence has attracted a number of researchers. However, the results are mixed. 
The following studies, including DeFond et al. (2002), Frankel et al. (2002), Ashbaugh 
et al. (2003), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Geiger and Rama (2003), Reynolds et al. 
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(2004), Kinney et al. (2004), Krishnan et al. (2005) and Francis and Ke (2006) are 
focused on the association between non-audit fees and auditor independence. Their 
results indicate that there is no evidence to support that non-audit fees are related to 
auditor independence. They argue that auditors are reluctant to undertake activities to 
damage their reputation because the benefit from each client is considered as a small 
percentage compared to auditors’ total revenue. For instance, DeFond et al. (2002) 
investigate the relation between nonaudit services and auditors’ going concern opinions. 
They find that there is no relation between purchasing nonaudit services and auditors’ 
issuance of going concern opinions. Further, they conclude that their finding supports 
the argument that the market-based institutional incentives, such as reputation loss and 
litigation costs are outweigh higher audit fees.  
 
Frankel et al. (2002) conduct a different study on examining the association between 
auditor fees and earnings management and the market reaction to the disclosure of 
auditor fees as well. They find that there is evidence between nonaudit fees and small 
earnings management and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Specifically, 
nonaudit fees are positively associated with small earnings management and the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. Meanwhile, audit fees are negatively associated 
with these earnings management. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) re-examine the association 
between nonaudit fees and earnings management, which was initially conducted by 
Frankel et al. (2002). Their result shows that there is no relation between positive 
discretionary accruals and any of the auditor fees. Further, they did not any relation 
between fee ration and the likelihood that firms beat analysts’ forecasts. Finally, they 
conclude that there is no evidence supporting the association between the magnitude of 
nonaudit fees and total fees.  
 
Meanwhile, Chung and Kallapur (2003) using the economic theory of auditor 
independence (DeAngelo 1981a) examine the association between the auditors’ 
incentives to compromise their independence and the client importance. Their findings 
do not support that there is a significant association between abnormal accruals and the 
client importance. Geiger and Rama (2003) investigate the association between the 
magnitude of both audit and nonaudit fees and auditor report modification decisions 
regarding financially stressed manufacturing companies. They find a significant positive 
association between the magnitude of audit fees and the likelihood of receiving going-
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concern modified audit opinion while they did not find such an association between 
nonaudit fees and audit opinions. 
 
Kinney et al. (2004) examine the association between auditor independence measured 
by financial restatements and nonaudit fees. Their finding suggests that there are some 
positive association between “unspecific” nonaudit fees and restatements with regard to 
large firms. A year later, Krishnan et al. (2005) examine the association between the 
joint provision of audit and nonaudit fees and auditor independence. In particularly, 
they examine if there is impairment to the perceived auditor independence by providing 
nonaudit services. They find that the nonaudit fee ratio and the level of nonaudit fees 
were negatively related to the earnings response coefficients in 2001. Further, they find 
a negative association between nonaudit services purchases and the earnings response 
coefficient, but this occurs mainly in the second and third quarters following proxy 
releases. They conclude that the nonaudit services did impair the perceived auditor 
independence. The following Table1 shows the details regarding auditor independence 
and non-audit fees.  
 
In Australia, the previous Auditing and Assurance Standards Board also called AuASB, 
a body of CPA Australia (CPAA) and the Institute of Charted Accountants in Australia 
(ICAA) through the Australian Accounting Research Foundation which is controlled by 
a joint standing committee consisting of the two professional bodies under through 
treasury under the oversight of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) Act was the response to the corporate 
collapses, such as HIH and One.Tel. In Australia, the Australian Securities Investments 
Commission (ASIC) is responsible for conducting inspections of audit firms on behalf 
of the FRC (Jubb and Houghon 2007). Barkess and Simnett (1994) and Wines (1994) 
have contrary results. Wines (1994) examine the association between qualified opinions 
and nonaudit fees. The evidence suggests that there is a negative relation between 
nonaudit fees and the issuance of any type of qualified opinions in a sample of 76 
Australian companies in the period from 1980 to 1989. While Barkess and Simnett 
(1994) did not find any relation between the level of nonaudit service fees and audit 
quality report qualifications using Australian companies.  
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Later, Sharma (2001) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) examine 49 bankrupt companies in 
Australia and find that higher nonaudit fees are negatively associated with going-
concern modified reports. In 2001, Australia has raised concerns of auditor 
independence after the collapse of some high profile accounting scandal through 
reviewing the existing regulation of auditor independence. Professor Ian Ramsay from 
the University of Melbourne was nominated to conduct an investigation on the 
adequacy of current requirements and provide recommendations issued in the Ramsay 
Report. The Ramsay Report is focused on employment and financial relationships and 
the provision of non-audit services (Hayes 2002).   
 
Summary 
Prior research on auditor independence has limited evidence that nonaudit fees are 
related to the compromise of auditor independence (DeFond et al. 2002, Ashbaugh et al. 
2003, Chung and Kallapur 2003, Reynolds et al. 2004, Kinney et al. 2004, Krishnan et 
al. 2005). Compared to the prior research conducted in the U.S. the Australian studies 
have documented the association between the compromise of auditor independence and 
fees paid to auditors by their client firms (Wine 1994, Sharma 2001, Sharma and Sidhu 
2001). The following Table 2 shows the details on past auditor independence research.  
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 Table 2: Findings of previous studies on auditor independence 
    Author(s),                 
     Year 
      Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
           Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                            
          Research   
DeFond, M. L.,            
Raghunandan, K. 
Subramanyam, 
K. (2002)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examine the association     
between non-audit 
services and auditor 
independence by 
measuring auditors’ 
propensity to issue going                                    
concern opinions.   
 
 
 
A sample consists of 2,428  
firms including 100 with first-
time going concern opinions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Estimate the coefficients 
in the logistic regression 
model used to predict the 
auditor’s probability of 
issuing a first-time going 
concern opinion on 
financially distressed 
clients.  
 
 
No significant association 
between non-audit service 
fees and auditor 
independence. Further, there 
is no association between 
going concern opinions and 
either total fees or audit fees.   
 
 
  
The authors assume going 
concern opinions, audit fees, 
and non-audit fees are all 
likely to be associated with 
financial distress. Further, 
the models may not be 
adequately controlled for 
financial distress. Finally, 
endogeneity has an impact 
on final results.  
Frankel, R. M., 
Johnson, M. F. & 
Nelson, K. K. 
(2002)                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigate the 
association between 
auditor fees and earnings 
management, and the 
association between the 
market reaction and the 
disclosure of auditor 
fees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial sample consists of 
4,701 proxy statements from 
the SEC’s EDGAR database 
between February 5, 2001 and 
June 15, 2001.  The final 
sample consists of 3,074 firms 
by deleting financial 
institutions and firms who 
changed auditor within this 
period and do not disclose 
auditor fees.                                                 
         
 
 
 
 
  Earnings management is 
identified by using two 
complementary 
approaches.   A logit 
model drawn from prior 
research to identify 
earnings management. 
Alternatively, modified 
Jones model is used to 
identify earnings 
management.    
 
 
 
 
 
Find that nonaudit fees are 
positively associated with 
Small earnings surprises and 
the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, and 
audit fees are negatively 
associated with these earnings 
management indicators. Find 
that an insignificant negative 
association between nonaudit 
fees and share values on fees 
disclosure date. 
 
 
 
 
Future research may focus 
on the results indicate that 
audit and nonaudit fees 
create different incentives 
effects, which is contrary to 
prior research. Further, 
future study may explore 
the association between size 
and audit and nonaudit fees. 
In future, regarding 
nonaudit services the 
following factors should be 
considered, such as audit 
opinions, earnings 
management, and financial 
statement fraud. 
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Table 2 continue 
    Author(s)                   
     Year 
 Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
Methods 
 
        Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
           Research   
Geiger, M. A., 
& Rama, D. 
(2003) 
  
Focus on examining the  
association between 
audit and nonaudit service 
fees paid to auditors and 
auditor’s decision 
regarding the type of 
opinion to a financially 
stressed company.                                                                                                                                                                              
The final sample consists 
of 66 companies receiving       
a first-time going concern 
modified audit opinion.                                                     
A logistic model is 
used to examine the 
research questions                                                                
A significant positive association 
between the magnitude of audit 
fees and the likelihood of
receiving a going-concern 
modified audit opinion. No 
significant association between 
nonaudit fees and audit opinions.                                                                                                                                                        
In future, two types of audit 
reporting “errors” should be 
concerned, the link between 
nonaudit services fees and partner 
compensation. A large sample 
would be a benefit for future 
research.
  
Ashbaugh, H., 
LaFond, R. & 
Mayhew, B. W. 
(2003) 
 
 
Re-examine prior research 
conducted by Frankel et al. 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial sample consists 
of 4,959 firms from US 
registrants’ 2000 proxy 
statements available on 
EDGAR or Global Access 
during November and 
December 2001.  The final 
sample consists of 3,170 
firms. 
 
 
 A fee regression 
model is used 
to examine the 
determinants of 
auditor fees. A 
modified regression 
model is applied to 
test the association 
between auditor fees 
and discretionary 
accruals 
No statistically significant 
association between firms 
meeting analyst forecasts and 
auditor fees. No systematic 
evidence to support the claim that 
auditors compromise their 
independence because of the 
nonaudit services purchased by 
their clients.  
 
Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) 
Find the relation between 
auditors’ incentives to 
compromise their 
independence and their 
clients’ importance using 
ratio of client fees and of 
nonaudit fees divided by 
the audit firm’s U.S. 
revenues or a surrogate for 
the audit-practice-office 
revenues as measures.  
The proxy statements 
information on audit, IT, 
and other fees paid by 
companies to their auditors 
was collected from 10K 
Wizard between February 
5 and June 30, 2001. The 
final sample consists of 
1,778 observations of 
client importance at the 
local-audit –office level.  
A regression model 
is used to estimate 
the absolute value of 
the modified Jones-
model abnormal 
accruals and the 
client importance. 
No significant association 
between the client importance 
measures and abnormal accruals. 
The result suggests that auditor 
incentives to compromise their 
independence should increase 
with the extent of client 
opportunities and incentives to 
manage earnings, and decrease 
with the strength of corporate 
governance and auditor expertise.  
This study is only focused on 
investigating auditor incentives to 
compromise independence based 
on financial interest rather than 
other factors including personal 
relationship. The data limitations 
do not allow the further 
examination on differing recurring 
from nonrecurring nonaudit 
services, and services enjoying 
significant economies from 
services without enjoying. 
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Table 2 continue 
    Author(s)                   
     Year 
     Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
             Methods                               
 
  Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
           Research   
Reynolds, J. K., 
Deis, D. R. & 
Francis, J. R. 
(2004)  
Investigates the 
association between 
auditor’s objectivity 
and nonaudit services 
or the level of 
economic dependence 
on a client.       
 
The initial sample consists 
of 4,148 U.S. companies 
filing proxy statements 
with fee disclosures from 
February 5, 2001 to May 
25, 2001.  The final 
sample consist of 2,507 
companies after deleting 
1,058 proxy statements 
from financial institutions 
and omitting 75 firms that 
changed auditors in fiscal 
year 2000 and another 508 
companies that miss data.  
 
An expanded and replication 
OLS regression models were 
applied to test the 
hypotheses. The expanded 
regression model was created 
by adding extra control 
variables while the 
replication regression model 
was developed to replicate 
the Frankel Johnson Nelson 
regression model.  
 
Prior research links between 
discretionary accruals and 
nonaudit fees is considered 
lacking of adequate control for 
firm growth. Additionally, there 
is no significant relation 
between auditor independence 
and nonaudit services. Overall, 
there is no evidence to support 
that relative level of nonaudit 
service fees impairs an auditor’s 
objectivity.   
 
This study is subject to the 
following limitations. First, 
it only provides cross-
sectional evidence. Second, 
the results are at least 
partially dependent on the 
quality of the cross-
sectional Jones 
discretionary accrual 
computation. Last, any 
comparisons between audit 
and nonaudit fees are 
dependent on the 
classification comprising 
each category.   
Kinney, W. R., 
Palmrose, Z. &  
Scholz, S. (2004), 
 
 
 
 
Examines the 
association between 
auditor independence 
and nonaudit service 
fees, and the relation 
between nonaudit 
service fees and the 
quality of financial 
reporting  
Interim and annual 
restatements were 
collected through Lexis-
Nexis News and Form 8-K 
library files between 
January 1, 1995 and 
December 31, 2000. 713 
companies were identified 
to have announced 
restatements over the six-
year period. 617 
companies were left after 
deleting 96 companies that 
not audited by one of the 
largest seven U. S. audit 
firms.  
Logistic regression models 
are developed to estimate 
auditor independence and 
audit quality of financial 
reporting and audit firm fees. 
First, there is no significant 
positive association between 
fees for financial information 
system design and 
implementation services or 
internal audit services and 
restatements. Second, there is 
some evidence of a significant 
positive association between 
audit fees, audit- related fees, 
and unspecified nonaudit 
services fees and restatements. 
Third, tax services fees are 
significantly and negatively 
associated with restatements  
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Table 2 continue 
    Author(s)                   
     Year 
 Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
     Methods                               
 
      Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
             Research   
Krishnan, J.,  
Sami, H. & 
Zhang, Y. 
(2005) 
Examines whether 
investors perceive 
auditor 
independence as 
being impaired 
when auditors 
provide nonaudit 
services through 
investigating the 
association between 
nonaudit service 
purchases and the 
earnings response 
coefficient.  
The initial sample has 
5,118 firms that filed 
proxies in 2001. The 
final sample has 2,390 
firms after deleting firms 
whose data are 
unavailable from 
Compustat, CRSP and 
I/B/E/S.    
A regression model is 
applied to estimate the 
relation between the 
earnings response 
coefficient and the 
purchase of nonaudit 
services.  
Find that nonaudit fee ratio and the 
level of nonaudit fees were negatively 
associated with ERCs in 2001. There 
is a negative association between 
nonaudit services purchases and ERC 
when using unexpected fees; 
however, this only occurs mainly in 
the second and third quarters 
following the disclosure of the proxy.  
This study only examines a short 
time period, earnings 
announcements during February 
through December of 2001. 
 
Additionally, this study assumes 
that different types of nonaudit 
fees are considered equivalently 
by investors when examining 
aggregate nonaudit fees.  
 
Future research may be focused 
on examining whether the effect 
of ERC of NAS varies across 
audit-related, tax, and other 
services. 
Francis, J. R., & 
Ke, B. (2006) 
 
 
Investigates 
whether the 
disclosure required 
by the SEC of fees 
for audit and 
nonaudit services 
paid by firms, has 
an influence on the 
market’s perception 
of auditor 
independence and 
earnings quality.  
Firms’ first-time proxy 
statement fee disclosures 
were collected on the 
SEC’s EDGAR online 
database. The data on the 
initial fee disclosures 
were gathered from 
Standard and Poor’s and 
a commercial data base 
from The Emerson 
Company. The final 
sample contains 3,133 
unique firms with 16,910 
firm-quarter 
observations.     
A pooled cross-
sectional regression 
model is used for a 
sample of quarterly 
earnings 
announcements made 
within 1 year before 
and 1 year after a 
firm’s first disclosure 
of fees paid to auditors 
Find that following the initial fee 
disclosures in 2001, the market 
valuation of quarterly earnings 
surprises was significantly lower for 
firms with high levels of nonaudit 
fees that for firms with low levels of 
such fees. While in the year prior to 
the new fee disclosures there was no 
reduction in earnings response 
coefficients for firms that 
subsequently reported high nonaudit 
fees. Overall, the mandatory fee 
disclosures provide valuable 
information when appraising auditor 
independence and earnings quality.   
It is impossible to completely 
rule out that high nonaudit fees 
paid to incumbent auditors are 
correlated with other 
unobservable firm characteristics 
driving the market’s negative 
response. The results are driven 
by high-accrual firms and given 
that earnings of high-accrual 
firms have greater uncertainty if 
auditor independence is in doubt, 
it is difficult to obtain alternative 
explanations.    
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Table 2 continue 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Barkess, L., & 
Simnett, R. 
(1994) 
 
1) Identifies the extent and 
level of other services 
provided by incumbent 
auditors in Australia. 2) 
Examines pricing issues 
by investigating the 
relation between fees for 
other services and audit 
fees. Last, addresses the 
question of independence 
through both 1) and 2).  
The data were collected 
from the Top500 publicly 
listed companies in 
Australia from 1986 to 
1990. The sample consists 
of 371 companies in 1986, 
403 in 1987, 466 in 1988, 
463 in 1989 and 391 in 
1990. 
 A fee regression model 
is developed to test 
the relation between 
the provision of other 
services and audit 
fees.  
Find that clients increase 
purchasing other services from 
their auditors. Identified a 
significant positive relation 
between fees paid for other 
services and audit fees. Failed 
to find a relation between the 
level of other services and the 
type of audit report issued or 
audit tenure meaning that audit 
independence is not 
compromised through 
providing other services.  
Future research may focus on 
examining to categorise the types of 
other services provided. 
Wine, G. 
(1994) 
Investigates  whether 
there is the potential for 
an appearance of auditor 
independence impairment 
when providing higher 
level of nonaudit services   
This study defines 100 
public companies that are 
listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange as at 30th 
June 1980. The final 
sample consists of 76 
companies for 10 years in 
this study period after 
deleting 24 companies are 
delisted or failed to 
provide annual reports. 
A probit regression 
model is used to test 
hypotheses. 
Find that auditors are less 
likely to qualify a given 
company’s financial 
statements when higher levels 
of nonaudit services fees are 
derived. This indicates that the 
independence of auditors of 
these companies may have 
been compromised. 
The difficulty of assessing audit 
quality by referring to the frequency 
with which auditing firms issue 
qualified opinions. 
 
Further research could address the 
question of whether financial 
statement users and other interested 
parties actually appreciate that the 
auditor provision of nonaudit 
services may reduce the necessity for 
the qualification of financial 
statements.  In addition, future 
research may also investigate the 
cross-sectional variation in the 
association found according to 
company size. 
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Table 2 continue 
    Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
            Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research   
Craswell, A. T. 
(1999)  
This study intends to find 
whether the provision of 
nonaudit services impairs 
auditor independence 
through testing the 
association between the 
provision of nonaudit 
services and auditors’ 
reporting opinions.  
The sample consists of 885 
publicly listed companies 
obtained from Who Audits 
Australia? For 1984, 1477 
for 1987 and 1079 for 
1994. 
 A cross-sectional logit 
model of qualified audit 
opinions is drawn from 
prior research and applied 
to test hypotheses using 
Australian data for 
Australian listed companies 
for 1984, 1987 and 1994. 
Find that auditors’ 
decisions of qualify 
their opinions are not 
affected by the 
provision of nonaudit 
services.  
This research design 
involves a comparison of 
companies with qualified 
and unqualified opinions. 
Sharma, D. S. 
(2001) 
 
Examines the relation 
between nonaudit fees as a 
proportional of total fees 
and auditors’ propensity to 
issue a going concern 
qualification to client facing 
imminent bankruptcy 
An initial sample consists 
of 141 bankrupt companies 
delisted from the 
Australian Stock Exchange 
from 1989 to 1996. Due to 
the lack of financial 
information by some 
companies, the final 
sample reduced to 49 
firms.  
A logit model is applied to 
test the association between 
audit opinion of going 
concern and auditor 
independence.   
Find that the provision 
of nonaudit services has 
a significant influence 
on auditors’ going 
concern qualification 
decision. Financial 
stress was found to 
significantly explain the 
auditors’ opinion. 
Some useful items contain 
important information for 
auditors to make decisions 
are not available. 
Furthermore, the sample in 
this research is quite small 
and considers lack of 
generalizability. 
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    Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                    
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
            Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research   
Sharma, D. S., & 
Sidhu, J. (2001) 
Investigates the influence of 
fees derived from the joint 
provision of nonaudit 
services and audit services 
on auditors’ propensity to 
issue a going concern 
qualification and address 
the relation between the 
economic incentives and 
audit independence. 
A sample of 49 firms 
delisted from the 
Australian Stock Exchange 
from 1989 to 1996 
A logit model is applied to 
test the association between 
audit opinion of going 
concern and auditor 
independence 
Auditors may be 
tempted to impair their 
independence when 
their audit clients paid 
higher proportions of 
nonaudit services fees 
to total fees. 
Some useful items contain 
important information for 
auditors to make decisions 
are not available. Further, 
the use of audit opinion as a 
measure of audit 
independence is at best a 
proxy because audit 
independence is unable to 
directly be observed. 
Therefore, the extent to 
which it is an appropriate 
and accurate proxy presents 
a limitation. Last, the 
sample in this research is 
quite small and considers 
lack of generalizability.     
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2.4 PCAOB inspections 
PCAOB inspection replaced prior peer review conducted by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) due to the increasing concerns that peer review 
failed to protect investors from poor quality audits. Section 101 of SOX summarizes the 
PCAOB’s four principal duties, including (1) register public accounting firms; (2) 
establish and /or adopt auditing standards and standards of quality control, ethics, and 
independence; (3) conduct inspections; and (4) provide enforcement as well. The 
PCAOB inspections are mainly focused on the following procedures, namely (1) 
evaluating the quality of the audit work conducted on a specific audit engagement; and 
(2) reviewing the auditor’s quality control system by addressing practices, policies and 
procedures that are concerned with audit performance, training, compliance with 
independence standards, client acceptance and retention as well as the development of 
policies and procedures. The PCAOB inspects large audit firms annually with more than 
100 public companies while inspects small audit firms with 100 public companies or 
less every three years. The PCAOB inspections consist of reviewing portions of selected 
audit engagements performed in the prior year (PCAOB Annual Report 2005). The 
PCAOB inspection teams adopt a risk-based approach and select engagements and 
aspects of those engagements for inspection with the aid of internally developed risk 
model (Gunny and Zhang 2013).  
 
With regard to the outcomes of the PCAOB inspections if the PCAOB inspection teams 
have not discovered any deficiencies then favourable inspection reports are issued to the 
audit firms. Any audit deficiencies related to the assessment of audit engagement are 
disclosed in the PCAOB inspection report without identifying the client’s name and 
details, but, deficiencies associated with reviewing auditor’s quality control system 
remain non-public unless the auditor fails to address these deficiencies to the Board’s 
satisfaction within 12 months. Gradison and Boster (2010) provide a detailed analysis of 
PCAOB inspection from 2004 to 2010. Their paper addresses the PCAOB inspection in 
the following aspects, such as the legal background of creating the PCAOB, the 
remedies to identified quality control defects and criticisms, protecting investors 
through improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures as well as the 
attributes to the PCAOB, including the PCAOB’s culture, outreach, auditing standards 
and academic research. Prior research on PCAOB inspections has documented the 
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following aspects, including audit deficiencies, quality control defects, client reaction to 
deficiencies in their audit firms’ inspection reports and investigation on how inspection 
reports are used.  
2.4.1 The PCAOB inspections and peer reviews  
Read et al. (2004) examine all auditors’ resignations between 2000 and 2003 and find 
that 47 local and regional audit firms disclosed in Form-8Ks filed from 2002 to 2003 
that they were ceasing all SEC audits. Only 8 such firms made this disclosure between 
2000 and 2001. By interviewing the audit partners of such firms they find that the 
primary reasons for ceasing to register with SEC is the perception of a more stringent 
oversight by the PCAOB, increased professional liability insurance costs as well as 
increased scrutiny of SEC registrants. Lastly, they find that many local and regional 
audit firms that had no SEC audit clients in 2002 voluntarily registered with the 
PCAOB. Gunny and Zhang (2006) find that opinions from the PCAOB inspections are 
able to distinguish earnings quality whereas the peer review opinions do not. Later, 
Gramling and Watson (2009) analyse the reports of the largest 20 triennial firms that 
have both a PCAOB inspection report and the AICPA’s Peer Review Program. The 
result indicates that the peer review intends to focus on audits of non-public companies 
while the PCAOB is focused on public companies audits.  
 
Summary 
Prior research conducted by Read et al. (2004) finds that some local and regional audit 
firms ceased to register with peer reviews based on some specific reasons while Gunny 
and Zhang (2006) find a relationship between the opinions of the PCAOB inspections 
and audit quality while the peer review opinions are not. Further, Gramling and Watson 
(2009) conduct an analysis on different focuses between the PCAOB inspection reports 
and the peer reviews. The Table 3 below presents more details on the findings of 
comparison between the PCAOB inspection and the AICPA peer review in prior 
research.     
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Table 3: Prior findings on peer reviews and the PCAOB inspections  
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future 
Research 
Read, Rama 
and 
Raghunanda
n (2004)  
Examines the influence 
on local and regional 
audit firms overseen by 
the PCAOB. 
775 small auditor 
resignations between 
2000 and 2003 and 991 
firms registered under 
the AICPA peer review 
program. 
  
 The analysis is 
based on the results 
from the interview 
conducted in this 
study. 
 
They find that 47 local and regional audit firms 
disclosed in Form-8Ks filed from 2002 to 2003 
that they were ceasing all SEC audits. Only 8 
such firms made this disclosure between 2000 
and 2001. By interviewing the audit partners of 
such firms they find the reasons, including a 
more stringent oversight by the PCAOB, 
increased professional liability insurance costs 
as well as increased scrutiny of SEC registrants 
The future study may focus on the 
impact of SOX on local and 
regional audit firms.  
Gunny, K & 
Zhang, T. 
(2006)  
They examine the 
association between 
earning quality and 
regulatory report 
opinions issued by both 
AICPA peer review 
and the PCAOB 
inspections. 
The PCAOB inspection 
reports were collected 
from 21 January 2005 
to 13 July 2006. The 
final sample includes 
5,795 auditor-client 
observations and 178 
auditors. 
A modified abnormal 
accrual Jones model 
and other regression 
models are 
combined to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that opinions from the PCAOB 
inspections are able to distinguish earnings 
quality whereas the peer review opinions do not. 
The future study may carry on the 
finding in this study by 
investigating the incrementally 
associated earnings quality after 
controlling for other public 
information financial statement 
users possess. 
Gramling 
and Watson 
(2009) 
 
This study investigates 
the nature and types of 
deficiencies regarding 
both public and non-
public audits in order 
to improve audit 
quality.   
20 largest triennially 
inspected firms had 
both the PCAOB 
inspection reports from 
August 2005 to March 
2008 and CPCAF peer 
review reports between 
September 2004 and 
November 2007.  
 
The analysis 
conducted in this 
study is through 
reviewing 
inspection reports. 
The key findings are included as follows; first, 
about 60% of the reports issued by the CPCAF 
and PCAOB identify at least one deficiency. 
Second, both the CPCAF and PCAOB reports 
highlight the pervasiveness of insufficient 
documentation. Finally, other common 
deficiencies in the CPCAF reports include 
incomplete or inaccurate management 
representation letters, incomplete financial 
statements and inaccurate audit reports, 
incomplete performance of analytical 
procedures as well as insufficient review 
procedures.   
The study on the following aspects 
may have benefits in future, such as 
the further exploration on the 
finding s between the PCAOB and 
CPCAF in this study, detailed 
comparison between these two 
inspection processes, focus on the 
issuer and non-issuer practices of 
these smaller firms, the audit 
quality between public and non-
public clients, the causes of the 
documentation issues in this study. 
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2.4.2 Audit deficiencies 
Roybark (2006) examined 175 inspection reports, including 146 small firms, 21 
regional firms and 4 national firms. The result shows the common audit deficiencies 
include failures to identify or appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of 
GAAP, some of which appear likely to be material to the issuer’s financial statements. 
Hermanson et al. (2007) reviewed small firm inspection reports and find that 60 percent 
of the inspected firms had audit deficiencies and 72 percent had quality control defects. 
Moreover, those deficiencies firms tend to be smaller and had more issuers compared to 
firms without receiving deficiency reports. The audit deficiencies contained in the 
inspection reports are generally associated with substantive tests and the failure to 
perform and document various procedures or analyses.  
 
Hermanson and Houston (2009) further examine the second-time inspections of small 
audit firms. They find that audit deficiencies declined from 60 percent cited in the first-
time inspections to less than 5 percent cited in the second-time inspections. Landis et al. 
(2011) also investigate PCAOB triennially firms’ inspection reports from 2005 to 2008 
by classifying the types of audit deficiencies contained in 339 inspection reports. They 
find that audit deficiencies declined following the time and the most commonly cited 
accounts include revenues and assets, and the most frequently cited transactions are 
associated with business combinations and equity. The most common audit deficiencies 
are related to insufficient testing and documentation.  
 
Further, a study conducted by Church and Shefchik (2012) provides a detailed analysis 
of the PCAOB’s inspection reports issued to large audit firms. They find that there is a 
significant downward linear trend between the total number of audit deficiencies and the 
investigation time from 2004 to 2009. They also find that 92.3 percent of total audit 
deficiencies involve a common and recurring deficiency. Furthermore, 77 percent of the 
misstatement audit deficiencies involve a common and recurring deficiency. With 
Regard to the financial statement accounts they most often impacted by audit 
deficiencies. They also find that regarding the responses to the PCAOB’s assessments 
Big 4 audit firms have more disagreements than second-tier firms. Finally, they 
conclude that every large audit firm has criticisms of quality control in every inspection 
year.  
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Summary 
The analysis of the PCAOB inspection reports shows that common audit deficiencies 
include failures to identify or appropriately address errors in the issuer’s application of 
GAAP (Roybark 2006). Further, Hermanson et al. (2007) reviewed small audit firm 
inspection reports and conclude that 60 percent of the inspected firms had audit 
deficiencies and 72 percent had quality control defects. Those deficiencies firms tend to 
be smaller and had more issuers compared to firms without receiving deficiency reports. 
Later, Hermanson and Houston (2009) comment on the decline of audit deficiencies 
regarding small audit firms between cited in the first-time inspections and the second-
time inspections. Finally, Landis et al. (2011) also make the same conclusion that audit 
deficiencies declined following the time and the most common audit deficiencies are 
related to insufficient testing and documentation. The Table 4 below presents more 
details of prior research on audit deficiencies.     
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Table 4: Prior research on audit deficiencies 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods Key findings Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Roybark, H. 
(2006) 
 
Examines the accounting 
firms inspected between 
2004 and 2005 as well as 
evaluates their audit 
deficiencies.  
 
Consist of 175 inspection 
reports involved 146 
small firms, 21 regional 
firms, 4 national firms 
and the Big 4 accounting 
firms as well. The 
inspection reports 
represent 542 audit 
engagements. 
 
A quantitative research 
analysis is applied based 
on the inspection reports 
The common deficiencies include 
failures to identify or properly address 
errors in the issuer’s application of 
GAAP, some of them are considered as 
material to the issuer’s financial 
statements.  Further, those GAAP 
deficiencies are related to inventory 
and/or cost of sales transactions, 
transactions associated with purchase 
and /or impairment of goodwill, and 
revenue recognition and /or accounts 
receivable. The areas associated with 
GAAS-related deficiencies are: 1) the 
assessment of client’s internal control; 2) 
work paper discrepancies and /or the 
quality of audit evidence; 3) the 
inappropriate use of analytical 
procedures, and 4) inadequate sample 
size and /or sampling errors.  
 
Hermanson, 
D. Houston, 
R. & Rice, J. 
(2007) 
 
Investigates 316 PCAOB 
inspection reports issued 
to smaller CPA firms 
through 2006 
316 PCAOB inspection 
reports through July 13, 
2006. 
 
A quantitative research is 
used to analyse these 
PCAOB inspection 
reports 
They find that 60 percent of the 
inspected firms have audit deficiencies 
and 72 percent had audit quality defects. 
Firms having audit deficiencies are 
smaller, have numerous issuers and are 
growing more rapidly compared to firms 
without audit deficiencies. They also find 
more audit deficiencies conducted in 
2004 compared to 2005. In addition, the 
evidence shows that clients from the 
firms having audit deficiencies are 
smaller, less profitable and more highly 
leveraged 
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Table 4 continue 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and 
data 
 
Methods Key findings Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Hermanson, D 
& Houston, R. 
(2009) 
Tests PCAOB 
inspections reports 
issued to small audit 
firms in the second round 
and determine whether 
small audit firms have 
made improvements in 
their process 
116 firms inspected 
twice and 474 audit 
firms not yet 
inspected twice  
based on the 
inspection reports 
released before or 
after 9/24/07 (the 
first date of the 
second round 
PCAOB 
inspections).  
 
A quantitative 
research method 
is applied 
The finding shows that the second PCAOB 
inspections to small audit firms are 
improved. For instance, Within these 161 
audit firms only 4 (3%) had audit 
deficiencies compared to 60% audit 
deficiencies in the first round. Regarding 
quality control defects it was 28% in the 
second round compared to 72% in the first 
round. Regarding those 474 audit firms the 
audit deficiencies were around 50% before 
or after 9/24/07 the first date of the second 
inspection release, and over 70% had quality 
control defects in before or after 9/24/07.   
 
Landis, M. 
Jerris, S & 
Braswell, M. 
(2011). 
 
Presents a descriptive 
analysis of the accounts 
and transactions 
documented in the 
PCAOB inspection 
reports for small audit 
firms. 
 
770 PCAOB 
inspection reports 
for small audit 
firms issued from 
2005 to 2008. 339 
inspection reports 
had audit 
deficiencies. 
They code each 
deficiency from 
339 inspection 
reports based on 
two criteria, 
such as the area 
of the 
deficiency and 
the type of audit 
failure.     
The overall trend of deficiencies reported on 
small audit firms is declined due to the facts 
that either the PCAOB inspections improved 
audit quality or a change of the attitude 
toward inspections by the PCAOB. Further, 
revenue is the most frequently cited in the 
inspection reports, and assets are responsible 
for most account deficiencies. Moreover, 
most departures from GAAP appear in 
liability accounts and transactions. 
Specifically, equity-related transactions are 
considered as the major source of transaction 
deficiencies while inadequate tests of third 
party auditors are the major source of audit 
procedure deficiencies. Finally, inadequate 
audit testing or the documentation of those 
tests is attributed to the majority of 
deficiencies cited in the inspection reports 
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Table 4 continue  
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods Key findings Limitations and future                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 
Church, B. & 
Schefchik, L. 
(2012) 
Provides an analysis of audit 
deficiencies cited in the 
inspection reports issued to 
large audit firms. 
48 inspection reports 
issued from 2005 to 2010 
for inspection years 2004 
to 2009. 
A quantitative research 
method is applied 
through coding 
deficiencies into three 
different categories. 
 
Find a significant downward linear 
trend in the number of deficiencies 
from 2004 to 2009. Moreover, they 
identify the financial statement 
accounts often impacted by audit 
deficiencies and the primary emphasis 
of the financial statement impacted by 
audit deficiencies. Finally, regarding 
the response to the PCAOB inspection 
outcomes Big 4 have more 
disagreements than second-tier firms. 
Quality control defects are issued by 
the PCAOB to every large accounting 
firm in every inspection year.    
This study is subject to the 
following limitations, 
including 1) audit deficiency 
coding is relied on the 
wording contained in the 
inspection reports; 2) the 
explanation of the steady 
decline in audit deficiencies 
is not clear. Third, there is 
lack of further disclosure in 
part two and three in the 
PCAOB inspection reports. 
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2.4.3  Quality control defects 
Epps and Messier (2007) conduct a study focused on engagement quality review 
designed to provide quality control for audit engagements and serve as an evaluation of 
the performance of the audit engagement partner and engagement team. Their result 
indicates that by comparing the firms’ guidance there are some differences in the 
assignment of engagement quality reviewer, the participation of the engagement quality 
reviewer in audit planning, the existence of practice aids, and the involvement of 
engagement quality reviewer during the course of audit engagements. Hermanson and 
Houston (2008) conducted another study on 20 smaller audit firms’ PCAOB inspection 
reports as of June 2008. They find 56 quality control defects in these 20 smaller audit 
firms and conclude that the following key issues, such as audit performance regarding 
technical competence, due care, and professional scepticism, concurring partner review 
and auditor communication and independence, should be concerned. Furthermore, the 
smallest audit firms, particularly lacking of staff are struggled to adequately address 
quality control defects.  
 
A firm’s system of quality control is defined as a process providing the firm with 
reasonable assurance that its personnel comply with applicable professional standards 
and the firm’s own standards of quality (PCAOB Sec. 20.03). The PCAOB identifies 
quality control into the following five categories, namely independence, integrity and 
objectivity; personnel management; acceptance and continuance of clients and 
engagements; engagement performance and monitoring (PCAOB Sec. 20.07). Quality 
control deficiencies are identified both through a review of elements of a firm’s system 
of control and from inferences that are drawn from the results of inspections of specific 
audit engagements. Evans et al. (2011) provide an illustrative example of a non-public 
portion of a large-firm inspection report. In this report, some details, such as issuers’ 
name and non-public portion of quality controls are identified. Their purpose of 
conducting this study is to illustrate how quality control deficiencies are presented and 
described in actual large-firm inspection reports. Moreover, they believe that 
transparency will be improved by releasing more information in quality control part.  
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Summary 
Epps and Messier (2007) investigate the engagement quality review and find that the 
differences are existed regarding those engagement quality reviews. Later, Hermanson 
and Houston (2008) conducted another study on quality control defects of 20 smaller 
audit firms and comment on some key issues needed to be conconcerned in future. 
Recently, Evans et al. (2011) provide an illustrative example of how quality control 
deficiencies are presented and described in actual large-firm inspection reports. The 
following Table 5 gives more details on the findings of quality control defects in prior 
research. 
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 Table 5: Past literature review on quality control defects 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
 Key findings  Limitations and 
future Research 
Epps, K. & 
Messier, W. 
(2007) 
Determines the consistency 
of engagement quality 
guidance and conduct a task 
analysis of engagement 
quality reviews for future 
research. 
Big 4 and two of the next 
three largest firms. 
A survey and an 
experiment. 
The result shows that there are some 
differences in the assignment of engagement 
quality reviewer, the participation of 
engagement quality reviewer in audit 
planning, the extensiveness of practice aids, 
and the involvement of engagement quality 
reviewer during the course of audit 
engagements. 
Provide some future 
research questions in the 
end. 
Hermanson, D 
& Houston, R. 
(2008) 
 
Provides a detailed analysis 
of quality control defects on 
small audit firms released by 
the PCAOB 
 
56 quality control defects 
in 20 smaller audit firms 
disclosed by the PCAOB 
from February 11, 2005 
o May 11, 2006. 
 
A quantitative research 
method is used to 
analyse quality control 
defects and compare 
differences between 
disclosed and non-
disclosed firms 
 
The find that issues rising from the 
following areas, such as audit performance 
issues, particularly in technical competence, 
due care, and professional scepticism, 
concurring partner review and auditor 
communication, and independence issues are 
the major causes resulting in quality control 
defects. Further, smallest audit firms are lack 
of staff and more likely to struggle to 
adequately address quality control defects. 
 
Evans, R. 
Boster, R. & 
Gradison, B. 
(2011) 
 
Intends to provide an 
example to illustrate how 
quality control deficiencies 
are presented and described 
in actual inspection reports 
to large firms. 
 
 An experiment to produce 
an illustrative example 
Greater transparency may better serve 
investors and audit committee and others. 
This could be implemented by providing a 
representative example of the non-public 
findings in the PCAOB inspection reports. 
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2.4.4 Client reaction to deficiencies 
Lennox and Pittman (2010) are focused on examining the association between the 
PCAOB inspections and audit quality. They find that audit clients do not perceive the 
PCAOB’s inspection reports as a signal of audit quality. Further, they find that 
compared to the PCAOB inspections peer review reports provide an evaluative 
summary. In addition, they find that peer review reports issued under the new reporting 
format have become less valuable based on client perceptions. Moreover, many firms 
are abandoning the peer review program instead of registering to both forms of 
oversight. Finally, they conclude that we still have understood less about the audit 
quality provided by the PCAOB inspections.         
 
Abbott et al. (2013) document a strong agency-based demand for perceived audit 
quality as proxied by the PCAOB inspection reports, find that effective audit 
committees of auditor clients are particularly sensitive to the receipt of a GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection report, and are more likely to switch auditors subsequent to 
the inspection report disclosure. Their result shows that PCAOB inspection reports have 
created a powerful public signal of perceived audit quality because of the objectivity, 
specificity, variation and visibility of these reports.  
 
 
Summary 
Client reaction to audit deficiencies is varied. For instance, Lennox and Pittman (2010) 
find that audit clients do not perceive the PCAOB’s inspection reports as a signal of 
audit quality. However, Abbott et al. (2013) argue that the PCAOB inspection reports 
have created a powerful public signal of perceived audit quality because of the 
objectivity, specificity, variation and visibility of these reports. The following Table 6 
presents more details on the findings of client reaction to defects in prior research. 
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Table 6: Client reaction to defects in prior studies   
Author(s) 
 Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Lennox, C. 
& Pittman, 
J (2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examines 
whether the 
PCAOB 
inspection 
reports are 
considered 
as a signal 
of audit 
quality.  
 
 
 
 
545 inspection reports 
issued p to December 
31, 2007. 
  
 A quantitative 
research method 
is used.  
They find that audit clients do not 
perceive the PCAOB’s inspection 
reports as a signal of audit quality. 
Additionally, the information 
contained in peer review reports fell 
after they became narrower in 
scope with the initial of PCAOB 
inspections. Finally, the PCAOB 
inspection regulation has resulted in 
losing small audit firms. Overall, 
the effect of the PCAOB 
inspections on audit quality has not 
been quite cleared 
It is difficult to justify policy 
description based on their result due to 
the short history of the PCAOB 
inspections compared to the long 
history of the peer review under the 
AICPA.  
Abbott, L. 
Gunny, K 
& Zhang, 
T. (2013) 
 
Investigates 
whether the 
PCAOB 
inspection 
reports are 
considered 
as a signal 
of audit 
quality by 
small audit 
firms. 
A total of 521 small 
nonforeign audit firms 
inspection reports were 
collected from January 
21, 2005to December 
31, 2007, of which 256 
were clean and 61 were 
GAAP-deficient. 
A logistic 
regression model 
is applied to test 
all hypotheses. 
Clients of GAAP-deficient, 
triennially inspected auditors were 
more likely to dismiss these 
auditors in favour of triennially 
inspected auditors that were not 
GAAP-deficient. Further, they also 
find that greater agency conflicts, 
the presence of an independent and 
expert audit committee as well as 
outside block holdings magnify this 
effect.     
The future research may focus on costs, 
benefits, implications, and 
consequences of the PCAOB 
inspection process. 
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2.4.5 Investigation on how inspection reports are used 
Robertson and Houston (2010) conducted an experiment on examining investors’ 
expectations with regard to the improvement in the credibility of future audit opinions 
based on PCAOB inspection reports. Particularly, their study is focused on the 
examination of investor reactions to the negative information documented in the 
PCAOB inspection reports for audit firms. Their findings indicate that investors 
anticipate more or less improvement in the credibility of future audit opinions when the 
PCAOB identified high or low-severity deficiencies, which is consistent with their 
prediction. Regarding the audit firms’ responses concerning the outcomes in the 
PCAOB inspection reports from the PCAOB it turns out the audit firms agreed with the 
outcomes issued by the PCAOB, then investors anticipate more improvement in 
credibility of future audit opinions. Compared to large audit firms small ones anticipate 
more improvement in the credibility of future audit opinions. Therefore they conclude 
that the PCAOB inspections can be considered to be useful when improving the 
credibility of audit opinions in the post-Enron environment under certain conditions.  
 
Carcello et al. (2011) examine the association between the PCAOB inspections and 
audit quality provided by Big 4 firms through measuring changes in auditee abnormal 
accruals. They find that the PCAOB inspection process has led to the improvement of 
audit quality by reducing auditee abnormal accruals. Offermanns and Peek (2011) 
examine whether the PCAOB inspection reports provide a meaningful signal of audit 
quality. They find that a significant relation between the information released in the 
PCAOB inspection reports from January 2005 to March 2010 and the market response. 
In addition, the market response can be readily attributed to the information in the 
PCAOB inspection reports. Finally, they find at least part of the market response to the 
release of the PCAOB inspection reports can be attributed to revisions in visitors’ 
beliefs regarding accounting information quality.          
 
Blankley et al. (2012) conducted a study on evaluating the letters provided by the small 
audit firms (100 or less issuers) to the PCAOB regarding the outcomes in these 
inspection reports. They classified the response letters into three categories, namely 
acknowledgements, disagreements and concurrences. They find that more than half of 
654 responses express support for the PCAOB and suggest inspections will lead to 
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improvements in audit quality. However, there are still a number of audit firms who do 
not respond to the PCAOB, of which a majority of them is found to have no deficiency 
reports or quality control deficiencies. Furthermore, a number of audit firms received an 
audit engagement deficiency disagreed with the PCAOB’s assessment, citing 
differences in professional judgment and /or documentation issues. 
 
From audit partner perspective, Houston and Stefaniak (2013) conduct a survey of 107 
audit partners from large public accounting firms and compare these audit partners’ 
perception of the PCAOB inspections and the Internal Quality Reviews (IQRs) within 
the following four aspects, including predictability, conduct, reviewer qualifications and 
behaviour as well as effects. They find that IQR reviewers have a better understanding 
of firms’ audit methodologies, and IQR is focused more on whether firms follow their 
methodologies, further IQR reviewers examine more audit areas. Both reviews are 
perceived to have an impact on professional reputation. Partners who have less 
experience perceive reviews as more invasive and as posing more consequences 
compared to partners who have more experience. Further, Lambert et al. (2013) 
investigate the influence of audit partner’s disclosure proposed by the PCAOB on 
improving audit quality and auditor independence as well. They find that prospective 
investors are significantly less likely to invest in, or allocate resources to a peer firm 
linked to a contaminated firm in the presence of audit partner disclosure than when 
partner identity is not disclosed. 
 
 
Summary 
Prior research on the usage of the PCAOB inspection reports, presents a variety of ways. 
Robertson and Houston (2010) conclude that the PCAOB inspections can be considered 
to be useful when improving the credibility of audit opinions in the post-Enron 
environment under certain conditions. Further, Offermanns and Peek (2011) believe at 
least part of the market response to the release of the PCAOB inspection reports can be 
attributed to revisions in visitors’ beliefs regarding accounting information quality. 
Recently, Lambert et al. (2013) provide additional evidence through investigating the 
influence of audit partner’s disclosure proposed by the PCAOB on improving audit 
quality and auditor independence. The Table 7 below presents more details on the 
findings of investigation on how inspection reports are used by prior research. 
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Table 7: Findings of prior research on the ues of inspection reports 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Robertson, 
J. & 
Houston, R. 
(2010) 
Examines investors’ 
reactions to the 
deficiency reports to 
audit firms issued by the 
PCAOB. 
A sample consists of 
142 participants, 
including 34 
investment club 
members, 61 M.B.A. 
and E.M.B.A. 
students and 47 civic 
group members. 
A 2×2×2 between-
subjects designed 
experiment is 
conducted to test 
all hypotheses.   
They find that investors anticipate 
more (less) improvement in the 
credibility of future opinions when: 
1) inspections contain high (low) 
severity deficiencies; 2) firms 
respond to the reports with 
concessions (denials); and 3) for 
small (large) firms. Additionally, 
investors’ assessment of the 
credibility of the firm’s response to 
the PCAOB inspection report is 
higher for concessions than denials; 
response credibility fully mediates 
the effect of response type 
(concession or denial) on the 
perceived improvement in the 
credibility of future opinions. 
First, a condensed version of the reports 
is used to complete this experiment. 
Second, the response manipulation 
featured absolute concessions and 
denials are different from the actual 
reports. Finally, the role of the 
inspections in investment is assumed 
based on the fact that the PCAOB does 
not disclose the clients’ name in the 
inspection reports.  
 
Future research may examine how other 
stakeholders in the audit process, such as 
creditors view audit firms after the 
inspection reports released and whether 
there are conditions under which denials 
cause more favourable evaluations than 
concessions. Future research may also 
examine whether the findings in this 
study are sensitive to the disclosure of 
the non-public portion of the inspection 
reports. Future research may help to 
develop audit quality measure, such as 
audit quality indicators to examine 
whether and how these measures might 
affect investors’ assessments of auditor 
credibility using inspection reports.   
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Table 7 continue 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future 
Research 
Offermanns, 
M. & Peek, 
E. (2011)  
Examines whether the 
PCAOB inspection 
reports are considered as 
providing a signal of 
audit quality.  
358 inspection 
reports were gathers, 
including 224 reports 
from the first round 
and 134 reports from 
the second round 
from January 2005 to 
March 2010.  
A quantitative is 
used to test the 
hypotheses.  
 
They find a significant market response to 
the information contained in the PCAOB 
inspection reports. They also find that at 
least part of the market response to the 
publication of PCAOB inspection reports 
can be attributed to revisions in investors’ 
beliefs about accounting information 
quality.      
Future research may investigate 
which components of the inspection 
report are particularly useful to 
investors.       
Carcello, J. 
Hollingswor
th, C & 
Mastrolia, 
S. (2011)  
Investigates whether the 
PCAOB inspection 
process results in an 
improvement in the 
quality of audits 
provided by Big 4 audit 
firms. To measure audit 
quality the authors 
examine changes in 
auditee abnormal 
accruals after the 
PCAOB inspections.    
1573 companies 
audited by Big 4, 
were collected 
between 2004 and 
2006. Abnormal 
accruals for 4719 
auditee-years were 
obtained as the final 
sample.   
 
 Ball and 
Shivakumar 
(2006) absolute 
value of 
performance-
adjusted 
discretionary 
accruals model is 
applied to test all 
hypotheses. 
  
They find a significant decline of abnormal 
accruals in both the year after the first 
PCAOB inspection the year after the 
second PCAOB inspection. These results 
are normally stronger for auditees that 
reported positive abnormal accruals before 
the initial PCAOB inspection. Their results 
provide preliminary evidence that the 
PCAOB inspection process has led to 
improve audit quality based on measuring 
a decline of auditee earnings management.  
 
This study has the following 
limitations. First, it is unable to 
judge the improvement of audit 
quality due to the PCAOB 
inspection process because of lack 
of a control sample. Second, there 
is no evidence showing that 
whether the benefits exceed costs 
associated with the inspection 
process. Third, to measure audit 
quality abnormal accruals are not 
the only one. Finally, the results 
may be biased.   
Blankley, A. 
Kerr, D. & 
Wiggins, C. 
(2012) 
 
This study is focused on 
analysing the effect of 
inspections on the 
accounting firms 
themselves. 
A sample consists of 
1081 response letters.   
Review the 
response letters 
and make a 
comparison 
through an 
analysis of the 
content of the 
response letters    
They find that a majority of firms 
supporting the PCAOB’s objective of 
improving audit quality and believe the 
inspection process will lead to higher 
Audit quality. However, they are still a 
number of firms do not agree with the 
PCAOB in the following aspects, such as 
the PCAOB’s evaluation, citing references 
in professional judgment and/ or 
documentation issues 
 
59 
 
Table 7 continue 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and 
data 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Houston, R. 
& Stefaniak, 
C. (2013) 
 
This study intends to 
examine and compare 
partner perception of 
PCAOB’s inspections 
and internal quality 
reviews based on the 
following aspects, 
including predictability, 
conduct, reviewer 
qualifications and 
behaviour as well as 
effects.  
107 audit partners 
from large public 
accounting firms 
were selected as a 
sample.   
 
 A quantitative 
research method 
is used to 
analyse the 
survey results. 
They find that IQR reviewers have a better 
understanding of firms’ audit 
methodologies, and IQR is focused more 
on whether firms follow their 
methodologies, further IQR reviewers 
examine more audit areas. While PCAOB 
inspectors are more focused on finding 
deficiencies compared to IQR reviewers, 
and IQR feedback is more timely and 
helpful for the improvement of audit 
quality. Both reviews are perceived to 
have an impact on professional reputation. 
Moreover, partners consider the PCAOB 
inspections to increase their firms’ 
litigation risk more than IQR does. Lastly, 
partners who have less experience perceive 
reviews as more invasive and as posing 
more consequences compared to partners 
who have more experience. 
Lambert, T. 
Luippold, B 
& Stefaniak, 
C. (2013) 
 
This research focuses on 
examining the 
association between 
investors’ reactions and 
audit partner disclosure    
380 individuals 
with investment 
experience were 
selected as 
participants in this 
study 
An incomplete 
2×2 between –
participants 
design was 
developed and a 
logistic 
regression 
model combined 
to test 
hypotheses 
They find that prospective investors are 
significantly less likely to invest in, or 
allocate resources to a peer firm linked to a 
contaminated firm in the presence of audit 
partner disclosure than when partner 
identity is not disclosed. 
Future research could expand by 
weighing the potential benefits of such 
disclosure and the potential costs that 
have proposed in this study.  Further, 
future study could investigate other 
psychological mechanism that may 
drive the effect, and further explore 
judgment and decision making 
differences among investor groups 
having work related experience with 
financial information or not.     
 
60 
 
2.4.6 Small audit firm inspection 
Hermanson et al. (2007) reviewed small firm inspection reports issued by the PCAOB 
to 316 firms through July 2006, and find that firms with audit deficiencies are smaller, 
for instance these smaller firms have fewer partners and staff, have a larger number of 
issuer clients, and are growing more rapidly than firms without deficiencies. Hermanson 
and Houston (2008) investigate 56 quality control defects disclosed in the PCAOB 
inspection reports related to 20 smaller audit firms. The finding indicates that these 
defects are considered to link audit performance issues and focused on technical 
competence, due care, and professional scepticism, concurring partner review and 
auditor communications with the audit committee. Later, Hermanson and Houston 
(2009) further examine the second-time inspections of small audit firms. They find that 
audit deficiencies declined from 60 percent cited in the first round to less than 5 percent 
cited in the second round. 
 
Hermanson et al. (2010) examine the relation between accounting restatements and the 
inspection reports issued to small audit firms through September 2009. Their findings 
show that the accounting issues identified in this study are involved to mergers, 
acquisitions, consolidation, or equity method; equity transactions; and convertible debt. 
Landis et al. (2011) also investigate PCAOB triennially firms’ inspection reports from 
2005 to 2008 and find that audit deficiencies declined following the time and the most 
commonly cited accounts include revenues and assets, and the most frequently cited 
transactions are associated with business combinations and equity. The most common 
audit deficiencies are related to insufficient testing and documentation.    
 
Daugherty and Tervo (2010) investigate whether the performance of audits in SOX era 
may fail to attain the stated objective of improving investor confidence in the capital 
markets. Smaller audit firms disagree the PCAOB inspection process increases overall 
audit quality and both smaller and medium firms having between 11 to 40 professionals, 
do not consider PCAOB inspections as positively impacting their audit practices. 
Daugherty et al. (2011) find that deficiency reports are related to triennially inspected 
auditors who are reluctant to resign while companies dismiss triennially inspected 
auditors are more likely to hire triennially inspected auditors without deficiency reports. 
According to them this result indicates that PCAOB inspections may cost triennially 
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inspected auditors vastly. Alternatively, there is also a relationship between the audit 
inspection reports and the voluntary resigning and ceasing to be registered with PCAOB.  
 
DeFond and Lennox (2011) investigate small auditors with 100 or less clients registered 
with the SEC following the passage of SOX. They find that the new auditors are more 
likely to issue going concern audit opinions than the exiting auditors. They conclude 
that the PCAOB intends to improve audit quality through the remediation of poor audit 
practices. Gramling et al. (2011) suggest that firms with PCAOB deficiencies were 
more likely to issue a going concern opinion for financially distressed clients 
subsequent to their PCAOB inspection than prior to their inspection. But, for firms 
without having PCAOB deficiencies their results do not provide enough evidence to 
find the likelihood of changing the issuance of going concern opinion even audit firms 
are conservative than before.  
 
 
Summary 
Prior study on the examination of small audit firms’ inspections has mainly focused on 
the association between small audit firms’ attributes and audit deficiencies. In particular, 
Hermanson et al. (2007) reviewed small firm inspection reports through July 2006, and 
find that firms with audit deficiencies are smaller firms having fewer partners and staff.  
Hermanson and Houston (2008) find a relation between 56 quality control defects and 
20 smaller audit firms.  
 
Form another perspective, prior studies by Daugherty and Tervo (2010) and Daugherty 
et al. (2011) investigate the association between the PCAOB inspection reports issued to 
small audit firms and the perceived signal of audit quality. Particularly, DeFond and 
Lennox (2011) examine small auditors and the audit quality between the PCAOB 
inspections and the peer reviews. The Table 8 below presents more details on the 
findings of small audit firm inspections by prior research. 
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Table 8: Past study findings of small audit firm inspections 
Author(s) 
 Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future          
Research 
Hermanson, D. 
Houston, R. & 
Rice, J. (2007) 
 
Investigates 316 
PCAOB inspection 
reports issued to 
smaller CPA firms 
through 2006 
 
316 PCAOB inspection 
reports through July 13, 
2006. 
 
A quantitative 
research is used to 
analyse these 
PCAOB inspection 
reports.  
 
They find that 60 percent of the inspected firms 
have audit deficiencies and 72 percent had audit 
quality defects. Firms having audit deficiencies 
are smaller, have numerous issuers and are 
growing more rapidly compared to firms 
without audit deficiencies. They also find more 
audit deficiencies conducted in 2004 compared 
to 2005. In addition, the evidence shows that 
clients from the firms having audit deficiencies 
are smaller, less profitable and more leverage.  
 
Hermanson, D 
& Houston, R. 
(2008) 
 
Provides a detailed 
analysis of quality 
control defects on 
small audit firms 
released by the 
PCAOB  
 
56 quality control defects 
in 20 smaller audit firms 
disclosed by the PCAOB 
from February 11, 2005 o 
May 11, 2006. 
A quantitative 
research method is 
used to analyse 
quality control 
defects and compare 
differences between 
disclosed and non-
disclosed firms.  
 
They find that issues rose from the following 
areas, such as audit performance issues, 
particularly in technical competence, due care, 
and professional scepticism, concurring partner 
review and auditor communication, and 
independence issues are the major causes 
resulting in quality control defects. Further, 
smallest audit firms are lack of staff and more 
likely to struggle to adequately address quality 
control defect. 
 
Hermanson, D 
& Houston, R. 
(2009) 
 
Examines PCAOB 
inspections reports 
issued to small audit 
firms in the second 
round and determine 
whether small audit 
firms have made 
improvements in their 
process. 
 
116 firms inspected twice 
and 474 audit firms not 
yet inspected twice  based 
on the inspection reports 
released before or after 
9/24/07 (the first date of 
the second round PCAOB 
inspections. 
A quantitative 
research method is 
applied 
The finding shows that the second PCAOB 
inspections to small audit firms are improved. 
For instance, Within these 161 audit firms only 
4 (3%) had audit deficiencies compared to 60% 
audit deficiencies in the first round. Regarding 
quality control defects it was 28% in the second 
round compared to 72% in the first round. 
Regarding those 474 audit firms the audit 
deficiencies were around 50% before or after 
9/24/07 the first date of the second inspection 
release, and over 70% had quality control 
defects in before or after 9/24/07.     
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Table 8 continue 
 
Author(s) 
Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future 
Research 
Hermanson, D. 
Houston, R. & 
Ye, Z. (2010) 
 
The study examines 
the relation between 
accounting 
restatements and 
inspection reports 
issued to small audit 
firms through 
September 2009. 
 
51 small firm inspection 
reports were collected. 
These reports are 
associated with client 
statements or adjustments 
to record amounts or 
disclosures.    
 
Reviewing the 
inspection reports. 
Their findings show that the accounting issues 
identified in this study are involved to mergers, 
acquisitions, consolidation, or equity method; 
equity transactions; and convertible debt. 
 
 
Landis, M. 
Jerris, S & 
Braswell, M. 
(2011) 
 
This study Presents a 
descriptive analysis 
of the accounts and 
transactions 
documented in the 
PCAOB inspection 
reports for small 
audit firms. 
770 PCAOB inspection 
reports for small audit 
firms issued from 2005 to 
2008. 339 inspection 
reports had audit 
deficiencies. 
They code each 
deficiency from 339 
inspection reports 
based on two criteria, 
such as the area of 
the deficiency and 
the type of audit 
failure. 
The overall trend of deficiencies reported on 
small audit firms is declined due to the facts that 
either the PCAOB inspections improved audit 
quality or a change of the attitude toward 
inspections by the PCAOB. Further, revenue is 
the most frequently cited in the inspection 
reports, and assets are responsible for most 
account deficiencies. Moreover, most departures 
from GAAP appear in liability accounts and 
transactions. Specifically, equity-related 
transactions are considered as the major source of 
transaction deficiencies while inadequate tests of 
third party auditors are the major source of audit 
procedure deficiencies. Finally, inadequate audit 
testing or the documentation of those tests is 
attributed to the majority of deficiencies cited in 
the inspection reports.   
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Table 8 continue 
 
Author(s) 
        Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future   
Research 
Daugherty, 
B. & 
Tervo, W. 
(2010) 
Investigate whether 
the performance of 
audits may achieve 
of the objective of 
enhancing investor 
confidence in the 
capital market.   
A survey was 
mailed to 461 
triennial firms and 
146 were returned.   
 
A survey and a 
quantitative 
research method 
are combined 
 
 
The efficiency of PCAOB inspections may be 
enhanced by focusing on potential unintended 
consequences and inspection process 
modifications instead of focusing on inspectors’ 
qualifications and actions.   
 
 
Future study may investigate 
the PCAOB inspections and 
their influence on recruiting 
and retention of audit 
professionals. Moreover, it 
may be useful to analyse 
changes in perception of 
PCAOB’s inspections’ 
outcomes and the process 
itself and second and third 
inspection reports. 
Daugherty, 
B. Dickins, 
D. & 
Tervo, W. 
(2011) 
 
 
Examine triennially 
inspected auditors’ 
involuntary and 
voluntary client 
losses after 
receiving deficiency 
reports. 
748 inspection 
reports were 
gathered, including 
147 second round 
inspections. 
A quantitative 
research method 
is applied. 
They find that deficiency reports are associated 
with triennially inspected auditors being 
involuntarily dismissed by their clients, and 
companies dismissing triennially inspected 
auditors are more likely to hire triennially 
inspected auditors without deficiency reports. 
Further, they find that deficiency reports are 
associated with triennially inspected auditors 
voluntarily resigning from their publicly traded 
clients, and ceasing to be registered with the 
PCAOB 
Future study may examine the 
influence that second round 
and later inspection reports on 
small audit firms’ clients or 
the impact of the change of 
deficiency report received by 
small auditors and the relation 
between deficiency severity 
and outcome measures. In 
addition, it may be also useful 
to consider whether negative 
outcomes associated with peer 
review reports regarding 
audits of privately held clients 
are associated with losses of 
publicly traded clients. 
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Table 8 continue 
 
 
Author(s) 
     Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
DeFond, 
M. & 
Lennox, C. 
(2011) 
This study is 
intended to examine 
whether the market 
structure change 
that a number of 
small auditors exit, 
has an impact on 
audit quality.   
1,233 small audit 
firms were 
collected. 607 small 
audit firms exited 
the market.   
 
 
A quantitative 
research method 
is applied to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
They find that the exiting audit firms are more 
likely to receive unfavourable peer review or 
inspection reports, have a greater likelihood of 
avoiding peer reviews and inspections.  
 
 
 
 
Gramling, 
A. 
Krishnan, 
J. & 
Zhang , 
Y.(2011) 
 
They investigate if 
there is an 
association between 
the PCAOB 
deficiency reports 
and the change of 
small audit firms’ 
going concern 
decision on 
financially 
distressed clients. 
A final sample 
consists of 202 
audit firms and 
1,648 client-year 
observations.  
 
A logistic 
regression 
model is 
developed to 
test hypotheses 
in this study.  
 
 
The result indicates that firms with PCAOB 
deficiencies were more likely to issue a going 
concern opinion for financially distressed 
clients subsequent to their PCAOB inspection 
than prior to their inspection. While other 
audit firms without having deficiency reports 
this study only provides limited evidence of a 
change in the likelihood of issuing a going 
concern opinion 
This study has some limitations. First, the 
numbers of audit firms available in the 
year of 2004, 2005 and 2006 are varied 
resulting in low statistical power of the 
tests for the year of 2004 and 2006. 
Second, there may have some factors that 
have an influence on going concern 
reporting behaviour, are missing. 
 Further study may examine deeply the 
change in going concern reporting 
decisions by either increasing willingness 
following a PCAOB inspection of the audit 
firm or increasing the level of competence 
brought to the reporting decisions. Second, 
it is helpful to examine whether the impact 
of the PCAOB inspection process is 
diminishing over time or encourage audit 
firms to improve audit quality. Finally, it is 
useful to investigate the way the PCAOB 
inspection process influences audit 
behaviour and audit performance.         
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2.4.7 Large audit firm inspection  
Carcello et al. (2011) conducted a study on Big 4 audit firms considered as differently 
from the small audit firms based on the following aspects, including the size of issuers, 
the frequency of inspections and the different duration of field work. The PCAOB 
inspects big audit firms with more than 100 issuers annually while inspects small audit 
firms with 100 or less issuers triennially. The average duration of the field work for big 
audit firms is 5.06 months compared to 5.71 days, on average to small audit firms 
(Lennox and Pittman 2010). They find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals in 
the year following the first PCAOB inspection, and further reduction in abnormal 
accruals in the year following the second PCAOB inspection. Specifically, in the first 
year following the PCAOB inspections the client firms experienced a reduction in 
abnormal accruals compared to the positive abnormal accruals in the pre-inspection 
period, however they did not this relationship between a reduction in abnormal accruals 
and the negative abnormal accruals within the same period as above. In the second year 
following the PCAOB inspections abnormal accruals were found both in positive and 
negative in the pre-period. Finally, they conclude that their results are normally 
considered as having a stronger relationship between a reduction and client firms 
reported positive abnormal accruals before the initial PCAOB inspection. 
 
Dee et al. (2011) examine the stock market effects of news of the PCAOB sanctions 
imposed on Deloitte and Touche, LLP (Deloitte) on December 10, 2007 for actions 
related to its 2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals Incorporated (Ligand). They find 
that the negative market effects observed in their study are most likely the result of the 
news of the control weaknesses at Deloitte instead of events specific to the Ligand audit. 
Further, a study conducted by Church and Shefchik (2012) provides a detailed analysis 
of the PCAOB’s inspection reports issued to large audit firms. They find that there is a 
significant downward linear trend between the total number of audit deficiencies and the 
investigation time from 2004 to 2009. Furthermore, 77 percent of the misstatement 
audit deficiencies involve a common and recurring deficiency. With Regard to the 
financial statement accounts they most often impacted by audit deficiencies. They also 
find that regarding the responses to the PCAOB’s assessments Big 4 audit firms have 
more disagreements than second-tier firms. Finally, they conclude that every large audit 
firm has criticisms of quality control in every inspection year.  
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Summary 
Prior research on big audit firms and the PCAOB inspections is focused on the 
examination of audit quality and the inspection results (Carcello et al. 2011; Lennox and 
Pittman 2010). Moreover, Dee et al. (2011) examine the stock market effects of news of 
the PCAOB sanctions imposed on Deloitte and Touche on December 10, 2007 for 
actions related to its 2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals Incorporated (Ligand). 
Further, a study conducted by Church and Shefchik (2012) provides a detailed analysis 
of the PCAOB’s inspection reports issued to large audit firms.  
 
2.4.8 Audit enforcement 
Gilbertson and Herron (2009) examine the PCAOB enforcement actions issued through 
2008. They find that firms with issues rising to the level of disciplinary action normally 
have longer inspections and more audit deficiencies compared to firms with inspection 
deficiencies not resulting in sanctions. Moreover, disciplined firms also tend to have 
fewer partners, audit more SEC issuers as well as having clients that are smaller and 
less financially sound. Messier et al. (2010) explore the association between 
enforcement actions and engagement quality review. They find that only 8 cases 
involved the Big4/5 public accounting firms out of 28 cases obtained sanctions against 
engagement quality review since 1993. All of these 28 cases involved sanctions because 
of the violations of GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP violations. Further, 23 cases 
were identified as GAAS violations associated with lack of due professional care. Lack 
of professional scepticism in 22 cases was identified in the analysis of those cases 
regarding engagement quality review, and over-relied on management representations in 
20 cases as well as ignored materiality concerns in 5 cases.  
 
Dee et al. (2011) investigate the stock market effects of news of the PCAOB sanctions 
imposed on Deloitte and Touche, LLP (Deloitte) on December 10, 2007 for actions 
related to its 2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals Incorporated (Ligand). They find 
that Deloitte clients had no reaction to other events specifically related to the Ligand 
audit failure prior to the sanctions. Further, they find that Deloitte clients have a 
significantly negative market reaction to news of the PCAOB sanctions over one-and 
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three-day event windows; reaction over the two-day window is negative but not 
significant. Finally, they find that there is a negative reaction to news of the PCAOB 
sanctions against Deloitte for firms that are financially distressed.  
 
Summary 
Gilbertson and Herron (2009) examine the PCAOB enforcement actions issued through 
2008 in prior study. They claim they find a relation between issues rising to the level of 
disciplinary action and longer inspections and more audit deficiencies among firms with 
inspection deficiencies. Alternatively, Messier et al. (2010) investigate the association 
between enforcement actions and engagement quality review. Meanwhile, Dee et al. 
(2011) investigate the stock market effects of news of the PCAOB sanctions imposed on 
Deloitte and Touche. The Table 9 below presents more details on the findings of audit 
enforcement by prior research. 
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Table 9: Previous findings on audit enforcement 
 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective     Sample  and data                       Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future  
           Research   
Gilbertson, 
D. & 
Herron, T. 
(2009) 
 
Examines characteristics of 
the disciplined firms, their 
PCAOB inspections, the 
related issuer clients as well 
as the circumstances that 
resulted in the disciplinary 
proceedings 
20 enforcements were 
gathered through 2008 
related to 17 cases 
disciplining 13 
triennially inspected 
firms, 1 annually 
inspected firm and 23 
individuals. The 
enforcement actions are 
related to 31 issuers.  
The analysis is based on 
the reviewing of all 
enforcements and an 
application of 
descriptive statistics.   
They find that firms with 
issues rising to the level of 
disciplinary action normally 
have longer inspections and 
more audit deficiencies than 
firms with inspection 
deficiencies not resulting in 
sanctions. Moreover, 
disciplined firms also tend 
to have fewer partners, audit 
more SEC issuers and have 
clients that are smaller and 
less financially sound.  
This study has some limitations. 1) 
their descriptive statistics have not 
been subjected to comparative 
statistical tests. 2) the finding may be 
biased.3) the delay of inspection 
reports and enforcement proceeding 
raise issues  
Future study may investigate the 
types of deficiencies that result in 
enforcement actions. Additionally, it 
is useful to examine whether the 
disciplined firms/individuals have 
retained licenses to practice even if 
their ability to audit public clients has 
been removed.  
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Table 9 continue  
Author(s)                   
 Year 
Objective  Sample  and data                       Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
 Limitations and future Research   
Messier, W. 
Kozloski, T. 
& Kozloski, 
N. (2010) 
Analyses the 
causes of 
enforcement 
actions against 
engagement 
quality 
reviewers (audit 
partners) and to 
understand what 
led to failures in 
the engagement 
quality review 
process. 
28 cases of sanctions 
against engagement 
quality review were 
gathered through 
different channels 
from 1993 to 2008. 
The combination of 
coding data and 
application of using 
descriptive statistics. 
They find that only 8 cases involved the 
Big4/5 public accounting firms out of 28 cases 
obtained sanctions against engagement quality 
review since 1993. All of these 28 cases 
involved sanctions because of the violations of 
GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP 
violations. Further, 23 cases were identified as 
GAAS violations associated with lack of due 
professional care. Lack of professional 
scepticism in 22 cases was identified in the 
analysis of those cases regarding engagement 
quality review, and over-relied on 
management representations in 20 cases as 
well as ignored materiality concerns in 5 
cases. Finally, about half of 28 cases resulted 
in the engagement quality review being denied 
the privilege of practicing before the SEC or 
PCAOB for three or more years.    
 
Limitations included in this study are as 
follows; 1) the sample of engagement 
quality review may not be 
representative. 2) there is lack of 
detailed description of the engagement 
quality review’s actions and the actions 
reported might be biased. 
 
The future investigation may cover the 
following aspects, including SEC and 
PCAOB selection and sanctioning 
process, AS7 guidance and due 
professional care.  
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Table 9 continue 
    Author(s)                   
     Year 
       Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future  Research   
Dee, C. 
Lulseged, A. & 
Zhang, T. 
(2011) 
 
 
 
Examines the 
client stock 
market reaction 
on the sanction 
imposed on a Big 
4 auditor issued 
by the PCAOB.   
The final sample 
contains 707 Deloitte 
and 2,363 non-
Deloitte clients.   
  Schipper and 
Thompson 1983 
regression, Sefcik and 
Thompson 1986 and 
a portfolio time –
series regressions are 
used in this study. 
They find that Deloitte clients had 
no reaction to other events 
specifically related to the Ligand 
audit failure prior to the sanctions. 
Further, they find that Deloitte 
clients have a significantly 
negative market reaction to news 
of the PCAOB sanctions over one-
and three-day event windows; 
reaction over the two-day window 
is negative but not significant. 
Finally, they find that there is a 
negative reaction to news of the 
PCAOB sanctions against Deloitte 
for firms that are financially 
distressed. 
 
 
 
72 
 
2.4.9 PCAOB international inspection 
Under Section 106 of SOX, international audit firms are subject to the rules of the 
PCAOB, including rules which are related to audit firm inspections. The PCAOB began 
its inspections on international audit firms in 2005 and has released over 230 inspection 
reports as of February 4, 2012 (Bishop et al. 2013). A working paper by Carcello et al. 
(2011) indicates that the importance that investors place on PCAOB inspections of 
international audit firms. They find a significant negative stock market reaction with 
regard to the PCAOB’s initial release in August 2009 of foreign auditors who had not 
been inspected by the PCAOB due to the foreign governments’ prohibition. However, 
they find a significant positive market reaction to the PCAOB’s January 2011 release 
registered U.K.-audit firms that are now allowed to be inspected by the PCAOB.  
 
The authors examine the PCAOB inspections of international audit firms through 
analysing 175 first-time and 56 second-time inspection reports issued through February 
4, 2012. They find that just over half of the inspection reports identify audit deficiencies, 
and two-thirds document quality control defects. Meanwhile they also find that firms 
having deficiencies are smaller while have more issuer clients than firms without 
deficiencies. Affiliates of Big 4 firms are less likely to have deficiencies than are other 
firms. Regarding the rate of audit deficiencies or quality control defects they did not 
find a significant association on whether the PCAOB acts alone or cooperates with a 
local regulator in conducting the inspection, or based on the home country’s legal 
tradition. Additionally, they find that the deficiencies are most associated with 
substantive testing and the failure to perform sufficient audit procedures.  
 
Bishop et al. (2013) conduct a study based on 175 first-time and 56 second-time 
international audit firm inspection reports through February 4, 2012. They find that just 
over half of the inspection reports had audit deficiencies, and two-thirds cite quality 
control defects. Further, firms with deficiencies are smaller, but have more issuer clients 
than no-deficiency firms. Affiliates of Big 4 firms are less likely to have deficiencies 
than are other firms. Audit deficiencies are most often related to substantive testing and 
the failure to perform sufficient audit procedures. These deficiencies are also common 
related to the balance sheet. With regard to the individual account revenue is considered 
to be the mostly cited. Compared to the prior research on the US firms, the findings of 
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the international inspection indicate that there is no difference regarding the rate of audit 
deficiencies or quality control defects for first-time versus second-time inspections.  
 
Song (2012) also investigates the PCAOB inspections on international audit firms. First, 
the findings indicate that there is a significant association between PCAOB inspections 
and abnormal accruals, total accruals, value relevance and the likelihood of receiving a 
going concern opinion for complying clients after the initial inspections conducted by 
the PCAOB in 2005. Moreover, the result also shows that both abnormal and total 
accruals are lower and value relevance are greater after the PCAOB began conducting 
inspections for their clients who have foreign auditors. Finally, the finding of the 
likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is higher after the PCAOB’s initial 
inspections, however, this finding is only observed to the extreme distress quartile 
sample. Second, regarding the jurisdictions the finding is consistent with the statement 
that there is a significant effect of PCAOB inspections in jurisdictions where the 
PCAOB has conducted joint inspections. Third, the result of a significant PCAOB 
inspection effect is only existed in common law countries. Fourth, there is also a 
significant PCAOB inspection effect only existed among Big 4 clients.  
 
 
Summary 
Prior study conducted by Carcello et al. (2011) focuses on examining the association 
between stock market reaction and the PCAOB inspections on international audit firms. 
Song (2012) investigates the PCAOB inspections on international audit firms and 
concludes that there was a PCAOB inspection effect on abnormal accruals, total 
accruals, and value relevance for clients of foreign audit firms, however this was mainly 
for clients of foreign audit firms in common law countries and Big 4 clients. 
Furthermore, Bishop et al. (2013) find that just over half of the inspection reports had 
audit deficiencies, and two-thirds cite quality control defects. The Table 10 below 
presents more details on the findings of the PCAOB international inspection in prior 
research. 
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Table 10: Past study on PCAOB international inspections 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       Methods           Key findings                                Limitations and future Research   
Carcello, J. 
Carver, B. & 
Neal, T. (2011) 
 
 
 
Examines the 
potential costs to 
investors of the 
PCAOB’s 
inability to 
conduct 
inspections of 
foreign audit 
firms.  
 
 
324 registrants 
audited by a firm 
located in a country 
that denied the 
Board the ability to 
conduct inspections 
A cumulative 
abnormal stock 
market return 
model drawn from 
Chaney and 
Philipich (2002) 
and Nelson et al. 
(2008) combines 
with a cumulative 
mean abnormal 
return regression 
model to test 
hypotheses 
They find that the market reacts 
negatively to the disclosure of 
the name of auditors and 
registrants that are not 
inspected, and that the market 
reacts positively to news that a 
foreign jurisdiction that 
previously denied the board 
inspection authority has reached 
an agreement to permit future 
inspections.  
 
Limitations included in this study are; 
1) their sample sizes are not large; 2) 
their results are dependent on the 
assumption that auditors located in 
other countries could be used as a 
control group; 3) this is the first paper 
focused on foreign auditors.   
 
 
Bishop, C. 
Hermanson, D 
& Houston, R. 
(2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is 
focused on the 
PCAOB’s 
inspections of 
international 
audit firms  
 
 
 
175 first-time and 
56 second-time 
inspection reports 
for international 
audit firms issued 
through February 4, 
2012. 
 
 
 
An analysis is 
conducted through 
reviewing the 
PCAOB inspection 
reports 
 
 
 
They find that just over half of 
the inspection reports had audit 
deficiencies, and two-thirds cite 
quality control defects. Further, 
firms with deficiencies are 
smaller, but have more issuer 
clients than no-deficiency firms, 
which are reflected by 
overtaking issuers in audit 
market. They further find no 
significant differences regarding 
the rate of audit deficiencies or 
quality control defects based on 
the fact that either the PCAOB 
acted alone or cooperated with a 
local regulator when conducting 
inspections or home country’s 
legal tradition.  
This study points out some future 
research areas, such as the association 
between larger samples of inspection 
reports and the consequence of 
negative inspection reports for 
international firms, international audit 
firm leaders’ perceptions of inspection 
process as well as the different 
inspection outcomes based on PCAOB 
cooperation status and the country 
legal tradition.   
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Table 10 continue  
 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective    Sample  and data                         Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Song, H. 
(2012) 
 
 
 
The author 
intends to 
examine the 
association 
between the 
PCAOB 
international 
inspection and 
audit quality. 
A final sample consists 
of 402 audit firms. 
  Different 
regression 
models are 
applied to test 
hypotheses in 
this study. 
 
 
 
 
The author finds a significant 
PCAOB inspection effect on 
abnormal accruals, total 
accruals, value relevance for 
clients of foreign audit firms, 
but this was mainly for 
clients of foreign audit firms 
in common law countries 
and Big 4 clients.   
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2.4.10 PCAOB auditing standards  
Prior to SOX, standards of regulating internal control are limited. The only statutory 
regulation of internal control over all SEC registrants was the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA) of 1977, and the only required public disclosure of significant internal 
control deficiencies for all SEC firms was in the firm’s 8-K, when disclosing a change 
in auditors (SEC 1988; Geiger and Taylor 2003; Krishnan 2005). Both Section 302 and 
404 define the effectiveness of internal control as similar as prior one which was 
developed in 1992 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the 
Treadway Commission. The SEC defines internal control as “a process affected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting.” Specifically, 
Section 302 of SOX requires firms to disclose material weakness in their controls, 
furthermore company executives are required to certify in the periodic reports. Section 
404 of SOX managers are required to provide an annual report on their internal controls, 
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures.   
 
Section 103 of SOX requires audit work paper retention for a minimum of 7 years. 
Further, Section 404 (b) requires the auditors attest to management’s assessment of its 
internal controls. Therefore, in 2004, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard 2 (AS2), An 
Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an 
Audit of Financial Statement to address the new audit requirements contained in Section 
103 and Section 404 (b) of SOX. AS2 provides guidance to auditors on how to conduct 
internal control over financial reporting audits (PCAOB 2004). The substantial increase 
in audit fees following the adoption of the PCAOB AS2 caused strong complaints to the 
SEC and PCAOB by public firms regarding the high audit fees (Johnson 2005).  
 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) examine the influence of internal control disclosures 
under Section 404 on audit fees. They find that audit fees in 2004 are much higher than 
the audit fees in 2003. Further, audit fees for fiscal year 2004 are 43 percent higher 
firms who disclosed their material weaknesses than firms who did not disclose. Finally, 
they find that the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures does 
not change based on the type of material weakness. Meanwhile, Tackett et al. (2006) 
conduct a similar research as Raghunandan and Rama (2006), and they find that Section 
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404 of SOX is significantly flawed because of the enormous expenditure of time and 
money spending on preparing documentations, evaluations and attestations of internal 
control over financial reporting. Further, audit failures resulting from applying generally 
accepted auditing standards correctly may come from the areas, such as inattentiveness, 
complacency, or lack of focus instead of weakly designed internal control over financial 
reporting or the failure of the auditor to attest to internal control over financial reporting. 
Finally, the amendment of Section 404 is needed in future.        
 
Hoitash et al. (2008) extend prior research on audit risk adjustment by investigating the 
association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting 
disclosed under Section302 and 404 of SOX. They find that audit fees increased during 
the 404 period, and the result also shows that less relative risk adjustment occurred 
under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Additionally, they find that 
companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay 
higher fee the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. 
Consistent with Johnson (2005) the research by Jiang and Wu (2009) also conclude that 
auditors intended to charge higher audit fees because of the audit work added through 
adopting AS2, and companies had to allocate more resources in order to meet the new 
requirements contained in AS2 as well. Consequently, numerous publicly traded 
companies have concerned about the increased financial and staffing burdens resulting 
in the adoption of the new auditing regulation. As a result some companies have either 
gone private or moved to securities markets in other countries.  
 
Doogar et al. (2010) investigate the impact of AS5 on audit fees. They find that AS5 
audit fees are associated with auditee fraud risk while they fail to find this association 
between AS2 audit fees and auditee fraud risk. Compared to AS2 benchmarks AS5 
audit fees are averagely lower for all auditees. Moreover, compared to AS2 benchmarks 
AS5 fees are lower for auditees who have lower fraud risk , however, AS5 fees are 
greater for higher-fraud –risk auditees. Finally, they conclude that AS5 replaced AS2 
based on the fact that AS2 is considered as overregulation, and auditors intend to apply 
a risk-based approach in order to improve both efficiency and potential effectiveness 
through the perspective auditing. 
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Munsif et al. (2011) examine audit fees for the first four years of Section 404 reporting. 
They find that firms remediating material weaknesses in internal controls benefit in the 
form of lower audit fees compared to firms that did not remediate. But, the benefits are 
partial due to the fact that even after remediation the firms continue to pay an audit fee 
premium when compared to firms that had clean Section 404 reports throughout the first 
four years. Specifically, they find that firms first had an adverse Section 404 report then 
had clean Section 404 reports in the following three years. These firms paid audit fee 
premium of 35, 32 and 21 percent in the following three years respectively. Meanwhile, 
Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) investigate the association between audit fees paid to 
public accounting firms and the remediation of Section 404 material weaknesses in a 
four-year period. They find that audit fees decline for firms that remediate a material 
weakness. However, they did not find that the corresponding fee reduces simultaneously. 
Moreover, they also find that audit fees are 19 percent higher three years after the initial 
remediation when compared to companies that never report an adverse 404 opinion.  
 
Considered the higher auditing cost adopting AS2 and the intention of maintaining the 
benefit from internal control audits the PCAOB proposed Auditing Standard 5 (AS5), 
An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit 
of Financial Statement, in 2007. The purpose of adopting AS5 is to replace AS2 in 
order to mitigate audit cost while still maintaining the benefit of internal control audits. 
AS5 is aimed to provide guidance to auditors on how to more effectively identify 
internal control weaknesses and meanwhile eliminate costly and unnecessary 
procedures. Prior research by Mock et al. (2009) focuses on examining the 
implementation of AS5 on evaluating internal controls’ effectiveness. Their study is 
applied a risk-based evidential reasoning approach on evaluating he effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting. They find that the fulfilment of SOX Section 
404 requirement of internal control over financial reporting imposes enormous burdens 
on auditors and management as well. During the period of AS2, many companies are 
unable to meet the SEC deadlines by providing appropriate control documentation. 
However, by implementing AS5 the evidence shows that the internal control 
effectiveness could be improved and costs associated with maintaining the internal 
control audits could also be reduced.   
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AS 5 adopts a “top-down, risk-based” approach and allows auditor to use the work of 
others, including management and internal auditors, in audits of internal controls to 
focus on the most important issues and simplify the procedures for intended benefits of 
internal control audit (PCAOB 2007a; SEC 2007). The key differences between AS2 
and AS5 are included: (1) the degree of auditor discretion in identification of material 
weaknesses; (2) the top-down versus bottom-up approach in audit planning; (3) the 
scalability of the audit; (4) the ability to rely on the work of others; and (5) the 
requirement for walkthrough of significant transactions (Jiang and Wu 2009). 
Compared to AS5 that is more principles-based AS2 consists of rule-based auditing 
standards prescribed procedures for internal control audits. Further, AS2 identifies eight 
“strong indicators” of existence of internal control material weakness, namely financial 
report restatement, internal control detection failures, an ineffective audit committee, an 
ineffective internal audit function or risk assessment function, an ineffective compliance 
function for entities in highly regulated industries, senior management fraud, 
uncorrected significant deficiencies, and an ineffective control environment.  
 
However, AS5 encourages auditors to use professional judgment to determine if the 
presence of indicators should be treated as materials weaknesses. Additionally, AS5 
only adopts half of those eight indicators listed in AS2. AS5 adopts a top-down and 
holistic approach that allows auditor to perform risk assessment and identify significant 
accounts and transactions through applying the audit testing from the financial 
statement level (Jiang and Wu 2009). The result of their study shows that the audit fees 
related to AS5 concentrate on a relatively small group of S&P 500 companies. They 
conclude that companies that have had to comply with SOX Section 404 with the 
exception of smaller accelerated filers and companies who have found internal control 
weaknesses experienced an increase in audit fees after the effect of AS5 applied. This 
result is also confirmed by the report from Compliance Week mentioned an increase of 
3.2 percent in audit fees from 2006 to 2007 for S&P 500 companies with revenue over 
$1 billion.                         
 
Regarding the audit fees paid to auditor Krishnan et al. (2011) find that audit fees were 
lower in the first two years of Audit Standard No. 5 implementation as compared with 
the last year of Audit Standard No.2. Further, the authors find the similar results by 
confining the sample to those clients with clear internal control opinions. Consequently, 
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they conclude that the new Audit Standard No. 5 does increase the efficiency in internal 
control. Then, they find that firms who have adverse opinions on internal control pay 
higher fees than those who have clean opinions. However, the premium paid by clients 
who have adverse opinions is smaller under AS5 than under AS2. Finally, they find that 
AS5 did not reduce the fees for the smallest firms compared to the large firms, which is 
the opposite result as the PCAOB’s expectation that the new standard would have 
benefits for smaller audit firms. In addition, they also find that compared to AS2 more 
complex firms would benefit from AS5. Therefore, their results indicate that the 
reduction of audit fee under AS5 is mainly held for complex firms.  
                
Compared to the study conducted by Krishnan et al. (2011) the research investigated by 
Wang and Zhou (2012) explore further the relation between the Auditing Standard No. 
5 (AS5) and audit fees and audit quality. They mainly focus on examining the adoption 
of AS5 and audit quality. They find that the implementation of AS5 does not have an 
influence on audit quality measured by abnormal accruals and the probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts or beating their forecasts by just one penny and the 
probability of issuing internal control material weakness opinions. Consequently, they 
conclude that the adoption of AS5 does not reduce the audit quality. From another 
perspective, prior research by Payne and Ramasay (2008) investigate two 
documentation methods, including summary memos and detailed work papers required 
by AS3 intending to improve audit quality and enhance public confidence. The result 
indicates that auditors who prepare detailed work papers spend more total time on the 
task, and total time is associated with identifying more errors and better pattern 
recognition. Auditors who prepare summary memos examine the evidence items a 
greater number of times, which is associated with better pattern recognition and 
increased memory. To sum up, each method enhances cognitive processing differently 
and the manner of cognitive processing affects performance measures differently.  
 
Agoglia et al. (2009) investigate how alternative work paper review methods affect 
sequential audit review team judgments through their impact on preparing work paper 
documentation. The result indicates that reviewers’ judgments are ultimately affected by 
the form of review expected by their preparers. They conclude that the effect of review 
mode can persist to the reviewer’s judgment through its influence on preparer work 
paper documentation and the resulting documentation quality assessment gap. Later, 
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Piercey (2011) examines the relation between audit effectiveness and the documentation 
requirement contained in AS3 of the PCAOB. The result shows that auditors assessing 
risk in qualitative terms respond to this pressure by rationalizing their lenient 
assessments even more vigilantly. The result becomes more lenient when adding the 
documentation requirement. While it fails to find this association between the adding 
documentation and quantified risk assessments.  
 
Meanwhile, Bronson et al. (2011) examine the influence of implementing both AS3 and 
AS2 on the reliability of earnings information. Their result shows that revisions to 
preliminary announcements when filing the 10-K report would have been 35% lower 
during 2005 if the historical frequency of issuing earnings releases after the audit report 
date had not changed. Furthermore, stock market reaction to impending revisions 
suggests lower reliability of preliminary earnings. Lenard et al. (2009) examine whether 
the additional documentation required by SOX is necessary. The result indicates that 
regarding revenue and assets issues as well as internal control issues additional 
documentation is required while it is not supported for documentation of the other 
issues addressed by the PCAOB inspection reports.  
 
Summary 
Prior research on the issuance of Auditing Standard 2 has discovered that audit fees 
increased enormously after adopting it. As a consequence, Auditing Standard 5 was 
issued to replace Auditing Standard 2. However, Krishnan et al. (2011) claim that Audit 
Standard 5 does increase the efficiency in internal control and did not reduce the fees 
for the smallest firms. In contrast, Wang and Zhou (2012) mainly focus on examining 
the adoption of AS5 and audit quality. They find that the implementation of AS5 does 
not have an influence on audit quality measured by abnormal accruals and the 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts or beating their forecasts. Compared to the 
above prior studies, Payne and Ramasay (2008), Piercey (2011) and Bronson et al. 
(2011) examine Auditing Standard 3 and its influence on audit quality as well. The 
Table 11 below presents more details on the findings of PCAOB auditing standards in 
prior research. 
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Table 11: Findings on prior auditing standards 
 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective    Sample  and data                       Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Raghunandan, 
K. & Rama, 
D. (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper examines 
the association 
between materials 
weakness disclosure 
and audit fees 
associated with this 
disclosure. 
 
A final sample contains 
660 firms that filed 
their Section 404 
reports by May 15, 
2005. 
 
 
 A fee regression 
model is applied.  
They find that audit fees in 
2004 are much higher than 
the audit fees in 2003. 
Further, audit fees for fiscal 
year 2004 are 43 percent 
higher firms who disclosed 
their material weaknesses 
than firms who did not 
disclose. However, in fiscal 
year 2003 they did not find a 
relation between audit fees 
and an internal control 
material weakness 
disclosure. Finally, they find 
that the association between 
audit fees and internal 
control disclosures does not 
change based on the type of 
material weakness. 
Future study may focus on the reaction 
of users to this disclosure, and auditors’ 
reactions depending on the type of 
internal control weakness.  
Tackett, J. 
Wolf, F. & 
Claypool, G 
(2006) 
 
 
 
The authors are 
intended to find out 
that costs and 
benefits associated 
with Section 404 of 
the SOX of 2002 
 A qualitative 
research 
They find that the internal 
control reporting 
requirements have negative 
net benefits to the securities 
markets due to the excessive 
cost and ambiguous 
interpretation.  
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Table 11 continue 
 
    Author(s)                   
         Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
      Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Hoitash, R. 
Hoitash, U. & 
Bedard, J. (2008) 
 
This paper 
examines the 
association audit 
fees and the quality 
of internal control 
over financial 
reporting (ICFR) 
after the SOX of 
2002 
The final sample has 
2,501 accelerated filers 
with complete data 
includes 350 (113) 
companies disclosing 
ICFR problems in 404 
(302) period. 
  An OLS audit fee 
regression model is 
applied. 
They find that audit fees 
increased during the 404 
period, and the result also 
shows that less relative 
risk adjustment occurred 
under Section 404 than 
under Section 302 in the 
prior year. Additionally, 
they find that companies 
disclosing internal control 
problems under Section 
302 continue to pay higher 
fee the following year, 
even if no problems are 
disclosed under Section 
404.    
 
There is a limitation regarding the data 
and methods. Second, tests of 
association do not determine direction 
of causality. 
Jiang, W & Wu, J. 
(2009) 
 
 
The authors 
examine the impact 
of PCAOB auditing 
standard 5 on audit 
fees. 
 
2,328 accelerated filers 
were identified under 
Section 404 (b). 
 
 
A qualitative research 
 
They conclude that 
auditors intended to charge 
higher audit fees because 
of the audit work added 
through adopting AS2, and 
companies had to allocate 
more resources in order to 
meet the new requirements 
contained in AS2 as well. 
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Table 11 continue 
 
    Author(s)                   
         Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Doogar, R. 
Sivadasan, P & 
Solomon, I. 
(2010) 
 
 
The research 
investigates the 
impact of 
auditing 
standard 5 on 
audit fees. 
 
A final sample consists 
of 3,023 observations 
were identified from 
November 15, 2005 to 
June 30, 2008. 
 
  The audit fee 
regression model 
is used in this 
study. 
They find that AS5 audit fees 
are aligned with auditee fraud 
risk, but not AS2 audit fees. 
Second, AS5 audit fees on 
average are lower for all 
auditees compared to AS2. 
Finally, AS5 audit fees are 
lower for low-fraud-risk 
auditees but greater for higher-
fraud-risk auditees.    
This study is subject to some 
limitations, such as proxy for audit 
labour usage is not the best choice. 
Second, the result may be biased due 
to the inability to control for fee 
realization rates.  
Munsif, V. 
Raghunandan, 
K. Rama, D. & 
Singhvi, M. 
(2011) 
 
The study 
examines audit 
fees for firms 
that remediated 
previously 
disclosed 
material 
weaknesses in 
internal control. 
The sample consists of 
1,610 SEC registrants 
with all available data. 
An audit fee 
regression model 
tests hypotheses. 
They find that firms 
remediating material 
weaknesses in internal controls 
benefit in the form of lower 
audit fees compared to firms 
that did not remediate. But, the 
benefits are partial due to the 
fact that even after remediation 
the firms continue to pay an 
audit fee premium when 
compared to firms that had 
clean Section 404 reports 
throughout the first four years. 
Specifically, they find that firms 
first had an adverse Section 404 
report then had clean Section 
404 reports in the following 
three years. 
Future research may cover further 
exploration of Section 404 opinions 
and the remediating firms, and 
remediation and financial statement 
users.   
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Table 11 continue 
 
    Author(s)                   
         Year 
    Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Hoag, M. 
Hollingsworth, 
C. (2011) 
 
The authors are 
intended to examine 
audit fees paid 
associated with 
remediating of Section 
404. 
 
 
A sample of 13,670 
observations. 
Two different 
regression models 
are applied to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that audit fees 
decline for firms that 
remediate a material 
weakness. However, they did 
not find that the corresponding 
fee reduces simultaneously. 
Moreover, they also find that 
audit fees are 19 percent 
higher three years after the 
initial remediation when 
compared to companies that 
never report an adverse 404 
opinion. 
 
Mock, T. Sun, 
L. Srivastava, R. 
& Vasarhelyi, 
M. (2009) 
 
This study develops a 
risk-based evidential 
reasoning approach to 
assess the effectiveness 
of internal control over 
financial reporting.  
   A qualitative 
research with 
developing an 
evidential reasoning 
approach drawn 
from the Dempster-
Shafer (DS) theory. 
By implementing AS5 the 
evidence shows that the 
internal control effectiveness 
could be improved and costs 
associated with maintaining 
the internal control audits 
could also be reduced.   
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Table 11 continue 
 
    Author(s)                   
         Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Krishnan, J. 
Krishnan, J. & 
Song, H. (2011) 
 
They 
investigate the 
impact of the 
change from 
AS2 to AS5 on 
audit fees. 
 The final sample 
consists of 1,563 
companies and 4,689 
firm-years 
An audit fee 
regression model is 
developed to test 
hypotheses 
They find that AS5 did not 
reduce the fees for the smallest 
firms compared to the large 
firms, which is the opposite 
result as the PCAOB’s 
expectation that the new 
standard would have benefits 
for smaller audit firms. In 
addition, they also find that 
compared to AS2 more complex 
firms would benefit from AS5. 
 
Wang, D. & 
Zhou, J. (2012) 
 
 
They 
investigate the 
impact of the 
PCAOB AS5 
on audit fees 
and audit 
quality. 
A sample contains 
4,928 firm-year 
observations with 
2,464 firms for fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007. 
Several regression 
models are developed 
to determine the 
impact of the 
PCAOB AS5 on 
audit fees and audit 
quality.   
They conclude that the adoption 
of AS5 does not reduce the 
audit quality. 
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Table 11 continue 
 
    Author(s)                   
         Year 
Objective                         
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
 Methods                               
 
                Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Payne, E. & 
Ramasay, R. 
(2008) 
 
Examines the 
implication of 
auditors’ use of 
two different 
documentation 
methods. 
 
286 staff and senior 
auditors from three of the 
Big 5 accounting firms 
are the participants in the 
experiment.   
A logistic 
regression 
model 
analyses the 
results from 
the 
experiment. 
The result indicates that auditors who 
prepare detailed work papers spend more 
total time on the task, and total time is 
associated with identifying more errors 
and better pattern recognition. Auditors 
who prepare summary memos examine the 
evidence items a greater number of times, 
which is associated with better pattern 
recognition and increased memory. 
 
Agoglia, C. 
Hatfield, R. & 
Brazel, J. 
(2009) 
 
Investigates the 
effects of audit 
review format 
on review team 
judgments 
60 participating auditors 
from larger international 
public accounting firms 
were selected, including 
30 as preparers and 30 as 
reviewers. 
A few 
regression 
models are 
applied to test 
the results 
from the 
experiment. 
The result shows that reviewers’ 
judgments are ultimately affected by the 
form of review expected by their 
preparers. They conclude that the effect of 
review mode can persist to the reviewer’s 
judgment through its influence on preparer 
work paper documentation and the 
resulting documentation quality 
assessment gap. 
Future study could explore further this 
effect by examining other issues, such 
as documentation completeness and 
clarity. Further, it may be useful to 
examine other modes of review. 
Finally, it is helpful to examine a 
specific review mode that reviewers 
have on their evaluation.   
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Table 11 continue 
 
  Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                    
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Piercey, M 
(2011) 
 
 
Focuses on the 
influence of 
documentation 
requirements on audit 
risk assessments. 
 
 
138 auditors from two 
large public accounting 
firms and 76 senior 
accounting students 
from a highly ranked 
accounting program 
A qualitative 
analysis based on 
the experimental 
results 
The result shows that auditors 
assessing risk in qualitative 
terms respond to this pressure 
by rationalizing their lenient 
assessments even more 
vigilantly. The result becomes 
more lenient when adding the 
documentation requirement. 
Limitations are included as follows; 1) 
this study did not consider all factors 
that may moderate the results; 2) lack of 
instrument to measure planned audit 
work; 3) participate are mixed with 
auditors and students. 
Future study should explore further by 
using individuals without accounting 
knowledge. 
Bronson, S. 
Hogan, C. 
Johnson, M & 
Ramesh, J. 
(2011) 
Investigates the 
impact of PCAOB 
AS2 and AS3 on the 
reliability of earnings 
information 
A final sample consists 
of 16,973 firm-year 
observations. 
Regression 
models are 
developed to 
complete this 
qualitative 
research 
Their result shows that revisions 
to preliminary announcements 
when filing the 10-K report 
would have been 35% lower 
during 2005 if the historical 
frequency of issuing earnings 
releases after the audit report 
date had not changed. 
Furthermore, stock market 
reaction to impending revisions 
suggests lower reliability of 
preliminary earnings.      
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Table 11 continue 
 
  Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Lenard, M.  
Meonske, N. &  
Alam, P. (2009) 
 
 
Expand prior research 
by Tackett et al. 
(2006) by analysing 
results of the PCAOB 
inspection reports.    
PCAOB inspection 
reports were 
downloaded from the 
PCAOB web site for 
February 2006. The 
data reports also called 
Reviews of Audit 
Engagement. 
A qualitative analysis 
based on reviewing 
the PCAOB 
inspection reports and 
coding the seven 
types of remarks 
footnotes. 
The result indicates that regarding 
revenue and assets issues as well 
as internal control issues 
additional documentation is 
required while it is not supported 
for documentation of the other 
issues addressed by the PCAOB 
inspection reports. 
 
Future study could continue to examine 
the results of the inspection reports in 
order to address whether audit reporting 
improves over the time in terms of: 1) 
fewer occurrences of fraudulent financial 
reporting; and 2) fewer occurrences of 
audit firms receiving adverse opinions for 
the mentioned in this study.      
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2.5 Audit quality and abnormal audit fees  
The definition of audit quality by (DeAngelo 1981b) consists of two components, 
including the likelihood that an auditor discovers existing misstatements and 
appropriately acts on the discovery.  
 
 “Audit quality has been debated for over two decades, however, there is still little 
understood due to the fact that there remains little consensus about how to define, let 
alone measure audit quality” (Knechel et al. 2013). Compared to Knechel et al. (2013) 
study on audit quality Francis (2011) developed a framework for understanding and 
examining audit quality. In his framework he claims audit quality could be analysed in 
the following six aspects, namely audit inputs, audit process accounting firms, audit 
industry and audit markets, institutions and economic consequences of audit outcomes. 
Audit quality divides into actual and perceived quality. Francis (2004) conducts a 
review of empirical research on audit quality over the past 25 years mainly in the United 
States.   
   
The definition of audit quality is described as “the market assessed joint probability that 
a given auditor will both discover a breach in a client’s accounting system, and report 
the breach (DeAngelo 1981b, p 186).” This definition of audit quality has been widely 
used in audit quality research, however, according to Financial Reporting Council (2006, 
p16) “there is no single agreed definition of audit quality that can be used as a ‘standard 
against which actual performance can be assessed.” Further, in the Consultation Report 
if International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO 2009, p3), a similar 
conclusion was drawn to audit quality, which is expressed as a difficulty of definition 
and agreement, particularly is specific to the stakeholder. Additionally, the definition of 
audit quality by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2003, p13) is described as 
“ one performed  in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) 
to provide reasonable assurance that audit financial statements and related disclosures 
are presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and are not materially misstated whether due to errors or fraud.”   
 
According to Knechel et al. (2013) “auditor knowledge and expertise have a direct 
bearing on the quality of the audit”. Bonner (1990) re-examines the effects of auditor 
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knowledge in auditing through addressing the task-specific knowledge which was not 
considered in prior research and fins that the task-specific knowledge aids the 
performance of experienced auditors in both the cue election and cue weighting 
components only in analytical risk assessment. Bonner and Lewis (1990) find that 
industry-specific experience is considered as a significant predictor of auditor 
performance in tasks, particularly in a specific industry. However, Ashton (1991) did 
not find a strong positive relation between auditors’ industry-specific experience and the 
accuracy of their error frequency knowledge. Meanwhile Johnson et al. (1991) designed 
an experiment to examine the effects of auditor industry specialization on the detection 
of audit fraud and find that auditors with specific industry experience are more likely to 
detect management fraud. 
 
Further, Bell et al. (1997) conclude that the knowledge auditors have developed from 
their clients’ business and industries makes a contribution to detect anomalies and 
verify consistencies. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) examine brand name, industry 
specialization and leadership audit pricing regarding Big 6 and Big 5 auditors in 
Australia. They did not find a strong relationship between fee premium and Big 6 and 
Big 5 specialist auditors. Nonspecialist Big 6 and Big 5 auditors are considered to have 
fee premium over nonspecialist non-Big 6 and Big 5 auditors who are the experts of 
their industries. But, this result is only held when their sample reduces to half of the 
original data in their study. Overall, they conclude that their result only provides limited 
support of having premium by industry specialists. Additionally, Ferguson et al. (2003) 
investigate the influence of auditor industry expertise on Australian Big 5 auditors’ 
audit fees. They find that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with 
industry expertise if the auditors is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the 
top two firms that are national industries.  
 
However, the top two national firms do not earn a premium in cities where they are not 
city leaders. In addition, they also find that national leadership rankings are driven by 
the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. They conclude that the 
market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia are determined by the 
office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets. Later, Ferguson et al. 
(2006) extend the research by Ferguson et al. (2003) and examine if the primary results 
concluded in Ferguson et al. (2003) are sensitive to the different definitions or 
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characterization of leadership. The research by Ferguson et al. (2006) intends to 
investigate if there is a positive relation between audit quality and city-specific market 
leadership. Their findings indicate that the conclusions in Ferguson et al. (2003) are 
confirmed. Further, they also find that overall city-specific leadership plays an 
important role in determining fees, but this finding is slightly significant.  
 
Meanwhile another study by Francis et al. (2005) followed the study of Ferguson et al. 
(2003), re-examines the pricing of Big 5 industry leadership in the U. S. audit market. 
They find that there is a significant fee premium of 19 percent on engagements of which 
Big 5 auditors are both the nationally top-ranked auditor and the city-level industry 
leader in the city where the client is headquartered. They conclude that their result 
shows that national and city-specific industry leadership jointly have an influence on 
auditor reputation and pricing. Their further testing result indicates that there is no 
premium if only considered national industry leaders. Later, Balsam et al. (2003) 
examine the association between earnings quality and auditor industry specialization. 
They find that clients of industry specialist auditors have lower discretionary accruals 
and higher earnings response coefficients than clients of nonspecialist auditors. Their 
result supports the conclusion that clients of industry specialists having higher earnings 
quality than clients of nonspecialists.  
 
In addition, Low (2004) conducts a study on the effects of auditor industry 
specialization on auditors’ risk assessments and audit-planning decisions. The result 
indicates that auditor’s knowledge of clients’ industry enhances their audit risk 
assessments and has a direct influence on the nature and the perceived quality of their 
audit-planning decisions. Basioudis and Francis (2007) conduct another study on the 
association between fee premium and industry leadership in the United Kingdom. Their 
UK results indicate that office-specific industry leadership alone has the highest audit 
fee premia of 19 percent for industry expertise compared to a smaller premium of 12 
percent when the city leader is also the national industry leader. Additionally, their 
findings are contrary to the current marketing strategies of Big 4 accounting firms. They 
believe Big 4 accounting firms should adjust their attitudes towards both national and 
local offices rather than intending to rely on the uniformity. Finally, auditor industry 
experts charge higher based on the higher audit quality provided by those auditor 
experts.           
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Carson and Fargher (2007) examine the influence of client size on estimating audit fee 
premiums in Australian audit market. They find that the fee premium regarding the 
auditor industry specialists is considered to be concentrated in the audit fee paid by the 
largest clients in each industry. They explain that the reason is considered as the 
additional demand for audit services by larger clients. They also find that fee premiums 
to auditors who are city-industry leader have a significant relationship with client size. 
Finally, they find higher fees for companies cross-listed on US exchanges as well. Later, 
Carson (2009) introduces the global audit firm networks and examines industry 
specialization of global audit firm networks and the association between national and 
global industry specialization. The result shows that global industry specialists have a 
highly significant and positive premium over audit fees. The result also indicates that 
national industry specialization is separately treated from global industry specialization. 
Furthermore, the significant fee premiums are related to both national industry leaders 
and global industry specialization. 
            
From another perspective, Owhoso et al. (2002) design a sophisticated experiment to 
how industry specialist auditor team detect errors. They find that senior add value to the 
team through detecting more mechanical errors compared to managers who detect more 
conceptual errors based on an analysis of nominal teams created from seniors and 
managers working individually. They also notice that if both seniors and managers work 
together then they contribute in a nonredundant way of improving the overall 
effectiveness of the team. Furthermore, the nominal teams outperform real teams in 
detecting mechanical errors instead of conceptual errors.  
 
 
Summary 
Prior research on audit quality has been mainly focused on the following two aspects, 
including the discussion of audit quality measurements, the association between audit 
quality and audit industry experience. For instance, Francis (2011) developed a 
framework for understanding and examining audit quality. Later, Knechel et al. (2013) 
conclude that auditor knowledge and expertise have a direct bearing on the quality of 
the audit.  
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Alternatively, prior studies on audit quality and industry specialization are mainly 
focused on Australia (Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Ferguson et al. 2003; Ferguson et al. 
2006; Carson and Fargher 2007) and the U. S. (Francis et al. 2005; Balsam et al. 2003; 
Low 2004).  Compared to the above mentioned studies, Basioudis and Francis (2007) 
conduct another study on the association between fee premium and industry leadership 
in the United Kingdom. The Table 12 below presents more details on the findings of the 
relation between audit quality and audit knowledge and expertise in prior research. 
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Table 12: Prior research on audit quality and audit knowledge and expertise 
  
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
   Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                              
 
Limitations and future Research 
Ferguson, A. 
& Stokes, D. 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Their paper 
investigates brand 
name, industry 
specialization, and 
leadership audit 
pricing in the wake 
of the mergers that 
created the Big 6 
and Big 5 
accounting firms.   
The sample consists 
of Australian listed 
public companies in 
each of the post-
merger years 1990, 
1992, 1994 and 1989. 
 
 
 
 
  Audit fee model 
were used drawn 
from prior study by 
further adding more 
variable to test the 
hypotheses. 
Find limited support for the ability of the 
Big 6/5 to obtain fee premiums over non-
Big 6/5 for those industries not having 
specialist auditors. Further, nonspecialist 
Big 6/5 auditors are able to obtain fee 
premiums over nonspecialist non-Big 6/5 
auditors for those industries having 
specialist auditors.  
Future study may examine if audit firms 
adopt boutique strategies by taking 
larger shares in fewer industries 
compared with covering more industries 
and having lower shares in each. 
Moreover, the future study may use 
different methods to classify 
specialization/leadership and pricing 
premiums. Finally, the impact of joint 
supply of nonaudit services to audit 
clients could be considered.   
 
Ferguson, A. 
Francis, J & 
Stokes, D. 
(2002) 
 
 
Studies the role of 
auditor industry 
expertise in the 
pricing of Big 5 
audits in Australia.  
 
 
The final sample has 
1,046 Australian 
publicly listed 
companies.    
 
 
A cross-sectional 
audit fee regression 
model is developed 
based on the 
models in prior 
audit fee research.  
 
 
There is an average premium of 24 percent 
associated with industry expertise when 
the auditor is both city-specific industry 
leader and one of the top two firms 
nationally in the industry. Failed to find 
this premium in cities where the top two 
nationally firms are not city leaders. 
Additionally, national leadership rankings 
are driven by the specific offices where 
accounting firms are city leaders.   
 
Future research may focus on using the 
new US fee disclosure to examine the 
interplay of firm-wide and office-level 
characteristics of accounting firms, and 
the audit market’s perception and 
pricing of auditor industry expertise.       
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Table 12 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
  Objective              
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future research   
Ferguson, A. 
Francis, J & 
Stokes, D. 
(2002) 
 
 
Investigates 
whether the results 
by Ferguson et al. 
(2003) could be 
confounded by the 
presence of city-
specific overall 
market leadership 
effects. 
They use the same data 
set as Ferguson et al. 
(2003) consisting of 
the full sample of 
Australian-listed 
companies in 1998.      
An OLS regression 
model is drawn from 
Ferguson et al 
(2003) and applied 
in this research. 
Their findings reaffirm 
that joint local and 
national leadership have 
an influence on fee 
determination and cause 
higher fees, although at a 
slightly weaker level of 
statistical significance 
 
 
Francis, J. 
Reichelt, K. & 
Wang, D. 
(2005) 
 
Aims to examine 
the pricing of Big 5 
industry expertise in 
the US based on the 
joint national and 
city research 
framework in 
Ferguson et al. 
(2003).  
 
The final dataset 
consists of 3,992 
observations for the 
national sample and 
3,045 observations for 
the city sample.    
 
An OLS audit fees 
regression model is 
drawn from 
Ferguson et al. 
(2003) and applied 
in this study.  
 
 
The evidence shows that 
audit fee premia of 
approximately 19 percent 
when auditors are both 
national and city-specific 
industry leaders. 
However, national 
industry leadership alone, 
without being a city-
specific industry leader, 
never results in a fee 
premium. 
Future study may consider both the 
national and city-specific dimensions 
of auditor reputations regarding audit 
quality. 
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Table 12 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
    Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
   Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Balsam, S. 
Krishnan, J. & 
Yang, J. (2003) 
 
 
Intends to examine 
the association 
between measures 
of earnings quality 
and auditor industry 
specialization. 
50,116 firm year 
observations were selected 
for testing discretionary 
accruals and 19,091 firm 
year observations were 
selected for testing 
earnings response 
coefficient. 
Discretionary accruals 
were measured by 
using the Jones (1991) 
model as in DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) 
while earnings 
response coefficient 
model was examined 
by an OLS regression 
model.   
Findings show that 
clients of industry 
specialist auditors 
have lower 
discretionary accruals 
and higher earnings 
response coefficients 
than clients of 
nonspecialist auditors. 
This study has limitations. First, the 
use of proxies to measure auditor 
industry specialization is a limitation. 
 
Future study should examine the 
refinements of the specialization 
measures with a consideration of 
incorporating smaller auditors. 
Low, K. (2004) 
 
It investigates the 
effects of industry 
specialization on 
auditors’ risk 
assessments and 
audit-planning 
decisions. 
98 supervising audit 
seniors were selected as 
participants from a Big 5 
firm to attend two in-house 
sessions. 
A quantitative research 
method is applied to 
test the experimental 
results. 
The author finds the 
auditors’ knowledge 
of the client’s industry 
improves their audit 
risk assessments and 
directly influences the 
nature and the 
perceived quality of 
their audit-planning 
decisions. 
Additionally, the 
auditors’ knowledge 
of the client’s industry 
moderates the 
sensitivity of the 
auditors’ planning 
decisions to their audit 
risk assessments. 
This study is subject to some 
limitations. First, the participates are all 
from one Big firm and senior level. 
Second, this study is only focused on 
banking industry.   
 
Future study may consider the 
difference between industry-matched 
and industry-mismatched auditors’ 
performance in assessing audit risks 
and developing audit procedures 
without the influence. It may be also 
useful to investigate that how industry 
specialists make these decisions and 
the factors that affect their decisions.  
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Table 12 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
     Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
     Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Basioudis, I. & 
Francis, J. (2007) 
 
The study examines the 
relation between audit 
fee premiums and 
national and office-
level industry leadship 
in the UK. 
 
 
907 listed companies 
on the London Stock 
exchange in the 2002-
2003 financial year, 
were collected as the 
final sample. 
An OLS audit fee 
regression model is 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
They find a significant 
fee premium for city-
specific industry 
leaders relative to other 
Big 4 auditors, but no 
evidence that either the 
top-ranked or second-
ranked firms nationally 
have a fee premium 
relative to other Big 4 
auditors.   
Future study may consider if there is an 
industry premium for Big 4 city-
specific industry leaders indicating 
differential audit quality relative to 
other Big 4 auditors.  
Carson, E. & 
Fargher, N. (2007) 
 
They examine the 
impact of client size on 
the estimation of audit 
fee premiums in the 
Australian market for 
audit services.  
 
 
The final sample 
consists of 558 
companies in 1998, 
543 companies in 1999 
and 611 companies in 
2004. 
 
 
An OLS audit fee 
regression model is 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
The results show that 
in Australian market 
for audit services, the 
fee premium attributed 
to industry specialist 
audit firms is 
concentrated in the 
audit fees paid by the 
largest clients in each 
industry. Further, 
higher fees for 
companies cross-listed 
on the US exchanges 
were found. Finally, 
they find fee premiums 
to auditors that are 
city-industry leaders 
are strongly related to 
client size.  
The future study could consider the 
issues, such as higher demand for more 
complex accounting and auditing 
issues raises an issue of lack of 
competitive pressure in a changed 
situation setting with a declining pool 
of large auditors available to audit 
large companies.   
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Table 12 continue 
  Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Carson, E. 
(2009) 
 
 
The author 
examines the role 
of global audit 
firm networks in 
the market for 
audit services. 
In 2000, 15, 583 
companies were 
selected and 14,628 
companies were 
selected in 2004 were 
selected representing 
62 (60) countries as the 
final sample.    
An OLS audit fee 
regression model is 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
The author finds that both 
2000 and 2004 that audit fee 
premiums are consistently 
associated with global 
specialist auditors, irrespective 
of whether those audit firms 
are or are not national 
specialists. 
This study has limitations. First, not all 
countries disclosed audit fees in this 
study period. Second, this study is only 
focused on a single industry. Finally, the 
method employed to measure industry 
specialization has limitations. 
 
Future study may examine the cross-
border issues and identify clients most 
likely to benefit from the purchase of 
global specialist audit services and 
examine the broader relationship 
between these clients and identified 
specialists beyond audit fees. 
 
Owhoso, V. 
Messier, W. 
& Lynch, J. 
(2002) 
The authors 
examine how 
industry 
specialized 
auditor teams 
detect errors 
using a 
sophisticated 
experimental 
design. 
144 auditors including 
72 auditors and 72 
managers from 42 
offices of the Big 5 
firm were participated 
in this study. 
A quantitative 
research method 
and an experimental 
design combine to 
test hypotheses. 
They find that seniors add 
value to the team by detecting 
more mechanical errors while 
managers detect more 
conceptual errors. Therefore, 
managers and seniors both 
contribute in a nonredundant 
way to the team’s overall 
effectiveness within 
specialization background. 
Further, they also find that 
nominal teams outperform real 
teams in the detection of 
mechanical but not conceptual 
errors.   
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2.5.1 Audit quality and tenure 
Audit tenure is defined as the number of years that an auditor remains auditing a firm 
(Myers et al. 2003). The following studies show that auditors with shorter tenure are 
related to lower earnings quality than auditors with longer tenure (Johnson et al. 2002; 
Ghosh and Moon 2005; Myers et al. 2003; Chi and Huang 2005; Gul et al. 2007). Gul et 
al. (2009) explain this relationship from three different perspectives. First, they believe 
that auditors with shorter tenure are lack of client-specific knowledge which is 
considered as the necessary skills to conduct a high-quality audit. Second, auditors with 
shorter tenure may be more lax in the early years by charging less with their clients and 
intend to remain auditing those clients in order to cover their initials loss in the later 
years. Consequently, this causes lower quality audits and lower quality earnings as well 
(Gul et al. 2007). Finally, they claim that firms with higher quality earnings intend to 
retain the incumbent high quality auditors, or high quality auditors intend to drop risky 
clients who have lower quality earnings, and those risky clients will switch to lower 
quality auditors. However, studies by (Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Geiger and 
Raghunandan 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Chen et al. 2008) show that longer audit 
firm tenure has a negative impact on audit quality.                     
 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) find that the longer audit firm tenure could have an impact on 
auditor independence due to the fact that an auditor’s objectivity is declined during this 
longer auditing period. Johnson et al. (2002) conduct a study on investigating the 
association between audit firm tenure and absolute discretionary accruals. In their study, 
audit firm tenure was categorized into three: short, medium and long. They define short 
tenure as two to three years and medium as four to eight years. The long tenure is 
defined as nine or more years. Considered medium tenure as a benchmark, they find that 
short tenure is related to larger absolute discretionary accruals, but they did not find a 
relation between long tenure and larger absolute discretionary accruals. Therefore, they 
conclude that long audit firm tenures are not related to a decline in earnings quality. 
Meanwhile Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) have an investigation on audit-client 
relationship and going concern opinions issued by auditors to bankrupt firms in the U. S. 
They find that auditors are resistant to issue a going concern opinion within the initial 
years of engagement, but they fail to find it in later years. Their finding shows the 
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contradict result that longer auditor-client relationship has a negative impact on audit 
quality.            
 
Myers et al. (2003) examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit quality 
proxied by discretionary and current accruals. In their study, Jones 1991 cross-sectional 
model is applied to estimate the discretionary accruals. To estimate the current accruals 
they use the change in noncash current assets minus the change in current liabilities 
other than short-term debt. Their result indicates that there is a significant relationship 
between both discretionary and current accruals and longer audit firm tenure. 
Specifically, the longer audit firm tenure is the less of both discretionary and current 
accruals are. They also find that there is a relation between audit firm tenure and less 
income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals. They suggest that longer audit firm 
tenure constrains earnings management. Finally, they conclude that there is no evidence 
to support that longer audit firm tenure is related to lower earnings quality.                            
 
Further, Carcello and Nagy (2004) intend to investigate the relation between audit firm 
tenure and fraudulent financial reporting, a proxy of audit quality. They compare firms 
cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with firms without fraudulent 
reporting within the same period. Their result shows that fraudulent financial reporting 
more likely occurs in the first three years of audit firm tenure. However, they did not 
find a relation between fraudulent financial reporting and long audit firm tenure. Later, 
Ghosh and Moon (2005) examine the association between audit firm tenure and 
earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions, a proxy of investor 
perceptions of earnings quality. They find a positive relation between earnings response 
coefficients and audit firm tenure. Furthermore, they find reporting earnings have an 
influence on stock ranking only if audit firm tenure becomes larger. Meanwhile a study 
by Chi and Huang (2005) using data of Taiwanese companies is focused on the relation 
between audit partner tenure and earnings quality. Their result shows that initially there 
is a negative relation between audit partner tenure and discretionary accruals; however, 
this relation becomes positive after the audit firm tenure is more than five years.  
 
Gul et al. (2007) find the similar result that higher levels of earnings management occur 
in the early years of the auditor-client relationship, further they find that both client size 
and the level of nonaudit fees have an influence on the association between audit firm 
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tenure and accruals. Particularly, when auditor tenure is short nonaudit fees may have 
an impact on auditor independence, while they did not find this impact on auditor 
independence when auditor tenure is long. Regarding the size of auditor clients they 
find that there is a positive relation between nonaudit fees and earnings management for 
small clients instead of large clients. They conclude their results as the association 
between nonaudit fees and auditor independence is related to auditor tenure. When audit 
tenure is short and client firm size is small then there is a negative relation between high 
nonaudit fees and auditor independence. 
              
Chen et al. (2008) also examine the association between audit partner tenure and 
earnings quality using data of Taiwanese companies. They find that the absolute and 
positive values of discretionary accruals decrease significantly with audit partner tenure. 
A further testing by controlling the partner tenure shows that absolute discretionary 
accruals decreased significantly with audit firm tenure. They suggest that the 
requirement of audit partner rotation could have an adverse influence on earnings 
quality. Meanwhile, Boone et al. (2008) examine the relation between audit firm tenure 
and clients’ risk premium. They find some evidence of a nonlinear relation between 
audit firm tenure and the ex ante equity risk premium. Specifically, they find that the 
equity risk premium decreases if the audit firm tenure is short while increases with 
longer audit firm tenure.    
                 
Later, Davis et al. (2009) conduct a study covered both pre-SOX and post-SOX 
examining the relation between auditor tenure and earnings management. Their pre-
SOX result is consistent with prior research findings that there is a relation between 
long-term audit firm tenure and lower audit quality proxied by a client’s ability to use 
discretionary accruals to meet or beat forecasts. Further, they find evidence that in the 
post-SOX there is a decline in earnings management. Their explanation is that audit 
quality is increased or managers intend to reduce managing earnings or both. 
Meanwhile, Gul et al. (2009) investigate the relation between audit firm tenure and 
earnings quality under the background of industry specialization and low balling. They 
find that the association of shorter audit tenure and lower earnings quality is not strong 
for auditor industry specialists than non-specialists. Regarding the effect of low balling 
they did not find this relation.  
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Summary 
The previous research on audit quality and tenure has been mainly focused on the 
examination of the influence of auditor and their client firms’ relationship on audit 
quality provided to the client firms. The results of prior studies are mixed. For instance, 
the following studies show that auditors with shorter tenure are related to lower earnings 
quality than auditors with longer tenure (Johnson et al. 2002; Ghosh and Moon 2005; 
Myers et al. 2003; Chi and Huang 2005; Gul et al. 2007). In contrast, studies by (Mautz 
and Sharaf 1961; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Chen et al. 
2008) show that longer audit firm tenure has a negative impact on audit quality. The 
Table 13 below presents more details on the findings of the relation between audit 
quality and tenure in prior research.   
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Table 13: Past research on audit quality and tenure 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
   Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
       Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Johnson, V. Khurana, 
I & Reynolds, J. 
(2002) 
 
 
They examine 
whether the length 
of the relationship 
between a company 
and an audit firm is 
associated with 
financial-reporting 
quality. 
 
 
The sample consists of 
2,463 (2,280) firm-year 
observations for the 
unexpected accruals 
(persistence) tests. The 
sample observations are 
evenly distributed across 
years.  
 
The OLS unexpected 
accruals and modified 
Jones 1991 model 
were both employed 
to test hypotheses.   
 
 
 
They find that relative to 
medium audit-firm tenures 
of 4 to 8 years, short audit-
firm tenures of 2 to 3 three 
years are associated with 
lower-quality financial 
reports. However, they did 
not any evidence of 
reduced financial –
reporting quality for longer 
audit-firm tenures of 9 or 
more years. 
 
 
 
Geiger, M. & 
Raghunandan, K. 
(2002) 
 
The study focuses 
on investigating the 
association between 
audit tenure and 
audit report failures. 
 
 
The sample has 117 
stressed bankrupt 
companies selected 
between 1996 and 1998.   
 
A logistic going 
concern regression 
model is applied to 
test the relation 
between audit report 
failures and audit 
tenure. 
 
The results show that there 
were significantly more 
audit reporting failures in 
the earlier years of the 
auditor/client relationship 
than when auditor had 
served these clients for 
longer tenures 
 
Future study may examine the impact 
of auditor tenure on other types of 
audit decisions, such as those made 
during the planning and execution 
phases of an audit. 
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Table 13 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Myers, J. Myers, 
L. & Omer, T. 
(2003) 
 
The authors intend 
to find out that if 
there is a relation 
between auditor 
tenure and earnings 
quality. 
 
 
The sample consists of 
42, 302 firm-years. 
A regression model 
measuring accruals is 
applied to test the 
relation between 
auditor tenure and 
earnings quality.   
The findings suggest that 
under the current system 
increased auditor tenure does 
not lead to reduced audit and 
earnings quality. 
 
Carcello, J. & 
Nagy, A. (2004) 
 
 
The study examines 
the relation between 
audit firm tenure 
and fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
 
 
The final sample 
includes 147 fraud 
observations and 68, 
195 non-fraud 
observations 
A logistic regression 
model is applied to 
measure the relation 
between audit firm 
tenure and fraudulent 
financial reporting.   
 
 
They find that fraudulent 
financial reporting is more 
likely to occur in the first three 
years of the auditor-client 
relationship. But, they did not 
find any evidence of this 
relation between long auditor 
tenure and fraudulent financial 
reporting.   
 
Future research needs to examine the 
relation between auditor tenure and 
financial reporting quality where 
auditor changes are compulsory or are 
driven by the audit committee rather 
than by management. 
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Table 13 continue  
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
        Methods                               
 
   Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Ghosh, A. & 
Moon, D. 
(2005) 
 
They analyse how 
investors and 
information 
intermediaries 
perceive auditor 
tenure. 
 
The full sample contains 
38,794 observations over 
the years 1990 through 
2000. 
 
 
  Regression models are 
applied to test the 
relation between 
auditor tenure and 
investors, independent 
rating agencies and 
financial analysts 
perceive earnings 
quality.  
They find a positive 
association between 
investor perceptions of 
earnings quality and 
tenure. Then, they find that 
the influence of reported 
earnings on stock rankings 
becomes larger with 
extended tenure, although 
the association between 
debt ratings and reported 
earnings does not vary 
with tenure. Finally, they 
document that the 
influence of past earnings 
on one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts becomes 
greater as tenure increases.  
 
 
Chi, W. & 
Huang, H. 
(2005) 
 
This study examines 
how audit tenure 
affects earnings 
quality by 
investigating the 
effect of audit-firm 
and audit-partner 
tenure on the level 
of discretionary 
accruals. 
The sample includes 
1,337 firm-year 
observations of Taiwan 
listed companies from 
1998 to 2001. 
A number of regression 
models are used to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that familiarity 
helps to produce higher 
earnings quality, but 
excessive familiarity 
results in lower earnings 
quality. 
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Table 13 continue  
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future     
          Research   
Gul, F. Jaggi, 
B. & 
Krishnan, G. 
(2007) 
 
 
This study examines 
whether the impact of 
nonaudit fees on 
auditor independence 
is contingent on 
auditor tenure. 
 
 
The final sample consists 
of 4,720 observations, 
including 1,846 
observations are from the 
year 2000 and 2,874 
observations are from the 
year 2001. 
 
 
 
An audit fee regression 
model and OLS 
regression models are 
combined to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
They find that there is a positive 
association between nonaudit 
fees and positive discretionary 
current accruals proxied for 
auditor independence, for firms 
with short auditor tenure of not 
more than three years.  
 
 
 
 
Limitations included in this study 
are: 1) data of this study only covers 
two years therefore the result may 
not be generalizable to other years; 
2) the data are only elated to the US 
so the result may not be applicable 
to others; 3) there are some 
measurement errors in calculating 
discretionary accruals; 4) the 
positive association between 
nonaudit fees and positive 
discretionary accruals for firms with 
short auditor tenure may be driven 
by lack of client-specific knowledge 
instead of lack of auditor 
independence.  
Future research could examine 
whether there is a relation between 
auditor independence and high 
nonaudit fees for smaller clients with 
short auditor tenure but not for larger 
clients.   
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Table 13 continue 
 
Author(s)                   
   Year 
Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future   
           Research   
Chen, C. Lin, 
C. & Lin, Y. 
(2008) 
 
 
This study 
investigates the 
relation between 
audit partner/firm 
tenure and earnings 
quality using a 
sample of Taiwanese 
companies. 
The sample contains 5,213 
observations from 888 
companies collected from 
the Taiwan Economic 
Journal database from 
1990 to 2001.   
Discretionary 
accruals regression 
models are used to 
test hypotheses. 
They find that the absolute and 
positive values of discretionary 
accruals decrease significantly 
with audit partner tenure by 
using performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings quality. 
 
 
This study is subject to some 
limitations. First, the legal 
environment is different from others. 
Second, the result in this study may 
not be applicable to other countries. 
Finally, measurement errors in 
partner tenure remain an issue that 
can not be fully addressed in this 
study. 
Boone, J. 
Khurana, I. & 
Raman, K. 
(2008) 
 
 
This research intends 
to investigate whether 
investors price audit 
firm tenure for Big 5 
audits by examining 
the relation between 
tenure and the ex ante 
equity risk premium.   
 
The sample consists of 3, 
264 company-years for 
reduced samples and 
12,493 company-years for 
full samples 
Annual cross-sectional 
regressions are used 
to test all hypotheses 
in this study. 
 
 
They find that the equity risk 
premium decreases in the early 
years of tenure but increases 
with additional years of tenure. 
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Table 13 continue 
 
Author(s)                   
   Year 
 Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Davis, L. Soo, 
B. & Trompeter, 
G. (2009). 
 
The authors 
examine the 
relation between 
auditor tenure and 
earnings 
management. 
 
Their final sample 
consists of 23, 748 
firm-years representing 
4,865 distinct firms. 
Both modified Jones 
1991 model and 
discretionary accruals 
regression models are 
combined to test the 
relation between 
auditor tenure and the 
ability to use 
discretionary accruals 
to meet or beat 
earnings forecasts. 
The results indicate that both 
short and long-term auditor 
tenure are associated with 
increased use of discretionary 
accruals to meet or beat 
earnings forecasts in the pre-
SOX period, but the results 
disappear following SOX. 
They also find evidence of 
increased earnings 
management in the earlier 
years of the auditor-client 
relationship. Moreover, they 
find evidence in the pre-SOX 
period that long-term auditor –
client relationships were 
associated with greater auditor 
tolerance for earnings 
management, but only after 
the auditor-client relation 
extends beyond 15 years or 
more.       
Limitations included in this study are: 1) 
earnings management, auditor 
independence and low audit quality are 
not observed; 2) the finding on the 
association between auditor tenure and 
increased earnings management may not 
be generalized to firms that are not 
followed by analysis; 3) this study is only 
focused on only one dimension of audit 
quality, that is auditor tolerance for the 
use of accruals to meet forecasts.  
 
Future study is needed to determine 
whether the post-SOX reduction in 
earnings management is permanent or 
transitory and whether it is attributable to 
a reduction in managers’ attempts to 
manage earnings or to decrease auditor 
tolerance for such actions. Further, 
development associated with the cost of 
adopting and not adopting rotation would 
be a value in future. 
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Table 13 continue 
 
Author(s)                   
   Year 
  Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                       
 
        Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Gul, F. Fung, S. 
& Jaggi, B. 
(2009) 
They examine 
whether industry 
specialization of 
auditors and low 
balling affect the 
association between 
auditor tenure and 
earnings quality.   
The final sample has 
32,777 firm–year 
observations based on 
firms from 1993 to 2004 
audited by Big 6/5/4 
auditors. 
A number of regression 
models are used to test 
the hypotheses in this 
study. 
The authors find that the 
association between 
shorter auditor tenure 
and lower earnings 
quality is weaker for 
firms audited by industry 
specialists compared to 
non-specialists. 
Additionally, they failed 
to find evidence of this 
relation in low balling. 
This study has some limitations, including 
1) the results in this study are dependent 
on the appropriateness of the proxies for 
earnings quality; 2) the results for low 
balling tests may be influenced by the 
lack of power of our tests; 3) there may 
have alternative explanations for the 
association between shorter auditor tenure 
and earnings quality; 4) the endogeneity 
issues remain to have an influence on the 
findings in this study.       
   
 
 
111 
 
2.5.2 Audit quality and abnormal audit fees 
Simunic (1980) initially creates an audit pricing framework after considering a number 
of factors, which are involved to have an influence on predicting audit fees, including 
audit risk, client size, and economic condition. Actual fees paid to auditors consist of 
two parts, namely: (1) normal fees that reflect auditors’ effort costs and litigation risk; 
and (2) abnormal fees that are specific to contractual relationships between auditors and 
their clients. Abnormal fees are considered as residuals of actual fees and normal fees. 
According to Kinney and Libby (2002), abnormal fees can be considered to capture the 
influence of economic bonding of auditor clients on their auditors. 
 
A number of papers have been addressed the relationship between audit quality and the 
abnormal fees paid to auditors, and the results are mixed (Frankel et al. 2002; Kinney 
and Libby 2002; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Krishnan et al. 2005; Higgs and Skantz 
2006; Hoitash et al. 2007; Hope et al. 2009; Mitra et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Hribar 
et al. 2010). The following studies examine a linear association between abnormally 
audit fees and audit quality (DeFond et al 2002; Krishnan et al. 2005; Hoitash et al. 
2007; Hribar et al. 2010). For instance, DeFond et al. (2002) did not find the association 
between abnormal audit fees and auditors’ going concern opinions between 2000 and 
2001. However, Krishnan et al. (2005) find that in 2001earnings response coefficients 
as a proxy of audit quality decline when abnormal audit fees increase. Further, Hoitash 
et al. (2007) find a significant positive relation between total fees and two measures of 
audit quality, namely the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating 
current accruals to cash flows and the absolute value of performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals from 2000 to 2003.  
 
Contrary, the following studies provide evidence of the relation between abnormal audit 
fees and audit quality through analysing a nonlinear association between abnormal audit 
fees and audit quality. For example, Larcker and Richardson (2004) find that audit 
quality increases as abnormal audit fees increase in absolute magnitude using data from 
2000 to 2001 to examine absolute discretionary accruals. Later, Higgs and Skantz (2006) 
find that firms with positive abnormal audit fees have greater earnings response 
coefficients than firms without positive abnormal audit fees. Hope et al. (2009) find that 
between 2000 and 2003 equity discount rates considered as an inverse indicator of audit 
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quality increase as positive abnormal audit fees increase, but failed to find an 
association between equity discount rates and negative abnormal audit fees.  
 
Meanwhile, Mitra et al. (2009) find a negative relation between positive abnormal audit 
fees and both absolute discretionary accruals and income-increasing accruals from 2000 
to 2005. However, they did not find an association between negative abnormal audit 
fees and discretionary accruals. Finally, Chio et al. (2010) find a positive association 
between positive abnormal audit fees and absolute discretionary accruals, but also did 
not find a relation between negative abnormal audit fees and absolute discretionary 
accruals. In the meantime, Asthana and Boone (2012) find audit quality declines as 
positive abnormal audit fees increase in magnitude which is consistent with prior 
research. Moreover, they find that audit quality declines as negative abnormal audit fees 
increase in magnitude, with the decline increasing in magnitude as proxies for client 
bargaining power increase.  
                      
 
Summary 
Prior research on abnormal audit fees has been focused on examining the influence of 
abnormal audit fees on audit quality delivered to the client firms. In particular, the 
following studies examine a linear association between abnormally audit fees and audit 
quality (DeFond et al 2002; Krishnan et al. 2005; Hoitash et al. 2007; Hribar et al. 2010). 
Alternatively, the following studies provide evidence of the relation between abnormal 
audit fees and audit quality through analysing a nonlinear association between abnormal 
audit fees and audit quality (Larcker and Richardson 2004; Higgs and Skantz 2006; 
Hope et al. 2009). As a consequence, the results are mixed. The Table 14 below 
presents more details on the findings of the relation between audit quality and abnormal 
audit fees in prior research.   
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Table 14: Previous study on audit quality and abnormal audit fees 
Author(s) 
          Year 
  Objective      Sample and data 
 
      Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
DeFond, 
M. 
Raghunan
dan, K. & 
Subraman
yam, K. 
(2002) 
 
 
They examine the 
impact of non-
audit service fees 
on auditor 
independence 
through the 
propensity to 
issue going 
concern opinions. 
A final sample 
consists of 1,158 
firms including 96 
with first-time 
going concern 
opinions. 
A going concern logistic 
regression model is 
applied in their study. 
They did not find the 
association between 
abnormal audit fees and 
auditors’ going concern 
opinions between 2000 
and 2001. 
 
Kinney, 
W. & 
Libby, R. 
(2002)  
 
 
 
Their paper 
examines the 
relation between 
auditors’ fees for 
nonaudit services 
and earnings 
management. 
 They reassess Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson 
(2002)’s approach from 
both conceptual and 
operational 
perspectives.  
 
They find that 
unexpected fees may 
better capture the 
profitability of the 
services. 
 
Larcker, 
D. & 
Richardso
n, S. 
(2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
They investigate 
the association 
between the fees 
paid to auditors 
for audit and non-
audit services, and 
the choice of 
actual measures 
for a large sample 
of firms. 
The sample 
contains 5,103 
firm-year 
observations 
involved 3,424 
firms. 
 
A number of 
regression models are 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that audit 
quality increases as 
abnormal audit fees 
increase in absolute 
magnitude using data 
from 2000 to 2001 to 
examine absolute 
discretionary accruals. 
 
This study has limitations: 1) endogeneity 
is ignored in this study; 2) this study is 
only focused on two years lacking of 
generalization; 3) there is a possibility of 
measurement error in their accrual 
metrics. 
 
Future study could develop a more 
complete set of structural models with a 
sophisticated selection of exogenous 
variables. 
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Table 14 continue 
 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
    Methods                               
 
  Key findings           Limitations and future Research   
Krishnan, J. 
Sami, H. & 
Zhang, Y. 
(2005) 
 
They intend to examine 
whether investors 
perceive auditor 
independence as being 
impaired when auditors 
supply nonaudit 
services through 
investigating the 
association between fee 
based measures of 
nonaudit service 
purchase and the 
earnings response 
coefficient.  
The sample consists of 
2,390observations for 
the first quarter, 2,113 
observations for the 
second quarter and 
1,581 observations for 
the third quarter. 
 
 
 
Regression models 
are used to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
They find that in 
2001earnings response 
coefficients as a proxy of 
audit quality decline 
when abnormal audit fees 
increase. 
 
 
The limitations included in this 
study are: 1) this study only focuses 
on a short time period; 2) treating 
different types of nonaudit services 
equivalently is assumed by this 
study. 
 
Further study may investigate 
whether the effect on earnings 
response coefficient of nonaudit 
service varies across audit-related, 
tax and other services.   
 
 
Higgs, J. & 
Skantz, R. 
(2006) 
 
Their study examines 
whether auditor 
independence is 
impaired when external 
auditor provides 
nonaudit services to 
their clients.  
Their sample contains 
1,313 firms 
Two regression 
models are drawn 
from prior research 
to test hypotheses.  
 
 
 
The authors find that 
firms with positive 
abnormal audit fees have 
greater earnings response 
coefficients than firms 
without positive 
abnormal audit fees. 
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    Table 14 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Hoitash, R. 
Markelevich, 
A. & 
Barragato, C. 
(2007) 
 
 
Their paper 
intends to 
examine the 
relation between 
fees paid to 
auditors and audit 
quality during the 
period of 2000-
2003. 
The final sample 
consists of 13,860 
observations, 
including 2,476, 
4,016, 3,949, and 
3,419 observations in 
2000-2003 
respectively. 
A number of 
regression models are 
developed to test their 
hypotheses. 
The authors find a 
significant positive relation 
between total fees and two 
measures of audit quality, 
namely the standard 
deviation of residuals from 
regressions relating current 
accruals to cash flows and 
the absolute value of 
performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals from 
2000 to 2003. 
 
Their study has some limitations: 1) 
using accruals may be considered as a 
noisy proxy for management’s 
discretion over earnings; 2) their sample 
covers a business and regulatory change 
that may have an impact on audit fees; 
3) there is a chance of missing variables 
and model misstatements; 4) some 
unobservable risks are existed.            
Hope, O. 
Kang, T. 
Thomas, W. 
& Yoo, Y. 
(2009) 
 
 
This study 
investigates the 
relation between 
excess auditor 
remuneration and 
the implied 
required rate of 
return on equity 
capital in global 
markets.  
 
The final sample 
contains 9,008 firm-
year observations 
from 3,273 firms 
collected from 14 
countries. 
 
Two different 
regression models are 
created to test two 
relevant hypotheses.  
 
 
The authors find that 
between 2000 and 2003 
equity discount rates 
considered as an inverse 
indicator of audit quality 
increase as positive 
abnormal audit fees increase, 
but failed to find an 
association between equity 
discount rates and negative 
abnormal audit fees. 
Limitations: 1) lack of capability of 
proving causality; 2) an issue raise 
when selecting choice of investor 
protection variable; 3) a measuring error 
with internal rate of return; 4) their 
sample is limited.  
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    Table 14 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
       Methods                               
 
     Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future  
          Research   
Mitra, S. Deis, 
D. & Hossain, 
M. (2009) 
 
 
The authors examine 
the empirical 
association between 
expected and 
unexpected audit 
fees and reported 
earnings quality.   
 
 
 
A sample contains 1,142 
firms (6,852 firm-year 
observations) with 
coverage of 6 years from 
2000 to 2005.  
 
 
 
   Several regression 
models are developed 
to test the hypotheses. 
 
 
They find a negative 
relation between positive 
abnormal audit fees and 
both absolute discretionary 
accruals and income-
increasing accruals from 
2000 to 2005. However, 
they did not find an 
association between 
negative abnormal audit 
fees and discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Chio, J. Kim, 
J. & Zang, Y. 
(2010) 
 
 
 
Their study 
investigates whether 
and how audit 
quality is associated 
with abnormal audit 
fees. 
Their sample consists of  
9,815 firm-year 
observations for 4 years,  
 
 
A number of 
regression models are 
created to test 
hypotheses 
They find a positive 
association between 
positive abnormal audit fees 
and absolute discretionary 
accruals, but also did not 
find a relation between 
negative abnormal audit 
fees and absolute 
discretionary accruals. 
Future study may re-examine the 
findings in their study by 
considering the asymmetric 
nonlinearity in the fee-quality 
relation. Further study may 
investigate whether and how 
internal control quality disclosure 
requirements influence the 
asymmetric association between 
abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality. 
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    Table 14 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Asthana, S. & 
Boone, J. (2012) 
They investigate the 
relation between 
audit quality and 
abnormal audit fees 
by testing the 
hypotheses. 
The full sample 
consists of 28,925 
observations. 
Regression models are 
developed to test three 
hypotheses in this study. 
The authors find audit quality 
declines as positive abnormal 
audit fees increase in 
magnitude which is consistent 
with prior research. Moreover, 
they find that audit quality 
declines as negative abnormal 
audit fees increase in 
magnitude, with the decline 
increasing in magnitude as 
proxies for client bargaining 
power increase. 
This study is subject to data limitation.    
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2.5.3 Audit quality and client firms’ internal controls 
Internal controls are considered as so important to both companies and auditors (Mautz 
and Sharaf 1961; AICPA 1984; COSO 1992). In 1941, SEC required auditors to 
consider a company’s internal controls in planning an audit (SEC 1941). Further, other 
standards of field work and auditing standards have also required auditors to obtain “ a 
sufficient understanding of internal control” to plan the audit, assess audit risks in order 
to determine the nature, timing and extent of tests to be performed (SAS No. 55, AICPA 
1990; SAS No. 78, AICPA 1997; SAS No.94, AICPA 2001). Later, Section 404 (b) of 
SOX changed the control model requiring that auditors attest to the effectiveness of 
their public clients’ internal control over financial reporting (U. S. House of 
Representatives 2002). Section 404 intends to provide stakeholders more information on 
if a company’s reporting system provides accurate financial information (PCAOB 2007).        
Later, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 2 to implement Section 404 (b) 
(PCAOB 2004). Auditing Standards No. 2 (AS No. 2, PCAOB 2004a, para 7) defines 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) as: 
 
a process designed by… the company’s principal executive and principal financial officers… 
and effected by the company’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of 
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
 
After two years of the issuance of AS No.2 and Section 404 (b), both the PCAOB and 
SEC conclude that the audit of internal control over financial reporting had brought 
significant benefits as well as the higher costs complying with the audit standards and 
requiring greater effort. Therefore, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 5 
(PCAOB 2007) to replace AS No. 2 due to the concerns of higher costs by addressing 
the requirements in AS No. 2. The purpose of adopting AS5 is to replace AS2 in order 
to mitigate audit cost meanwhile remaining the benefits of internal control audits. AS5 
is aimed to provide guidance to auditors on how to more effectively identify internal 
control weaknesses and simultaneously eliminate costly and unnecessary procedures. 
AS No. 5 is focused to address the following major respects (SEC 2007a): 1) AS No. 5 
is less prescriptive and given auditors more flexibility to exercise more professional 
119 
 
judgment; (2) AS No. 5 allows the auditor to implement the scalable based on the size 
and complexity of any company (PCAOB 2009a); (3) AS No. 5 guides auditors to focus 
on areas that present the highest risk, including the period-end financial reporting 
process and controls designed to prevent fraud; (4) AS No. 5 is not considered 
management’s evaluation process as the focus of the audit, in contrast to AS No. 2, 
which included detailed requirements for the auditor to evaluate management’s 
evaluation process; and (5) AS No. 5 applies a principles-based approach of 
determining when and to what extent the auditor can use the work of others. 
 
2.5.3.1 The role of internal controls 
Internal control over financial reporting has been considered as an important feature of a 
company (Kinney et al. 1990; Kinney 2000, 2001). Prior to SOX, standards of 
regulating internal control are limited. The only statutory regulation of internal control 
over all SEC registrants was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, and the 
only required public disclosure of significant internal control deficiencies for all SEC 
firms was in the firm’s 8-K, when disclosing a change in auditors (SEC 1988; Geiger 
and Taylor 2003; Krishnan 2005). For instance, Kinney and McDaniel (1989) conduct a 
study on examining characteristics of 73 firms that correct prior reported quarterly 
earnings from 1976 to 1985. They find that a restatement by breaching a firm’s internal 
control system is negatively associated with both firm size and firm profitability.  
 
Later, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) examine the association between internal control 
and restatements using 41 firms, find that firm size measured as a proxy of firms’ 
internal controls. However, they did not find a relation between restatement and the firm 
size. McMullen et al. (1996) are focused on examining the association between weak 
internal control and voluntary report applying SEC enforcement actions and corrections 
of prior reported earnings as a proxy for weak internal control, and find that small firms 
with weak internal control are less likely to voluntarily report internal control compared 
to other small firms to provide voluntary reports on internal control.  
 
Under Section 404 of SOX managers are required to provide an annual report on their 
internal controls, assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and 
procedures.  Prior to Section 404 of SOX, Section 302 of SOX also requires firms to 
disclose material weakness in their controls, furthermore company executives are 
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required to certify in the periodic reports. Both Section 302 and 404 use definition of 
“effective” internal control which is similar to those developed in 1992 by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission. The 
SEC defines internal control as “a process affected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the reliability of financial reporting.”  
 
2.5.3.2 Internal controls and audit fees 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) examine the influence of internal control disclosures 
under Section 404 on audit fees. They find that audit fees in 2004 are much higher than 
the audit fees in 2003. Further, audit fees for fiscal year 2004 are 43 percent higher 
firms who disclosed their material weaknesses than firms who did not disclose. 
However, in fiscal 2003 they did not find a relation between audit fees and an internal 
control material weakness disclosure. Finally, they find that the association between 
audit fees and internal control disclosures does not change based on the type of material 
weakness. Later, Hogan and Wilkins (2008) find that audit fees are abnormally high for 
firms with an internal control deficiency in the year preceding the deficiency disclosure. 
The results indicate that auditors are able to reduce the impact of poor controls through 
substantive testing. Meanwhile, Hoitash et al. (2008) conclude that companies 
disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees in 
the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Their 
conclusion provides the details of audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX 
implementation. 
 
Doogar et al. (2010) investigate the impact of AS5 on audit fees. They find that AS5 
audit fees are associated with auditee fraud risk while they fail to find this association 
between AS2 audit fees and auditee fraud risk. Compared to AS2 benchmarks AS5 
audit fees are averagely lower for all auditees. Moreover, compared to AS2 benchmarks 
AS5 fees are lower for auditees who have lower fraud risk , however, AS5 fees are 
greater for higher-fraud –risk auditees. Finally, they conclude that AS5 replaced AS2 
based on the fact that AS2 is considered as overregulation, and auditors intend to apply 
a risk-based approach in order to improve both efficiency and potential effectiveness 
through the perspective auditing. Similarly, Krishnan et al. (2011) conduct an analysis 
of the change from AS2 to AS5 as well as the impact of this change on audit fees. They 
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find that audit fees were lower in the first two years after implementing AS5 compared 
to the last year of AS2.  
 
Further, the highest decline of fees is associated with companies that had remediated 
material weaknesses in their internal control and changed from an adverse opinion 
under AS2 to a clean opinion under AS5. Moreover, firms that obtained first-time 
adverse opinions of their internal control under AS5 compared to the last year of AS2, 
paid lower fee premiums. Finally, they did not find any evidence regarding the benefit 
of small and less complex firms obtained from AS5, specifically AS5 allows small and 
less complex firms to be “scaled” on the internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). 
However, only relative more complex firms are found to have the benefit of audit fee 
savings.                  
 
A study by Munsif et al. (2011) indicates that there is difference of audit fees paid to 
audit firms by remediating firms and firms continued to report material weaknesses in 
internal control. The remediating firms pay less than firms that continue to report 
material weaknesses in internal control. However, the remediating firms pay fee 
premiums while firms that have clean Section 404 reports do not. Furthermore, they 
point out that this fee premiums persist two more years longer after remediation, and 
they conclude that audit fees are associated with firms that have material weaknesses.  
 
Summary 
Internal control over financial reporting has been considered as an important feature of a 
company (Kinney et al. 1990; Kinney 2000, 2001). Prior to SOX, standards of 
regulating internal control are limited. Both Section 302 and 404 of SOX were 
developed to address the client firms’ internal control systems. Prior research is mainly 
focused on addressing the association between internal controls and audit fees under 
both Section 302 and 404 of SOX. The Table 15 below presents more details on the 
findings of the association between internal controls and audit fees in prior research.   
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Table 15: Past study on internal controls and audit fees 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
 Limitations and future Research   
Raghunandan, 
K. & Rama, 
D. (2006) 
 
 
 
This study examines 
the relation between 
material weakness 
disclosures made 
pursuant to section 
404 of SOX and audit 
fees.  
 
A final sample contains 
660 firms that filed 
their Section 404 
reports by May 15, 
2005. 
 
A fee regression model 
is applied.   
 
 
They find that audit fees in 2004 
are much higher than the audit 
fees in 2003. Further, audit fees 
for fiscal year 2004 are 43 
percent higher firms who 
disclosed their material 
weaknesses than firms who did 
not disclose. However, in fiscal 
year 2003 they did not find a 
relation between audit fees and 
an internal control material 
weakness disclosure. Finally, 
they find that the association 
between audit fees and internal 
control disclosures does not 
change based on the type of 
material weakness. 
Future study may focus on the reaction of 
users to this disclosure, and auditors’ 
reactions depending on the type of 
internal control weakness.  
 
 
 
Hogan, C. & 
Wilkins, M. 
(2008) 
 
The authors examine 
audit fees in the fiscal 
year prior to 
disclosure of internal 
control deficiencies 
for companies that 
disclosed deficiencies 
between November 
2003 and November 
2004 and compare to 
the companies 
without reporting 
control deficiencies. 
Their sample contains 
284 internal control 
deficiency observations 
having 6,451 matched 
industry observations 
between November 1, 
2003 and November 
30, 2004.    
 
An audit fee regression 
model and an 
abnormal accrual 
regression model are 
combined to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
They find that audit fees are 
significantly higher for internal 
control deficiency firms after 
controlling for size, risk, and 
profitability. Moreover, the fee 
increment is highest for firms 
that have the most substantial 
internal control problems. 
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2.5.4  Type of internal controls  
The prior research has focused on the internal controls and audit clients in the following 
aspects. First, the audit clients’ attributes are associated with the incidence of 
accounting-specific material weaknesses. Second, account-specific deficiencies are 
considered to have an influence on assessing risks by auditors over financial reporting. 
Doyle et al. (2007a) find that companies reported account-specific material weaknesses, 
are likely to be larger, financially healthier, more diverse in business operations and 
have higher growth compared to companies reported entity-level material weaknesses. 
Moreover, they conclude that the account-specific material weaknesses result in 
complex operating environments while the lack of staffing and expertise contribute 
more to the entity-level material weaknesses.  
 
Alternatively, Ge and McVay (2005) examine a sample of 261 companies who have 
disclosed at least one material weakness in internal control in their SEC filings after 
SOX. Their finding indicates that generally material weaknesses in internal control are 
associated with the following issues, such as deficient revenue-recognition policies, lack 
of segregation of duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting process and accounting 
policies and inappropriate account reconciliation. More specifically, the most common 
account-specific material weaknesses are occurred in the accrual accounts, including 
accounts receivable and inventory accounts. Referring to complex accounts, these 
material weaknesses are most occurred in derivative and income tax accounts.  
 
Moreover, they find a link between deficiencies and lack of technical expertise and 
industry concentration. Recently, Bedard and Graham (2011) conduct an investigation 
on internal control deficiencies under Section 404 of SOX. They find that deficiencies 
regarding revenue and tax are most likely classifies as severe internal control issues. 
Account-specific material weaknesses caused by complex operating environments and 
lack of technical experts, are generally considered as common problems. But, 
implementing an ERP system intends to mitigate these problems. Similarly, Morris 
(2011) examines the implementation of enterprise resource planning system and internal 
control weakness. The finding confirms prior research finding that firms who have 
implemented enterprise resource planning system are less likely to report internal 
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control weaknesses than firms who have not implemented this system. Further, this 
different has been existed for both entity-wide and account-level controls.  
 
Summary 
The prior research has been focused on the internal controls and audit clients in the 
following two aspects (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a; Bedard and Graham 
2011). First, the audit clients’ attributes are associated with the incidence of accounting-
specific material weaknesses. Second, account-specific deficiencies are considered to 
have an influence on assessing risks by auditors over financial reporting. The Table 16 
below presents more details on the findings of different types of internal controls in 
prior research.    
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Table 16: Previous research on findings of internal controls 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
    Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
    Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
 Limitations and future Research   
Doyle, J. Ge, 
W. & 
McVay, S. 
(2007b) 
 
 
They examine the 
association 
between accruals 
quality and internal 
control.  
 
 
Using 705 firms that 
disclosed at least one 
material weakness 
from August 2002 to 
November 2005. 
 
An accrual quality 
regression model is 
used to test the 
relation between 
internal control and 
accrual quality.   
 
They find that weaknesses are 
generally associated with poorly 
estimated accruals that are not 
realized as cash flows. In addition, 
this relation between weak internal 
controls and lower accruals quality 
is driven by weakness disclosures 
related to overall company-level 
controls, which may be more 
difficult to audit around.   
 
This study has limitations: 1) the 
disclosure of a material weakness is 
considered as a proxy for actual 
presence of an internal control 
problem; 2) there is an assumption that 
the material weaknesses have been 
presented for multiple years; 3) the 
ability to infer causality between 
internal control problems and accruals 
quality is limited; 4) this study has to 
rely on a proxy for accruals quality. 
Ge, W. & 
McVay, S. 
(2005)  
 
 
 
The authors 
investigate 261 
companies that 
disclosed at least 
one material 
weakness in 
internal control 
after the effective 
date of SOX. 
 
The sample contains 
493 distinct 
deficiencies for the 
261 firms from August 
2002 to November 
2004. 
 
A logistic 
regression of the 
probability of a 
firm disclosing a 
material weakness 
is used to analyse 
the material 
weaknesses in 
internal control. 
They find that poor internal control 
is generally related to an 
insufficient commitment of 
resources for accounting controls. 
Material weaknesses in internal 
control tend to be related to 
deficient revenue-recognition 
policies, lack of segregation of 
duties, deficiencies in the period-
end reporting process and 
accounting policies, and 
inappropriate account 
reconciliation. Additionally, they 
find that disclosing a material 
weakness is positively associated 
with business complexity, 
negatively associated with firm 
size and firm profitability as well. 
Further study could examine why there 
is a strongly negative relation between 
profitability and material weakness 
disclosures or explore why large 
auditors are more likely to disclose a 
material weakness.  Moreover, further 
study could investigate the types of 
material weaknesses disclosed by 
firms. Finally, more work can be done 
by exploring the links between 
disclosure of material weaknesses and 
fraud, earnings management, or 
restatements.   
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Table 16 continue 
   Author(s)                   
       Year 
Objective                         
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
          Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Bedard, J. & 
Graham, L. 
(2011) 
 
 
They examine 
detection and severity 
classification of 
internal control 
deficiencies 
identified under 
Section 404 of SOX. 
 
 
The sample comprises 
3,990specific internal 
control deficiency 
detected in 76 
engagements for 44 
companies. 
 
A few logistic 
regression models are 
used to test detection 
and servity 
classification of 
internal control 
deficiencies identified 
under section 404 of 
SOX. 
They find that auditors detect 
about three-fourths of 
unremediated internal control 
deficiencies usually through 
control testing. They also find 
that clients often 
underestimate internal control 
deficiencies servity but this 
tendency is lower among well-
controlled companies with a 
well-designed Section 404 
process. 
This study has limitations: 1) the sample 
size is small; 2) engagements in this 
study were performed under different 
standards, such as AS2 and AS5; 3) it is 
difficult to directly compare the 
proportions of material weakness 
identified in this study; 4) sample 
engagements were chosen by 
participating firms.   
Morris, J. 
(2011) 
 
This research intends 
to examine the 
impact of enterprise 
resource planning 
(ERP) systems on the 
effectiveness of 
internal controls over 
financial reporting   
 
The sample contains 
108 firms and 377 
firm-year observations 
that announced 
implementation of ERP 
systems between 1994 
and 2003.  
 
This study uses a probit 
regression model 
adopted from Ogneva 
et al. (2007) to examine 
the hypotheses. 
The finding indicates that 
enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) implementing firms are 
less likely to report internal 
control weaknesses than a 
matched control sample of 
non-ERP implementing firms. 
Further, the author finds that 
this difference exists for both 
general and individual 
controls. 
This study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) the sample is suffered 
from a large-firm bias; 2) the selection 
process raise potential bias issue as well. 
 
Further study should consider additional 
ways to identify ERP implementers and 
the extent to which the systems have 
been implemented and are being 
utilized.      
   
 
127 
 
2.5.5  Internal control disclosure   
Doyle et al. (2007a) examine the determinants of weakness in internal control for 779 
firms disclosing material weakness from August 2002 to 2005. The results indicate that 
these firms tend to be smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing 
rapidly, or undergoing restructuring. Meanwhile Doyle et al. (2007b) also investigate 
the association between accruals quality and internal controls over financial reporting 
using 705 firms that disclosed at least a material weakness in the period from 2002 to 
2005, and find that weaknesses are related to poorly estimated accruals, however, are 
not realized as cash flows. Further, the association between weak internal controls and 
lower accruals quality is caused by weakness disclosures regarding the overall 
company-level controls. These weaknesses are considered as more difficult to audit as 
well. 
 
In addition, Ashbaugh et al. (2007) investigate the economic factors and management’s 
incentives to discover and report control problems. The finding indicates that firms 
intend to disclose internal control deficiencies, have more complex operations, recent 
organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations as well as 
fewer resources available for internal control. Firms with internal control deficiency 
have more incentives to discover and report these internal control deficiencies, are more 
likely to use a dominate audit firm and also have more concentrated institutional 
ownership. Masli et al. (2010) analyse the potential benefit for firms implementing 
enterprise resource planning system and the internal control material weakness 
disclosure. Their finding indicates that the internal control monitoring technology 
assists firms in reducing material weaknesses. However, implementing internal control 
monitoring technology is only slightly increased audit fees and slightly increased audit 
delays in the post-SOX period. 
 
Lin et al. (2011) examine the association between a firm’s internal control function and 
the disclosure of material weaknesses under Section 404 of SOX. Their finding 
indicates that the disclosure of material weaknesses is negatively related to the 
education level of the internal audit function and the extent the internal audit function 
covers by incorporating quality assurance techniques, financial reporting audit activities, 
and monitoring the prior remediation. Finally, the disclosure of material weaknesses is 
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positively related to the internal audit function practice of grading audit engagements 
and external –internal audit cooperation. 
 
Summary 
Prior research on the internal control weakness disclosure has concluded that the 
determinants of disclosing weakness in internal controls are included size, age, financial 
health and so on (Doyle et al. 2007a). Moreover, Doyle et al. (2007b) examine the 
association between accruals quality and internal controls over financial reporting, and 
find that weaknesses are related to poorly estimated accruals, however, are not realized 
as cash flows. Alternatively, Masli et al. (2010) analyse the potential benefit for firms 
implementing enterprise resource planning system and the internal control material 
weakness disclosure. Lin et al. (2011) examine the association between a firm’s internal 
control function and the disclosure of material weaknesses under Section 404 of SOX. 
The Table 17 below presents more details on the findings of internal control disclosure 
in prior research. 
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Table 17: Prior study on internal control disclosure 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Doyle, J. 
Ge, W. & 
McVay, S. 
(2007a) 
 
 
They examine 
determinants of 
weaknesses in 
internal control for 
779 firms 
disclosing material 
weaknesses from 
August 2002 to 
2005. 
 
 
 
The final sample has 
779 firms disclosing 
material weaknesses 
from August 2002 to 
2005. 
 
 
 A logistic regression 
model is used to 
examine the 
hypotheses 
developed in this 
study.  
 
 
 
 
They find that these firms tend to 
be smaller, younger, financially 
weaker, more complex, growing 
rapidly, or undergoing 
restructuring. Firms with more 
serious entity-wide control 
problems are smaller, younger and 
weaker financially while firms with 
less severe, account-specific 
problems are healthy financially but 
have complex, diversified, and 
rapidly changing operations. 
Finally, they find that the 
determinants also vary based on the 
specific reason for the material 
weakness.   
This study has the following limitations: 1) 
this study only covers a very short time 
frame; 2) there may have an issue of under-
identifying material weaknesses by some 
firms in this study.  
 
Future study should examine further of the 
materiality thresholds for determining 
whether or not a firm has a material 
weakness in internal control among firms.    
 
Ashbaugh-
Skaife, H. 
Collins, D. 
& Kinney, 
W. (2007) 
 
This paper 
examines economic 
factors caused 
firms’ control 
failures and 
managements’ 
incentives to 
discover and report 
control problems 
using internal 
control deficiency 
disclosure prior to 
mandated internal 
control audits. 
The sample includes 
326 firms with 
internal control 
deficiencies and a 
control sample of 
4,484 firms.    
A logistic 
regression model is 
used to estimate the 
relation between 
internal control risk 
attributes and 
incentives to 
discover and report 
internal control 
problems associated 
with firms’ internal 
control deficiency 
disclosures. 
They find that compared to non-
disclosers firms disclosing internal 
control disclosures, have more 
complex operations, recent 
organizational changes, greater 
accounting risk, more auditor 
resignations and have fewer 
resource available for internal 
control.    
Further study may investigate whether there 
are significant differences in internal 
control risk profiles and incentives to report 
for firms that disclosed internal control 
deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits 
versus firms that report deficiencies under 
Section 404 of SOX. Then further 
exploration may examine the relation 
between internal control weaknesses and 
quality of externally reported numbers. 
Finally, it also worth of investigating 
whether internal control deficiencies result 
in higher information risk that increase 
firms’ cost of capital.   
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  Table 17 continue 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective                         
 
   Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Masli, A. 
Peters, G. 
Richardson, V 
& Sanchez, J. 
(2010) 
 
 
 
The authors analyse 
the potential benefits 
that firms can realize 
from implementing 
technology specially 
aimed at monitoring 
the effectiveness of 
their internal control 
system.  
 
 
 
The sample contains 139 
observations of firms 
announcing SOX-related 
internal control monitoring 
technology initiatives from 
2003 to 2006.  
 
 
 
 Three OLS 
regression models 
are used to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
They find that the 
implementation of internal 
control monitoring technology 
is associated with lower 
likelihood of material 
weaknesses, smaller increases 
in audit fees, and smaller 
increases in audit delays 
during the post-SOX time 
period.  
 
 
Further study could examine the link 
between other types of internal control 
monitoring technology and specific 
outcomes. Further, it is worth to 
investigate whether internal control 
monitoring technology enhances audit 
quality from both external and internal 
aspects despite its association with audit 
deficiency and timeliness. Finally, further 
research may examine how internal 
control monitoring technology impacts 
managerial outcomes.    
Lin, S. Pizzini, 
M. Vargus, M 
& Bardhan, I. 
(2011) 
 
They examine the 
role that a firm’s 
internal audit 
function (IAF) plays 
in the disclosure of 
material weaknesses 
report under Section 
404 of SOX   
The sample contains 214 
firms from 2003 to 2004 
 
A logit model is 
used to estimate the 
hypotheses. 
The results indicate that 
material weakness disclosures 
are positively associated with 
the internal audit function 
practice of grading audit 
engagements and external-
internal audit coordination, 
suggesting that these activities 
increase the effectiveness of 
Section 404 compliance 
processes.    
This study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) their sample is small and 
has homogeneity as well; 2) it is difficult 
to determine the lack of statistically 
significant hypotheses associated with 
IAF attributes; 3) large firms tend to 
participate in the survey resulting in 
limiting their ability to generalize findings 
to firms that did not respond to the 
survey.     
 
 
 
 
.   
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2.5.6  Internal controls and corporate governance 
Corporate governance has an influence on internal control, such as audit committee 
financial expertise reduces the likelihood of a material weakness in the internal control 
over financial reporting. For instance, Krishnan (2005) suggests that there is a negative 
relation between the presence of internal control problems and audit committee 
independence and the number of audit committee members with financial expertise. 
Later, Zhang et al. (2007) investigate the association among audit committee quality, 
auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weakness in the post-SOX. 
The result indicates that there is a relation between audit committee quality, auditor 
independence and internal control weaknesses. Compared to firms that have more 
financial expertise, including both accounting financial expertise and non-accounting 
financial expertise, firms who have less financial expertise will be likely to identified 
with an internal control weakness. 
 
Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) examine the relation between audit 
committee and internal control deficiencies in the post-SOX. They find a relation 
between the active audit committee and internal control weaknesses reported. Moreover, 
they find that audit committees with a small proportion of financial experts are more 
likely to report internal control weaknesses. Hoitash et al. (2009) conduct a study on 
examining the relation between corporate governance and disclosures of material 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. They report an association 
between the internal control quality and the characteristics of board and audit committee 
under Section 404 instead of Section 302. Specifically, they find a weaker association 
between the disclosure of material weaknesses and more audit committee members who 
have accounting and supervisory experience and board strength. Further, they also find 
a relation between the nature of material weaknesses and the type of experience. Finally, 
they discover that the disclosure of material weaknesses is associated with a financial 
expert without accounting experience, or multiple financial experts. 
 
Meanwhile, Naiker and Sharma (2009) are focused on examining the relation between 
internal control deficiencies reported under Section 404 of SOX and the presence of 
former audit partners on the audit committee. They find a negative relation between the 
presence of former audit partners on the audit committee and internal control 
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deficiencies indicating that the presence of former audit partners on the audit committee 
reduces the likelihood of internal control deficiencies.  
 
Li et al. (2010) examine the interactions among chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) 
professional qualifications, internal control weakness under Section 404 of SOX, CFOs’ 
turnover, CFOs’ qualification improvement and correction of material weaknesses. 
Their finding indicates that in 2004 firms received adverse opinions under Section 404, 
have less qualified CFOs, such as lacking financial accounting knowledge, or having 
shorter CFO working experience or both. This result shows that CFO qualification plays 
an important role in determining internal control quality. Further, in 2005 firms who 
have received adverse SOX 404 opinions are considered to hire better qualified CFOs. 
Finally, SOX 404 opinion improvement could be achieved by hiring better qualified 
CFOs rather than hiring a new CFO.  
 
Alternatively, Carcello et al. (2011) conclude that the benefits of independence and 
expertise to audit committee are reduced if the chief executive officer (CEO) is involved 
in corporate board selection. Moreover, they find that there is a negative association 
between stock market reaction and a restatement, and this association could be litigated 
if the firm has a completely independent audit committee without the CEO involvement 
of selecting directors. Cohen et al. (2010) applied semi-structured interviews to 
investigate the interaction of auditors with the audit committee, board, and internal 
auditors in the post-SOX period. They find that auditors generally consider audit 
committees to be ineffective in monitoring the financial reporting process. Furthermore, 
they find that the corporate governance has improved after SOX, particularly audit 
committees are considered to be quite active, diligent, knowledgeable and powerful.  
 
Summary 
Prior studies have found that corporate governance has an influence on internal control. 
For instance, audit committee financial expertise reduces the likelihood of a material 
weakness in the internal control over financial reporting (Krishnan 2005; Zhang et al. 
2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007). Further, Hoitash et al. (2009) conduct a study 
on examining the relation between corporate governance and disclosures of material 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.  
 
133 
 
Similarly, Naiker and Sharma (2009) investigate the relation between internal control 
deficiencies reported under Section 404 of SOX and the presence of former audit 
partners on the audit committee. Alternatively, Li et al. (2010) examine the interactions 
among chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) professional qualifications and internal control 
weakness under Section 404 of SOX. The Table 18 below presents more details on the 
findings of internal controls and corporate governance in prior research.  
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Table 18: Past studies on internal controls and corporate goverance 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
       Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Krishnan, J. 
(2005)  
 
 
 
The author examines 
the association 
between audit 
committee quality 
and the quality of 
corporate internal 
control.  
 
 
The sample consists of 
128 firms with internal 
control problems and 
128 firms without 
internal control 
problems. 
 
A logistic regression 
model is used to 
estimate the incidence 
of internal control 
problems. 
 
 
The finding indicates that 
independent audit 
committees and audit 
committees with financial 
expertise are significantly 
less likely to have internal 
control problems. 
 
 
 
Limitations included in this study are: 1) 
this study is a study of association rather 
than causation; 2) the sample size is 
smaller therefore the result may not be 
generalized.  
 
Further study could examine the role of 
audit committee composition and other 
factors in determining the quality of 
internal control of a more general 
population of firms.  
Zhang, Y. 
Zhou, J. & 
Zhou, N. 
(2007) 
 
 
The paper examines 
the relation between 
audit committee 
quality, auditor 
independence, and 
the disclosure of 
internal control 
weaknesses after the 
enactment of SOX.  
 
 
 
Their sample consists 
of 208 companies 
having material 
internal control 
collected from 
November 15, 2004 to 
July 31, 2005.  
 
 
The authors use 
conditional logit 
regression models to 
test their hypotheses in 
this study. 
 
 
The study finds that if 
firms’ audit committees 
have less accounting 
financial expertise and 
non-accounting financial 
expertise then most likely 
these firms disclose 
internal control weakness. 
Furthermore, if auditors of 
these firms are more 
independent then these 
firms will most likely to 
have internal control 
weaknesses, in particularly 
if these firms recently 
change their auditors.   
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Table 18 continue 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
     Methods                               
 
          Key findings                                
 
  Limitations and future Research   
Krishnan, G. 
& 
Visvanathan, 
G. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
This study 
discusses the role of 
audit committees 
and auditors when 
reporting internal 
control deficiencies 
in the post-SOX 
period. 
Their sample includes 90 
firm-reporting material 
weaknesses in their 
internal controls. 
A logistic 
regression model 
is used to test five 
hypotheses in this 
study. 
The authors find that a higher 
number of meetings of the audit 
committee, lesser proportion of 
financial experts in the audit 
committee, and more auditor 
changes firms hat report internal 
control weaknesses compared to 
firms without having 
weaknesses. Additionally, firms 
that report internal control 
weaknesses, have more 
restatements of financial 
statements      
The limitations are included: 1) the sample 
is small and the examining period is short; 
2) this study is subject to the effects of 
audit-related variables. 
 
Further study may examine whether the 
causes and consequences of control 
weaknesses are identifiable with specific 
changes in governance mechanisms as 
well as an extension of their research by 
examining a larger and a multi-period 
sample.   
 
Hoitash, U. 
Hoitash, R. & 
Bedard, J. 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
The authors 
examine the 
association between 
corporate 
governance and 
disclosures of 
material 
weaknesses in 
internal control 
over financial 
reporting.  
 
 
The final sample consists 
of 5,480 firm-year 
observations, including 
3,911 accelerated and 1, 
569 non-accelerated 
filters, and 19,673 audit 
committee members. 
 
 
 
 
 
A basic logistic 
regression model 
is used to test 
their hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They find a lower likelihood of 
disclosing Section 404 material 
weakness is associated with 
relatively more audit committee 
members having accounting and 
supervisory experience and 
board strength. Moreover, the 
material weakness disclosure is 
associated with designating a 
financial expert without 
accounting experience, or 
designating multiple financial 
experts.   
 
The limitations included in this study are: 
1) this study only examines the relation 
between corporate governance and internal 
control material weakness in the first two 
years after the implementation of Section 
404; 2) the cross-sectional approach 
engaged in this study is subject to the 
endogeneity problem. 
 
Further study could examine the 
association between corporate governance 
and the internal control material weakness 
for a longer time. 
 
   
 
136 
 
Table 18 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
        Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Naiker, V. & 
Sharma, D. 
(2009) 
The study examines the association 
between internal control 
deficiencies reported under Section 
404 of SOX and the presence of 
former audit partners on the audit 
committee who are affiliated and 
unaffiliated with the firm’s external 
auditor.  
They collected a 
sample of 1,225 firms 
for the 2004 fiscal 
year. 
They use a 
logistic 
regression 
model to test 
their 
hypotheses. 
Their results do support the 
suggestion of three-year 
“cooling-off” rule proposed 
by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ. In addition, audit 
partners on the audit 
committee who are affiliated 
(AFAPs) do allow 
management to circumvent 
the disclosure of internal 
control disclosures when 
conditions appear to suggest 
that there is a negative 
relation between AFAPs and 
performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals.     
The limitations in this study are: 1) the 
authors could not test whether former 
audit partners who actually worked on 
the audit of a client are as effective as 
their counterparts who have not worked 
on the audit of the client due to lack of 
data; 2) this study did not provide 
evidence of causation; 3) due to further 
lack of historical data of non-partner 
audit firm employees his study could not 
explore further the relation between audit 
committee members and current or 
former auditor.  
Li, C. Sun, 
L. & 
Ettredge, M. 
(2010) 
 
 
They are focused to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of 
the interrelationships among chief 
financial officers’ (CFOs’) 
professional qualifications, SOX 
Section 404 internal control 
weakness, CFOs’ turnover, CFOs’ 
qualification improvement, and 
correction of material weaknesses.  
The full sample 
contains 2,937 
companies’ filings 
initial SOX 404 
reports from January 
2005 to May 2005. 
 
A number of 
logistic 
regression 
models are 
used to test 
their 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
The findings indicate that 
firms that obtain initial 
adverse SOX 404 opinions 
for 2004 have less qualified 
CFOs. Further, these 
recipients have more CFO 
turnover in 2005, and these 
firms are more likely to hire 
CFOs having improved 
qualifications.    
Limitations included in this study are: 1) 
additional modelling may be useful to 
explain the relations; 2) the examining 
period in this study is too short; 3) they 
are unable to distinguish between CFO 
resignations and CFO dismissals due to 
lack of data; 4) this study does not 
examine the subsequent employment of 
departing CFOs. 
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Table 18 continue 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
      Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Caecello, J. 
Neal, T. 
Palmrose, Z. & 
Scholz, S. 
(2011) 
 
 
Their paper 
examines whether 
involvement of the 
chief executive 
officer (CEO) in 
selecting board 
members reduces 
audit committee 
effectiveness. 
Their sample contains 
104 restatement firms 
matched with an equal 
number of 
nonrestatement firms. 
Conditional logistic 
regression models 
are used to test their 
hypotheses in this 
study. 
They find that CEO 
involvement in the board 
selection process eliminates 
the benefits of both an 
apparently independent audit 
committee and financial 
expertise. Further, they find 
that the negative stock market 
reaction associated with a 
restatement is mitigated if the 
firm maintains a completely 
independent audit committee, 
only when the CEO is not 
involved in the director 
selection process. Finally, they 
find that these results appear 
to be driven by more severe 
restatements, which include 
misstatements due to 
fraudulent financial reporting.   
This study has some limitations: 1) the 
sample size is smaller; 2) there is still 
an issue of endogeneity; 3) there may 
be some measurement errors involving 
the CEO selection process. 
Cohen, J. 
Krishnamoorthy, 
G. & Wright, A. 
(2010) 
They investigate 
the interaction of 
auditors with the 
audit committee, 
board, and internal 
auditors in the post-
SOX period. 
36 external auditors, 
including 11 seniors, 12 
managers and 13 partners 
were selected as 
interviewees of their 
sample. 
A semi-structured 
interview approach 
is used to address 
research questions. 
They find that auditors 
generally consider audit 
committees to be ineffective in 
monitoring the financial 
reporting process. Moreover, 
they find that the corporate 
governance has improved in 
the post-SOX period, 
particularly audit committees 
are considered to be quite 
active, diligent, 
knowledgeable and powerful. 
Further study may examine how the 
litigation regime internationally affects 
the role of audit committees in the 
selection process. Further, using 
different methods, such as an 
experimental or archival study 
examines auditors’ experiences.   
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2.6  Audit quality and client firms’ internal corporate governance  
According to Lin and Hwang (2010), the role of corporate governance structure of a 
corporation in financial reporting is to ensure compliance with GAAP and to maintain 
the credibility of corporate financial statements. Prior research on corporate governance 
is focused on the composition, expertise, and activity of the board of directors (BOD) 
and its audit committee (AC). 
2.6.1 BOD independence 
The finding of Fama and Jensen (1983) indicates that the board of directors is 
considered as the most important management control mechanism. Beasley (1996) 
states that from an agent perspective the role of the board, particularly the independence 
of the board plays critically in overseeing corporation’s management. Prior research by 
Beasley et al. (2000) on fraudulent financial reporting and corporate governance, 
particularly independent boards and audit committees audit committee meetings, shows 
that companies that have financial statement fraud from technology and financial 
industries have fewer audit committees compared to companies that have financial 
statement fraud from technology, health care and finance industries, have less 
independent audit committees and less independent boards. Furthermore, they find that 
the fraud companies from the technology and health care industries have fewer audit 
committee meetings as well.  
 
Prior research (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002) on board’s independence shows that there is 
significant negative relationship between earnings management and increased BOD 
independence measured by the proportion of outside or independent directors on the 
board. For instance, Klein (2002) finds a negative relation between audit committee 
independence and abnormal accruals as well as board independence and abnormal 
accruals. Further, the result shows that reducing board or audit committee independence 
is associated with large increasing of abnormal accruals. However, the studies by Park 
and Shin (2004) and Peasnell et al. (2005) do not find a significant relationship. Ferris et 
al. (2003) examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. 
They find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments 
held by a director. Further, they failed to find that multiple directors shirk their 
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responsibilities to serve on board committees. Finally, there is no evidence showing 
multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation.  
 
Brennan and McDermott (2004) examine the issue of independence of boards of 
directors and non-executive directors of companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. 
Their study finds a lack of consistency in interpreting the definition of “independence”, 
a lack of disclosure of information although the majority of independent boards are 60 
percent. Srinivasan (2005) finds higher outside director turnover rates for companies 
restating earnings downward than for other companies. Kang et al. (2007) investigate 
the diversity and independence of the board membership of 100 top Australian 
companies in 2003. Their finding shows that 83 companies had aboard comprising a 
majority of independent directors. Further, the result also shows that 73 companies had 
an independent chair-person. 
 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) investigate the impact of multiple directorships on corporate 
diversification. The authors find that directors’ busyness is inversely related to firm 
value. Alternatively, firms where board members hold more outside board seats suffer a 
deeper diversification discount. Hunton and Rose (2008) conduct an experiment using 
87 audit committee members to examine the effects of audit issue and director status on 
the likelihood of accepting an auditor’s recommendation. Their result indicates that 
directors holding multiple directorships are less likely to accept an auditor’s restatement 
recommendation than directors with a single directorship. Further analysis shows that 
directors with multiple directorships are less willing to support restatements due to the 
concern of the damage on their reputation capital.  
 
Moreover, Tian et al. (2011) are focused on independent directors through examining 
the influence of their human capital and social capital on investor reactions to the 
board’s CEO selection decision. Their finding suggests that the effect of internal social 
capital was stronger when the new CEO was an insider than an outsider. Similarly, 
Hoitash (2011) examines whether independent directors who have social ties to 
management (inside directors) can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders. The results show that everything else equal, 
CEO compensation is higher when social ties between management and independent 
directors exist.   
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Summary 
Prior research on corporate governance has covered the following perspectives, such as 
the composition, expertise, and activity of the board of directors (BOD) and its audit 
committee (AC). For instance, prior research (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002) on board’s 
independence shows that there is significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and increased BOD independence.  
 
Further, Hoitash (2011) examines whether independent directors who have social ties to 
management (inside directors) can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders. Alternatively, Beasley et al. (2000) find that the 
fraud companies from the technology and health care industries have fewer audit 
committee meetings as well. The Table 19 below provides more details on the findings 
of board of director’s independence in prior research.    
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Table 19: Previous literature research on board of director’s independence 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
  Sample  and data                       
 
      Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Beasley, M. 
Carcello, J. 
Hermanson, 
D. & Lapides, 
P. (2000) 
 
 
This study provides 
an analysis of the 
influence from 
corporate governance 
on financial statement 
fraud by investigating 
three industries, 
including technology, 
health care and 
financial services 
from the late 1980s to 
the 1990s. 
 
66 companies were 
collected through 
technology, health care 
and financial industries 
between January 1987 
and December 1997. 
 
 
The analysis is based 
on documenting 
fraudulent financial 
reporting and 
comparing the 
results between 
these three 
industries with 
fraud and without 
fraud.    
 
 
 
The result shows that companies 
that have financial statement 
fraud from technology and 
financial industries have fewer 
audit committees compared to 
companies that have financial 
statement fraud from 
technology, health care and 
finance industries, have less 
independent audit committees 
and less independent boards. 
Furthermore, they find that the 
fraud companies from the 
technology and health care 
industries have fewer audit 
committee meetings as well. 
This study has a limitation:  lack of a 
discriminant model with one-to-one 
matching of fraud and non-fraud. 
 
Further research may develop more 
accurate fraud prediction model to 
compare fraud companies with non-
fraud companies.    
 
 
 
Klein, A. 
(2002)  
 
The study examines 
whether audit 
committee and board 
characteristics are 
related to earnings 
management by the 
firms.  
 
 
 
The final sample consists 
of 692 observations 
collected from S&P 500 
proxy statements as of 
March 31, 1992 and 
1993 filed by the SEC. 
 
 
Several cross-
sectional regression 
models are used to 
test abnormal 
adjusted accruals 
and board and audit 
committee 
composition.     
 
 
The author finds a negative 
relation between audit 
committee independence and 
abnormal accruals as well as 
board independence and 
abnormal accruals. Further, the 
result shows that reducing board 
or audit committee 
independence is associated with 
large increasing of abnormal 
accruals 
Further study needs to produce better 
measures of abnormal accruals. 
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Table 19 continue 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
      Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Ferris, S. 
Jagannathan, 
M. & 
Pritchard 
(2003)  
 
 
The authors 
investigate the 
number of external 
appointments held 
by corporate 
directors. 
A final sample contains 
3,190 firms that at least 
$100 million in total 
assets at the beginning 
of 1995.     
Logistic regression 
models are used to 
analyse the relation 
between the firm 
performance and the 
number of 
appointments held by 
the directors.   
They find that firm 
performance has a positive 
effect on the number of 
appointments held by a 
director. Further, they failed to 
find that multiple directors 
shirk their responsibilities to 
serve on board committees. 
Finally, there is no evidence 
showing multiple directors are 
associated with a greater 
likelihood of securities fraud 
litigation. 
 
Park, Y. & 
Shin, H. 
(2004)  
 
Their study 
examines the role 
of the board by 
investigating the 
effect of board 
composition on the 
practice of earnings 
management in 
Canada. 
Their sample contains 
539 firm-years. 
 
They use the cross-
sectional pooled 
regression method to 
test the board 
independence and 
earnings management.   
 
 
They find that earnings are 
managed upward to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings 
declines.  Moreover, they 
claim outside directors as a 
whole do not reduce abnormal 
accruals.  
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Table 19 continue 
 
Author(s)                   
    Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Brennan, N. & 
McDermott, 
M. (2004) 
 
 
This study 
examines the 
independence of 
boards of directors 
and non-executive 
directors of Irish 
listed companies.  
A sample of 80 annual 
reports collected from 
the Irish listed 
companies.  
 
An analysis is based 
on descriptive 
statistics.  
 
 
Their study finds a lack of 
consistency in interpreting the 
definition of “independence”, 
a lack of disclosure of 
information although the 
majority of independent 
boards are 60 percent. 
The limitations are included: 1) their 
sample contains a very diverse group of 
companies; 2) interpreting the 
information in annual reports may cause 
issues; 3) this study divides business and 
personal associations. 
Peasnell, K. 
Pope, P. & 
Young, S. 
(2005) 
They investigate 
whether the 
incidence of 
earnings 
management by UK 
firms depends on 
board monitoring. 
The final sample 
consists of 559 firms 
with 1,271 firm-year 
observations.  
 
They use pooled 
OLS regression 
models to estimate 
the impact of board 
monitoring on the 
extent of earnings 
management. 
They find little evidence that 
outside directors influence 
income-decreasing abnormal 
accruals when pre-managed 
earnings are high. 
Future study may investigate how boards 
and audit committees work together in 
monitoring and controlling earnings 
management. Further, it may examine 
the relation between firm’s corporate 
governance and the interpretation of 
accounting information. Finally, further 
effort on improving endogeneity is 
needed in future.   
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 Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
     Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Srinivasan, S. 
(2005) 
 
 
The study is 
focused on 
examining the 
association between 
outside directors 
and companies 
having accounting 
restatements.   
 
A sample of 409 
companies that restated 
their earnings from 1997 
to 2001. 
 
 
Regression models 
are used to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
The author finds higher 
outside director turnover rates 
for companies restating 
earnings downward than for 
other companies. 
 
 
 
Further study may examine the costs 
associated with improving the role of 
audit committee in providing quality 
financial reporting and the outside 
directors. 
 
 
 
Kang, H. Cheng, 
M. & Gray, S. 
(2007) 
 
 
This study 
examines the 
diversity and 
independence of the 
board membership 
of 100 Australian 
companies in 2003.  
 
Their sample contains 
100 companies from 11 
different industries. 
 
 
 
The analysis is based 
on the basic 
descriptive statistics 
and estimation of 
regressions. 
 
Their finding shows that 83 
companies had aboard 
comprising a majority of 
independent directors. Further, 
the result also shows that 73 
companies had an independent 
chair-person. 
 
Further study may examine the extent 
of diversity in Australian companies in 
more depth by investigating the less 
visible backgrounds and roles of 
directors in more detail.  
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Table 19 continue 
 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                              
 
     Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Jiraporn, P. 
Kim, Y. & 
Davidson, W. 
(2008) 
 
 
 
They investigate the 
impact of multiple 
directorships on 
corporate diversification. 
Their sample contains 
3,605 firm year 
observations from 1998 
to 2002. 
Regression 
analysis is used to 
test hypotheses. 
The authors find that 
directors’ busyness is 
inversely related to firm 
value. Alternatively, firms 
where board members hold 
more outside board seats 
suffer a deeper 
diversification discount. 
 
Hunton, J. & 
Rose, J. 
(2008) 
 
 
 
Their study intends to 
examine the relation 
between audit issues and 
director status. 
 
 
 
88 audit committee 
members were 
participated in this 
experiment.   
 
A quantitative 
research method is 
used to analyse the 
experimental 
results. 
 
 
 
Their result indicates that 
directors holding multiple 
directorships are less likely 
to accept an auditor’s 
restatement recommendation 
than directors with a single 
directorship. Further 
analysis shows that directors 
with multiple directorships 
are less willing to support 
restatements due to the 
concern of the damage on 
their reputation capital. 
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Table 19 continue 
 Author(s)                   
      Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
      Methods                               
 
        Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Tian, J. 
Haleblian, J. 
& 
Rajagopalan, 
N. (2011) 
 
This study is 
focused on 
independent 
directors through 
examining the 
influence of their 
human capital and 
social capital on 
investor reactions to 
the board’s CEO 
selection decision. 
 
 
 
 
208 CEO succession 
events were selected as 
the final dataset. 
 
 
 
Regression analysis is 
used to estimate the 
effects of independent 
directors on investor 
reactions to new CEO 
selection. 
 
Their finding suggests that 
the effect of internal social 
capital was stronger when 
the new CEO was an insider 
than an outsider. 
 
 
 
 
The limitations included in this study 
are: 1) their measures of board capital 
may not be accurate to capture the 
underlying board process; 2) the 
finding of board benefits from co-
working experience may not accurate; 
3) this study is only focused on 
nondiversified companies; 4) this study 
is only focused on one particular 
decision context. 
 
Further study could examine hoe the 
effectiveness of boards of directors is 
affected by various types of board 
human and social capital.  
Hoitash, U. 
(2011)  
 
 
The author 
examines whether 
independent 
directors who have 
social ties to 
management (inside 
directors) can 
effectively perform 
their fiduciary duty 
to monitor 
management on 
behalf of 
shareholders. 
The final sample 
contains 13,000 distinct 
board members serving 
on more than 3,000 firm-
year observations. 
 The results show that 
everything else equal, CEO 
compensation is higher 
when social ties between 
management and 
independent directors exist. 
Limitations are included: 1) some 
observations of outside of the board 
room are unavailable; 2) this study 
misses some variables of social ties 
measures; 3) there is an issue of 
endogeneity.       
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2.6.2 BOD expertise 
Carcello et al. (2002) examine the relation between three board characteristics, such as 
independence, diligence and expertise and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. 
The result shows that there is a significant positive relation between audit fees and 
board independence, diligence and expertise. This result indicates that a more 
independent, diligent and expert board demands higher audit quality (greater assurance, 
which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide due to the 
concern of its reputation, the avoidance of legal liability and the promotion of 
shareholders’ interests.  Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard et al. (2004) provide some 
evidence that the financial sophistication of the board and the audit committee is an 
important factor in preventing managers to manipulate earnings management.         
 
A study conducted by Park and Shin (2004) shows that there is a significant negative 
relation between increased board financial expertise and earnings management, however, 
Xie et al. (2003) find a negative insignificant relationship. Guner et al. (2008) analyse 
how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. They find that 
financial experts exert significant influence, though not necessary in the interest of 
shareholders.  
 
 
Summary 
Prior studies on the expertise of board of directors mainly focuses on the investigation 
of the influence of expertise, particularly financial expertise on audit quality. For 
instance, studies conducted by Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard et al. (2004) provide some 
evidence that the financial sophistication of the board is an important factor in 
preventing managers to manipulate earnings management. Further, Park and Shin (2004) 
and Guner et al. (2008) also find the significant influence of financial experts on audit 
quality and corporate decisions as well. Table 20 below provides more details on the 
findings of board of director’s expertise in prior research.   
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Table 20: Past study on board of director’s expertise 
Author(s) 
          Year 
Objective Sample  and data Methods 
 
Key findings Limitations and future Research 
Carcello, J. 
Hermanson, 
D. Neal, T. & 
Riley, R. 
(2002)  
The study examines 
the relation between 
three board 
characteristics, such 
as independence, 
diligence and 
expertise and Big 6 
audit fees for 
Fortune 1000 
companies.  
The sample consists 
of 258 firms.  
An audit fee 
regression model is 
used to test the 
relation between 
board 
characteristics and 
audit fees.  
The result shows that there is a 
significant positive relation between 
audit fees and board independence, 
diligence and expertise. This result 
indicates that a more independent, 
diligent and expert board demands 
higher audit quality than the Big 6 
audit firms normally provide due to 
the concern of its reputation, the 
avoidance of legal liability and the 
promotion of shareholders’ interests. 
Limitations are included in this study: 1) their 
sample only contains large public and 
nonfinancial companies; 2) there may have 
exogenous factors in this study; 3) this study can 
not rule out that a more independent, diligent 
and expert board exhibits less price resistance; 
4) data and model within this study are 
limitations as well. 
 
Further research may investigate the relation 
between corporate governance mechanisms and 
other aspects of the audit process.  
Xie, B. 
Davidson, W. 
& DaDalt, P. 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
They investigate the 
role of the board of 
directors, the audit 
committee and the 
executive committee 
in preventing 
earnings 
management. 
The sample 
contains 282 firm-
year observations 
from S& P 500 
index. 
Several regression 
models are used to 
test hypotheses.  
They find that board and audit 
committee members with corporate 
or financial background are 
associated with firms that have 
smaller discretionary current 
accruals. 
This study has a limitation that it can not 
interpret the results as demonstrating a causal 
link between board and audit committee 
composition and earnings management. 
Bedard, J. 
Chtourou, S. 
& Courteau, 
L. (2004) 
 
 
 
The authors examine 
whether the 
expertise, 
independence, and 
activities of a firm’s 
audit committee and 
board have an 
influence on the 
quality of its publicly 
released financial 
information.  
A sample contains 
300 US companies 
with aggressive 
earnings 
management.  
 
A multinomial 
logit model of 
regression is used 
to test their 
hypotheses. 
This study provides some evidence 
that the financial sophistication of the 
board and the audit committee is an 
important factor in preventing 
managers to manipulate earnings 
management.         
  
This study is subject to some limitations: 1) this 
study did not provide a causal link between 
audit committee characteristics and the level of 
earnings management;2) their measures of 
earnings management has errors; 3) the sample 
is limited to firms at the extremes of abnormal 
accrual distributions.   
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Table 20 continue 
 
Author(s) 
      Year 
Objective 
 
Sample and data 
 
Methods Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Guner, A. 
Malmendier, 
U. & Tate, G. 
(2008)  
They analyse how 
directors with 
financial expertise 
affect corporate 
decisions.  
The full sample 
consists of 32, 493 
observations.  
Different 
regression models 
are used to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that financial experts exert 
significant influence, though not 
necessary in the interest of 
shareholders.  
Limitations included in this study are: 
1) the impact of board members on 
firm policies can not be fully 
monitored; 2) the overall impact of 
financial experts on shareholder value 
is difficult to assess; 3) there is a 
trade-off between potential 
improvements in monitoring and 
potential losses through the advisory 
channel.   
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2.6.3 Board duality 
Hickson et al. (1971) initially identify the certainty regarding the decision-making 
power by insiders through controlling the flow of information. This certainty occurs 
depending on having two or more key positions by one individual. For example, the 
CEO who is also Chair of the Board of Directors controls the agenda of the Board 
(lorsch & MacIver 1989). The results from prior research (Mallette & Fowler 1992) and 
prior research (Dechow et al. 1996) indicate that these dual roles cause adopting poison 
pills and issuing fraudulent financial statements respectively. Other prior studies have 
also examined the negative impact that CEO duality can have over strategy (Finkelstein 
1992), performance (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois 1988; Haleblian & Finkelstein 1993) and 
the entrenchment of the CEO (Mallette & Fowler 1992).  
 
Dune (2004) explores further on the relation between top management team duality and 
the decision to release false financial information. The finding of this study indicates 
that top management team duality is a key characteristic that makes a contribution to 
illegal corporate behaviour. Meanwhile, Gul and Leung (2004) examine the linkages 
between board leadership structure regarding CEO duality, the proportion of expert 
outside directors on the board and voluntary corporate disclosures. The result shows that 
CEO duality is associated with lower levels of voluntary corporate disclosures. 
However, this association becomes weaker in the presence of higher the proportion of 
expert outside directors on the board indicating the expertise of non-executive directors 
moderates the CEO duality/corporate disclosures relationship. Further, Faleye (2007) 
examines the determinants of CEO duality. The finding shows that organizational 
complexity, CEO reputation and managerial ownership increase the probability of CEO 
duality.     
 
On the other hand, the following studies (Xie et al. 2003; Davidson et al. 2005; Abdul et 
al. 2006) fail to find evidence of the association between CEO duality and earnings 
management activity in their studies. In the UK, Dahya et al. (2009) examine 
performance of publicly listed UK companies over a period that encompasses the 
issuance of the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best Practice. They find that companies 
splitting the combined CEO/COB position to conform to the Code’s requirement did not 
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exhibit any absolute or relative improvement in performance when compared to various 
peer-group benchmarks. 
 
Summary 
Prior research on board duality has covered a variety of aspects. For example, Dechow 
et al. 1996 conclude that these dual roles cause adopting poison pills and issuing 
fraudulent financial statements respectively. Others have examined the negative impact 
that CEO duality can have over strategy (Finkelstein 1992), performance (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois 1988; Haleblian & Finkelstein 1993) and the entrenchment of the CEO 
(Mallette & Fowler 1992).  
 
Additionally, Dune (2004) explores further on the relation between top management 
team duality and the decision to release false financial information. Meanwhile, Gul and 
Leung (2004) examine the linkages between board leadership structure regarding CEO 
duality and voluntary corporate disclosures. The Table 21 below provides more details 
on the findings of board duality in prior research.  
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Table 21: Past study on board duality 
Author(s) 
      Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Dune, P. 
(2004)  
The author 
explores further on 
the relation 
between top 
management team 
duality and the 
decision to release 
false financial 
information.  
The final sample 
contains 103 firms. 
A cross-sectional logit 
regression model is 
used to test 
hypotheses.  
The finding indicates that top management 
team duality is a key characteristic that 
makes a contribution to illegal corporate 
behaviour.  
The study has limitations: 1) their 
sample is biased; 2) there are only 
public companies included in this 
study; 3) this study is only focused on 
voluntary disclosure; 4) this study only 
examines one part of illegal corporate 
behaviour.  
Gul, F. & 
Leung, S. 
(2004)  
They examine the 
linkages between 
board leadership 
structure regarding 
CEO duality, the 
proportion of 
expert outside 
directors on the 
board and 
voluntary 
corporate 
disclosures.  
The final sample 
contains 385 firm 
observations.  
They adopt a two-
stage OLS regression 
model to test 
hypotheses.  
The result shows that CEO duality is 
associated with lower levels of voluntary 
corporate disclosures. However, this 
association becomes weaker in the 
presence of higher the proportion of expert 
outside directors on the board indicating 
the expertise of non-executive directors 
moderates the CEO duality/corporate 
disclosures relationship.  
Further exploration could examine how 
other elements of corporate 
governance, such as size of boards, 
corporate family ownership and outside 
blocks, are associated with corporate 
voluntary disclosure strategies.   
Faleye, O. 
(2007)     
 
This study 
examines the 
determinants of 
CEO duality.  
The sample consists 
of 1,883 firms. 
Probit regression 
models are used to test 
hypotheses. 
The finding shows that organizational 
complexity, CEO reputation and 
managerial ownership increase the 
probability of CEO duality. 
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Table 21 continue 
Author(s) 
         Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Davidson, R. 
Stewart, J. & 
Kent, P. (2005) 
 
They examine the role of a 
firm’s internal governance 
structure in constraining 
earnings management. 
A sample of 434 
listed Australian 
companies for the 
ending financial year 
of 2000. 
Several regression 
models are developed 
to test their 
hypotheses. 
They did not find evidence to 
support that there is an association 
between an independent 
chairperson and earnings 
management.  
Limitations are included: 1) discretionary 
accruals considered as a measure of 
earnings management raise issues; 2) 
another limitation is related to the 
measure of testing the strength of internal 
governance mechanisms; 3) lack of 
suitable proxies to operationalize audit 
committee effectiveness.   
Abdul 
Rahman, R. & 
Mohamed Ali, 
F.(2006)  
They investigate the extent 
of the effectiveness of 
monitoring functions of 
board of directors, audit 
committee and concentrated 
ownership in reducing 
earnings management 
among Malaysian listed 
companies from 2002 to 
2003. 
A final sample 
consists of 97 listed 
companies from 2002 
to 2003 collected 
from Bursa Malaysia 
Main Board.  
 A cross-section 
modified Johns model 
is applied in this study.  
The authors fail to find evidence of 
the association between CEO 
duality and earnings management 
activity in their studies. 
Future study needs to examine the extent 
to which discretionary accruals is harmful 
or beneficial to the shareholders. 
Dahya, Garcia 
and Bommel 
(2009) 
The authors examine 
performance of publicly 
listed UK companies over a 
period that encompasses the 
issuance of the Cadbury 
Committee’s Code of Best 
Practice. 
Their sample includes 
1,124 UK publicly 
listed firms from 
1989 to 1996.   
Regression models are 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
They find that companies splitting 
the combined CEO/COB position 
to conform to the Code’s 
requirement did not exhibit any 
absolute or relative improvement in 
performance when compared to 
various peer-group benchmarks. 
Future study may address the similar 
Codes of Best Corporate Practice in other 
countries.  
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2.6.4  BOD stagger 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state the entrenched managers are likely to expropriate 
shareholder wealth and thus increase the likelihood of managing earnings through 
hiding their personal benefits and avoiding legal penalties or other undesirable 
consequences. Prior studies find that entrenchment increases the likelihood of managers 
expropriating shareholder wealth (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Moreover, the following studies examine the link between weak governance proxied by 
management entrenchment and firm performance (Morck et al. 1988; Yermack 1996; 
Gompers et al. 2003); in particularly the following studies (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002) 
examine the association between management entrenchment and greater earnings 
management. 
 
Alternatively, prior studies also find that staggered boards impair firm value, deter 
proxy contests and reduce the likelihood of involuntary executive turnover (Bebchuk 
and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007). Zhao and Chen (2008) find that staggered boards are 
associated with lower likelihood of committing fraud and smaller magnitudes of 
absolute unexpected accruals. Further, they also find that staggered boards are 
negatively associated with firm value. Prior research also argues combining CEO and 
board chair roles (duality) or splitting these roles depends on the consideration of costs 
and benefits associated with splitting CEO and board chair roles (Faleye 2007; Dey et al. 
2009). Consistent with their result a study conducted by Dahya et al. (2009) through 
analysing the publicly listed UK companies, suggests that splitting CEO and board chair 
roles mandated by the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best Practice appears to be off 
beam.  
 
Summary 
Prior studies find that entrenchment increases the likelihood of managers expropriating 
shareholder wealth (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The following 
studies examine the link between management entrenchment and firm performance 
(Morck et al. 1988; Yermack 1996; Gompers et al. 2003); particularly the studies 
conducted by Beasley (1996) and Klein (2002) examine the association between 
management entrenchment and greater earnings management. Moreover, the following 
studies find that staggered boards impair firm value, deter proxy contests and reduce the 
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likelihood of involuntary executive turnover (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007). 
The Table 22 below provides more details on the findings of board stagger in prior 
research.   
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Table 22: Board stagger in prior research 
Author(s) 
      Year 
Objective 
 
Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings 
 
Limitations and future Research 
Yermack, D. 
(1996)  
The objective of this 
study is to examine the 
relation between the 
corporate structure and 
the effectiveness of 
corporate governance 
system.  
A sample of 452 large US 
public corporations across 
eight years collected from 
Forbes magazine.  
Different regression 
models are applied in 
this study.  
The author finds an inverse 
association between board 
size and firm value 
regarding 452 large US 
industrial corporations from 
1984 to 1991.    
 
Bebchuk, L. & 
Cohen, A.  
(2005)  
They examine the 
association between 
the value of publicly 
traded companies and 
their staggered boards.  
The full sample consists of 
firms between 1,400 and 
1,800 collected from the 
Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre (IRRC) in 
1995, 998, 2000 and 2002 
respectively. 
Regression models are 
applied in this study.  
They find that staggered 
boards are associated with 
an economically meaningful 
reduction in firm value.  
Limitations included in this study are: 1) 
this study did not attempt to identify the 
effects of levels of protection from removal; 
2) lack of further identification of 
arrangements under different groups.  
Further study needs to examine hoe 
staggered boards affect various corporate 
decisions.   
Faleye, O.  
(2007)  
The study intends to 
examine the 
association between 
classified boards and 
the firm value.  
The final sample consists 
of 2,021 firms.  
Regression models are 
used to test hypotheses.  
The author finds that 
classified boards are 
associated with a significant 
reduction in firm value even 
among complex firms.  
 
Zhao, Y. & 
Chen, K. 
(2008) 
 
They investigate the 
relation between 
staggered boards and 
earnings management. 
Their final sample consists 
of 83 fraud firms. 
Regression models are 
used to test hypotheses.  
They find that staggered 
boards are associated with 
lower likelihoods of 
committing fraud and 
smaller magnitudes of 
absolute unexpected 
accruals.  
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2.6.5  AC existence 
The board of directors often delegates the responsibility for overseeing financial 
reporting to an audit committee in order to efficiently improve the board’s performance 
(Lin and Hwang 2010). Prior research presents mixed findings. For instance, studies 
conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Jaggi and Leung (2007) show that there is a 
significant negative relationship between earnings management and the existence of an 
audit committee. Their result is consistent by Stewart and Munro (2007) who design an 
experiment to examine the impact of audit committee existence, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings on the external auditors.  
 
Further, Davidson et al. (2005) find that 83 percent of Australian listed companies had 
an audit committee established, while 64 percent of those committees consist of entirely 
non-executive directors and 86 percent are comprised of a majority of non-executives. 
Later, Stewart and Kent (2006) examine whether the existence of an audit committee, 
audit committee characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher 
audit fees. They find that the existence of an audit committee, more frequent committee 
meetings and increased use of internal audit are associated with higher audit fees. 
Further, the expertise of audit committee members is associated with higher audit fees 
when meeting frequency and independence are low. Cohen et al. (2010) find that audit 
committees in the post-SOX period are perceived to have more knowledge and 
authority as well as being more diligent and active. However, management still plays an 
important role in selecting and dismissing auditors.  
 
Summary 
Prior studies conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Jaggi and Leung (2007) show that 
there is a significant negative relationship between earnings management and the 
existence of an audit committee. Others such as Davidson et al. (2005), Stewart and 
Kent (2006) and Cohen et al. (2010) examine the existence of an audit committee on 
audit quality proxied by higher audit fees, auditor independence, more knowledge and 
authority as well as being more diligent and active. The Table 23 below provides more 
details on the findings of AC existence in prior research.  
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Table 23: Audit committee existence in past study 
Author(s) 
       Year 
Objective Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings Limitations and future Research 
Jaggi, B. & 
Leung, S. 
(2007)  
They examine the 
relation between the 
existence of audit 
committee and 
earnings 
management.  
The sample consists of 
523 firm-year 
observations collected 
in Hong Kong from 
1999 to 2000.  
A three-stage 
regression model is 
applied to test 
hypotheses.  
The finding shows that there is a 
significant negative relationship 
between earnings management and 
the existence of an audit committee.  
Future study may investigate whether 
expertise and experience of audit 
committee members would improve their 
monitoring effectiveness. 
Stewart, J. & 
Munro, L. 
(2007)  
 
Their study examines 
the impact of audit 
committee existence, 
the frequency of 
audit committee 
meetings and the 
auditor’s attendance 
at meetings on the 
external auditors. 
75 participates 
including audit 
partners, directors, 
senior managers and 
managers were invited 
from the Big 4 and 
four middle-tier 
auditing firms located 
in three capital cities in 
Australia.  
A 3×1 between –
subjects design is 
applied to test all 
hypotheses. 
They find that the audit committee, 
the frequency of committee meetings 
and the auditor’s attendance at 
meetings are significantly associated 
with a reduction in perceived audit 
risk. 
Limitations included in this study are: 
1) their result is not generalized; 2) lack 
of a definition of audit risk; 3) the 
respondents were not randomly selected. 
    
Further research could examine if the 
result still holds when audit committee 
meetings are changed. Additional work 
needs to consider the role of audit 
committee in negotiation with 
management and resolution of disputes.  
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Table 23 continue 
Author(s) 
      Year 
Objective Sample  and data 
 
Methods 
 
Key findings Limitations and future Research 
Stewart, J. & 
Kent, P. (2006)  
They examine 
whether the 
existence of an audit 
committee, audit 
committee 
characteristics and 
the use of internal 
audit are associated 
with higher audit 
fees.  
A final sample 
contains 401 
Australian listed 
companies in October 
2000. 
A number of OLS 
regression models are 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
They find that the existence of an 
audit committee, more frequent 
committee meetings and 
increased use of internal audit are 
associated with higher audit fees. 
The study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) the number of employees in 
internal audit may not be a good measure of 
the use of internal audit; 2) their research 
model may not capture the causality. 
 
Further study needs to consider internal audit 
budget, and more refined measures of 
independence, expertise and diligence of 
audit committee members.   
Cohen, J. 
Krishnamoorthy, 
G. & Wright, A. 
(2010b) 
 
 
 
 
The authors 
investigate the role 
of audit committee 
in the post-SOX 
period. 
36 external auditors, 
including 11 seniors, 
12 managers and 13 
partners were 
participated in this 
experiment.  
 
A semi-structured 
interview approach is 
applied to address the 
research questions. 
Their analysis is 
based on the 
experimental results.  
They find that audit committees 
in the post-SOX period are 
perceived to have more 
knowledge and authority as well 
as being more diligent and active.  
Further study may focus on examining how 
effective are audit committees in identifying 
and resolving reporting problems. Moreover, 
it also needs to investigate the influence of 
experience of audit committee chairs and 
other members of audit committee and the 
board on the audit process in future.    
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2.6.6 AC meetings 
One of audit committee’s functions is to provide its members with sufficient time to 
perform their duties of monitoring their firm’s financial reporting process. The BRC 
(1999) recommends that audit committees meet at least once quarterly and discuss 
financial reporting quality with the external auditor. According to Menon and Williams 
(1994) the number of meetings measured as a proxy for audit committees’ diligence is 
used in prior research. However, prior research on audit committees’ meeting provides 
mixed results. For example, Xie et al. (2003) report a negative association between 
earnings management and the number of AC meetings. On the other hand, Bedard et al. 
(2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2006) did not find such an association. Stewart and 
Munro (2007) design an experiment to examine the impact of audit committee existence, 
the frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings 
with the external auditors. They find that the audit committee, the frequency of 
committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly 
associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk.  
 
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) examine the association between firm characteristics 
and the number of audit committee meetings considered as a proxy for audit committee 
diligence. They find that the following factors, such as the size of firms, outsider block-
holdings, litigious industries and the frequency of board meetings, could have an 
influence on the determination of the number of audit committee meetings. Later, 
Sharma et al. (2009) explore further prior research by examining the determinants of 
audit committee meeting frequency within New Zealand background. The findings 
indicate that there is a negative association between the meeting frequency and multiple 
directorships, audit committee independence and an independent chair of the audit 
committee. Further, they find a positive relation between audit committee meeting and 
the size of the audit committee and the level of institutional and managerial ownership.  
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Summary 
Menon and Williams (1994) concluded that the number of meetings can be measured as 
a proxy for audit committees’ diligence in prior research. Xie et al. (2003) report a 
negative association between earnings management and the number of AC meetings. 
While Bedard et al. (2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2006) did not find such an 
association.  
 
Further, Stewart and Munro (2007) find that the audit committee, the frequency of 
committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly 
associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. Raghunandan and Rama (2007) find 
the size of firms, outsider block-holdings, litigious industries and the frequency of board 
meetings, could have an influence on the determination of the number of audit 
committee meetings. The Table 24 below provides more details on the findings of AC 
meeting in prior research.    
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Table 24: Audit committee meetings in past study  
Author(s)                   
     Year 
    Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                             
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Raghunandan, 
K. & Rama, D. 
(2007)  
 
The authors examine 
the association 
between firm 
characteristics and 
the number of audit 
committee meetings.  
A final sample 
contains 319 
companies.  
 
A regression 
model is used to 
test hypotheses.   
They find that the following factors, such 
as the size of firms, outsider block-
holdings, litigious industries and the 
frequency of board meetings, could have 
an influence on the determination of the 
number of audit committee meetings.  
The study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) audit committee meeting 
frequency is not a perfect proxy; 2) lack of 
predicting the causality; 3) this study is 
only focused on a year. 
 
Further study may examine differences in 
the functioning of audit committees across 
nations 
Sharma, V. 
Naiker, V. & 
Lee, B. (2009)  
 
 
 
 
explore further prior 
research by 
examining the 
determinants of audit 
committee meeting 
frequency 
 within New Zealand 
background 
A final sample 
contains 96 firm-
years including 16 
nonrepeat and 40 
repeat companies. 
An OLS 
regression model 
is used to test 
hypotheses.   
 
The findings indicate that there is a 
negative association between the meeting 
frequency and multiple directorships, 
audit committee independence and an 
independent chair of the audit 
committee. Further, they find a positive 
relation between audit committee 
meeting and the size of the audit 
committee and the level of institutional 
and managerial ownership. 
Limitations included in this study are: 
1) meeting frequency lacks of reflection of 
the diligence; 2) lack of useful variable in 
their model; 3) they did not provide 
 evidence of causality; 4) this study did not 
predict future changes.  
 
Future study may re-examine the 
determinants of audit committee meetings.     
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2.6.7 AC size 
BRC (1999) and the SEC (1999) both mention the number of audit committees, 
particularly the SEC mandates that audit committees consist of a minimum of four 
directors. A larger audit committee represents greater resources and talents to rely on in 
overseeing the financial reporting process (Lin and Hwang 2010). Prior research shows 
mixed results on the association between AC size and earnings management. For 
instance, Xie et al. (2003) failed to find significant association between the number of 
directors on the audit committee and earnings management. Their result is consistent 
with the findings from prior research conducted by Abbott et al. (2004) that failed to 
find the impact of audit committee size on earnings restatement. However, Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) find that audit committee size is negatively related to earnings 
management. Similarly, Lin et al. (2006) examine the role of audit committees in 
providing quality corporate financial reporting. Specifically, they examine the influence 
of audit committees’ characteristics, including size, independence, financial expertise, 
activity and stock ownership on earnings restatement. But, they only find a negative 
association between the size of audit committees and the occurrence of earnings 
restatement.  
 
Summary 
Prior research shows mixed results on the association between AC size and earnings 
management. For instance, Xie et al. (2003) failed to find significant association 
between the number of directors on the audit committee and earnings management. 
Their result is confirmed by Abbott et al. (2004). However, Yang and Krishnan (2005) 
find that audit committee size is negatively related to earnings management. Similarly, 
Lin et al. (2006) only find a negative association between the size of audit committees 
and the occurrence of earnings restatement. The Table 25 below provides more details 
on the findings of AC size in prior research.    
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Table 25: Findings of AC size in prior study 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
     Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
     Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Abbott, L. 
Parker, S. & 
Peters, G. 
(2004)  
They examine the 
impact of audit 
committee 
characteristics on the 
likelihood of financial 
statement. 
A final sample 
contains 88 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A logistic regression 
model is applied in this 
study.  
They failed to find the impact 
of audit committee size on 
earnings restatement. 
The study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) the analysis is based on 
the historical data; 2) the approach is 
based on the same limitations; 3) the 
meeting frequency threshold is not 
accurate; 4) lack of the conjecture of 
restatements and audit committee. 
 
Yang, J. & 
Krishnan, J. 
(2005) 
They examine the 
association between 
audit committee 
characteristics and 
measures of quarterly 
earnings management.  
A final sample 
contains 896 firm-
year observations 
from 1996 to 2000. 
Several accrual 
regression models are 
applied in this study.  
They find that audit committee 
size is negatively related to 
earnings management. 
Limitations are: 1) lack of causality; 
measures of estimating earnings 
management are not perfect; 3) the 
results in this study may be biased. 
Lin, Li and 
Yang (2006)  
examine the role of 
audit committees 
characteristics, 
including size, 
independence, 
financial expertise, 
activity and stock 
 ownership on earnings 
restatement. 
A final sample 
contains 212firms.  
A restatement logistic 
regression model is 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
They only find a negative 
association between the size of 
audit committees and the 
occurrence of earnings 
restatement. 
This study is subject to a year 
observation limitation.  
 
Further study may re-examine the issues 
in this study if more data are available.   
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2.6.8  AC expertise 
The SEC (1999) requires the minimum qualified as ‘financial expert’ for every audit 
committee and the necessary financial knowledge that all committee members must 
have. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) state that the audit committee’s financial expertise 
(specially auditing knowledge) increases the likelihood that detected material 
misstatements and will report to the audit committee and correct in a short term. 
However, Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) document a negative association 
between the audit committee’s financial expertise and occurrence of earnings 
management. Williams (2005) conducts a study on examining the characteristics of 
financial experts designated by companies following the requirement under Section 407 
of SOX. The result shows that almost all companies have a financial expert, and some 
of these companies even have more than one financial expert. Later, Carcello et al. 
(2006) conducted a similar research on examining the SEC’s financial expert disclosure 
requirement. They find that most of companies comply with the SEC’s requirement 
regarding financial expert disclosure and most of them have a financial expert on the 
audit committee, however the actually quality of these disclosures is low.  
 
But, Lin et al. (2006) failed to find such a significant relationship. Zhang et al. (2007) 
provide evidence that firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control 
weakness under SOX if their audit committees have less accounting financial expertise. 
Meanwhile, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accruals quality is positively related to 
accounting expertise on the audit committee, particularly when accounting expertise and 
financial expertise are both presented. Carcello et al. (2011) find that greater CEO 
involvement in selecting directors, including CEO services on the 
governance/nominating committee, eliminates the beneficial effects of audit committee 
independence and expertise with regard to reducing the incidence of restatements.  
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Summary 
Prior studies indicate mixed results of financial expertise in audit committee on audit 
quality. For instance, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find a positive relation between the 
audit committee’s financial expertise and the likelihood of detected material 
misstatements. However, Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) document a 
negative association between the audit committee’s financial expertise and occurrence 
of earnings management. Further, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accruals quality is 
positively related to accounting expertise on the audit committee. The Table 26 below 
provides more details on the findings of AC expertise in prior research.    
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a detailed literature review on the PCAOB inspections, 
particularly the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ 
abnormal audit fees, the effectiveness of client firms’ internal controls and the internal 
corporate governance of client firms. This chapter also discusses the relevant aspects 
related to the PCAOB inspections. Additionally, a brief summary is provided after each 
section of this chapter.           
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Table 26: Findings of AC expertise in past literature review 
Author(s)                   
     Year 
Objective                         
 
Sample  and data                       
 
Methods                               
 
         Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Williams, S. 
(2005)  
The study examines 
the characteristics of 
financial experts 
designated by 
companies.  
The sample contains 
489 firms, including 
370 from large firms 
and 119 from small 
firms. 
 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis is applied in 
this study.   
 
The result shows that almost all 
companies have a financial 
expert, and some of these 
companies even have more 
than one financial expert.  
Future study may investigate the changes in 
the compensation structure for audit 
committee members and financial experts as 
the increased workload is addressed. Further 
study may consider the influence of gender of 
financial experts on audit committee. 
Carcello, J. 
Hollingsworth, 
C. & Neal, T. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 They examine the 
SEC’s financial expert 
disclosure 
requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The full sample 
consists of 400 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A logistic regression 
model is applied to 
test hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They find that most of 
companies comply with the 
SEC’s requirement regarding 
financial expert disclosure and 
most of them have a financial 
expert on the audit committee, 
however the actually quality of 
these disclosures is low. 
 
 
Limitations are: 1) the sample may be biased; 
2) their analysis is based on companies’ 
public disclosures. 
 
Further study may investigate further on the 
association between company financial 
experts and their audit committee, stock 
market reaction and audit committee 
financial experts as well as multiple audit 
committee financial experts. 
Dhaliwal, 
Naiker, Navissi 
(2010) 
This study examines 
the relation between 
audit committee 
experts and accruals 
quality. 
The sample contains 
770 firms from 2004 
to 2006. 
 
A number of 
regression models are 
applied to test 
hypotheses. 
 
They find that accruals quality 
is positively related to 
accounting expertise on the 
audit committee, particularly 
when accounting expertise and 
financial expertise are both 
presented. 
Limitations are: 1) the study did not provide 
evidence of causality; 2) it relies on historical 
employment data; 3) the issue of endogeneity 
is existed. 
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Table 26 continue 
 Author(s)                   
     Year 
    Objective                         
 
 Sample  and data                       
 
     Methods                               
 
Key findings                                
 
Limitations and future Research   
Carcello, Neal, 
Palmrose, and 
Scholz (2011)  
They investigate 
whether involvement 
of the chief executive 
officer in selecting 
board members 
reduces audit 
committee 
effectiveness. 
The final sample 
consists of 104 
restatement firms and 
104 matched 
nonrestatement firms.  
A conditional logistic 
regression model is 
applied in this study.   
They find that greater CEO 
involvement in selecting directors, 
including CEO service on the 
governance/nominating committee, 
eliminates the beneficial effects of 
audit committee independence and 
expertise with regard to reducing 
the incidence of restatements. 
This study is subject to the following 
limitations: 1) the sample size is small; 
2) the issue of endogeneity is existed; 
3) there may have measurement errors 
in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3.  Theoretical frameworks and hypotheses development 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the theoretical frameworks of the study and develops three 
hypotheses that need to be tested. Both agency theory and signalling theory are applied in 
this study. The PCAOB inspection provides the independent third party assurance for 
client firms by auditing auditors. The PCAOB inspection reports are considered as a signal 
of audit quality to the existing and prospective investors. Then, the three hypotheses are 
formulated in this study. 
3.2 Theoretical frameworks 
3.2.1  Agency theory 
Agency theory is defined in terms of contractual relationships in which one or more 
persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is considered to be the first 
study that interpreted agency relationships through the modelling of agents and principals. 
Agency theory is based on the information asymmetry phenomenon that agents have more 
information than principals and this information asymmetry adversely affects the 
principals’ ability to monitor effectively whether their interests are being properly served 
by agents. Further, agency theory assumes that both principals and agents act rationally 
and intend to maximize their wealth through the contracting process (Adams 1994).  
 
In addition, agents are assumed to have self-seeking motives and most likely to take the 
opportunity to act against the interests of the owners of the firms. Therefore, Scapens 
(1985) refers to this dilemma as the “moral hazard” problem. Another type of agency 
problem raised from “adverse selection” occurs when the principals lack of information 
and therefore is unable to determine whether managers act in the best interests of the firm. 
Finally, Scapens (1985) claims that the existence of efficiency also called “pareto-
optimality” is used to solve the issue raised from the contracting relationship between 
principals and agents when neither party can enhance their wealth at the expense of the 
other. To ensure this efficiency both principals and agents will need to minimize their 
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contracting costs. Monitoring costs are incurred by principals and bonding costs are 
incurred by agents. Together with residual losses, these costs represent total agency costs.    
 
In terms of maintaining costs, external auditors are placed as the independent third party to 
monitor managers’ preparation of the financial statements in order to identify any financial 
manipulation and gave an assurance that financial reports provide a true and fair view. The 
monitoring costs associated with this external audit assurance are identified in audit fees. 
In terms of bonding costs, Wallace (1980) argues that managers also demand monitoring 
services due to concern for securing their positions and salary levels in the firms. For 
instance, internal auditing required by managers, intends to show their accountability to 
principals and ‘bond’ their relationship with principals in order to secure their positions 
and salary levels in their firms. Watts (1988) suggests that examples of bonding costs 
consist of expenditure on audit committees, non-executive directors and internal auditors.   
      
According to Culpan and Trussel (2005), the important idea in the agency relationship is 
the selection of appropriate governance mechanisms between principal and agents that 
reflects an efficient alignment of principal and agent interests as well as a reduction of 
agency costs. Similarly, Cohen et al. (2002) conclude that from the agency perspective, the 
board’s central mission is to ensure that management’s actions are aligned with 
stakeholders’ interests. Further, under the agency perspective the board is focused on 
monitoring and control, evaluating corporate performance, managing recruiting and 
compensation as well. Auditors considered as part of the corporate governance monitor the 
quality of the financial reporting process (Beasley and Salterio, 2001).  
 
On this study, the PCAOB is viewed as a monitoring mechanism. The PCAOB was created 
by Section 101 of SOX in order to replace the peer review conducted by the AICPA due to 
the concern of lack of audit quality and auditor independence. The PCAOB is a non-profit 
private organization and is authorized by Section 104 to conduct inspections on public 
audit firms in the US. One of the purposes of creating the PCAOB is to enhance auditor 
independence through conducting inspections on the public audit firms in the US. From the 
agency theory perspective, investors in client firms are principals and client firms act as the 
agents on behalf of the principals. Managers in client firms have a fiduciary duty to act on 
the best interests of client firms. Auditors considered as monitors are responsible for 
presenting a truly and fair financial statement with managers in client firms. 
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The PCAOB conducts inspections on audit firms to ensure audit quality and auditor 
independence when auditors provide auditing assurance to their client firms. Since audit 
quality is difficult to observe therefore from the signalling theory perspective the PCAOB 
inspection reports are considered as a signal of evaluating audit firms’ quality delivered to 
their client firms. Since both client firms and investors can access these publicly released 
inspection reports by the PCAOB, client firms may use these inspection reports to decide 
whether they should retain the current audit firm. Also investors could make a decision if 
they should invest more or less in the client firm in future. The Figure 1 below describes 
the details of the theoretical framework for this study. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework  
 
PCAOB regulatory oversight
Auditors Client firms Investors in client firms
Inspect & issues
Inspection reports
Signaling
theory
Inspection reports 
are a signal of audit 
quality
Inspection reports 
are a signal of audit 
quality
(Monitors) (Agents) (Principals)Agency Theory
 
 
3.2.2  Signalling Theory 
According to Morris (1987, p. 48), signalling theory developed by Spence (1973) in the 
labour market addresses information asymmetry issues in markets and shows how this 
asymmetry can be reduced by the party with more information signalling it to others. 
Signalling theory is applied in accounting research and used to explain voluntary 
disclosures. Managers from higher quality firms intend to distinguish themselves from 
lower quality firms through voluntary disclosures (Watson et al. 2002). This is consistent 
with Eccles et al. (2001, p. 192) who state ‘a management team that has confidence in both 
its own abilities and its strategy will not shy away from telling the market its plans for the 
future and how well it is doing today’. 
 
Verrcchia (1983) and Dye (1985) state that firms use accounting disclosures as a means of 
overcoming adverse selection. Specifically, firms with favourable performance are more 
likely to disclose proprietary information in order to distinguish themselves from other 
firms. Consequently, this will increase the demand for their securities and reduce their cost 
of capital in future. This is confirmed by the finding of a study by Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) indicating that firms’ disclosure ratings are positively associated with earnings 
performance. However, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) argue that there is a trade-off 
between a firm’s desire to convey favourable information to the financial markets and its 
intention to protect proprietary information from potential competitors.  
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A study conducted by Gelb (2000) examines corporate signalling practices, such as 
dividends, stock repurchases, and accounting disclosures. The result indicates that “good 
news” firms are more likely to convey favourable news via dividends or stock repurchases 
rather than accounting disclosures. These firms appear to rely on dividend and stock 
repurchase signals as a means of conveying favourable news to investors without 
disclosing specific proprietary information. Another study by Zhang and Wiersema (2009) 
shows how CEOs signal the unobservable quality of their firms to potential investors 
through providing the observable quality of their financial statement. Further studies 
focused on the application of signalling theory to explain how firms use boards to 
communicate with organizational stakeholders (Miller and Triana, 2009). Signalling theory 
is also used to examine the signalling value of board characteristics (Certo 2003), top 
management team (TMT) characteristics (Lester et al. 2006) and founder involvement 
(Busenitz et al. 2005).  
            
External auditors, as independent agents provide greater assurance on the financial 
reporting prepared by management because shareholders as owners are willing to pay high 
audit fees to monitor managers’ opportunistic behaviour. According to DeFond (1992), 
audit quality is generally not directly observable; the market requires a signal of audit 
quality. Prior research shows that Big 4 audit firms are considered as a proxy of audit 
quality, and they charge a premium audit fee compared to Non Big 4. From another 
perspective, investors and financial statement users must rely on some signals to judge 
audit quality which has been done by auditors, because they are unable to witness the audit 
process. PCAOB is authorized to conduct investigations and issue inspection reports to 
audit firms. According to the results of Abbott et al. (2013), PCAOB inspection reports 
have created a powerful public signal of perceived audit quality because of the objectivity, 
specificity, variation and visibility of these reports. Further, Carcello et al. (2008) provide 
evidence by showing that the PCAOB inspection process has led to an improvement in 
audit quality. Therefore, favourable PCAOB inspection reports can be considered as a 
signal of high audit quality.  
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3.3 Development of hypotheses 
3.3.1  Audit quality and abnormal audit fees  
Fees paid to auditors can affect audit quality in the following two ways: larger fees paid to 
auditors may increase the effort exerted by auditors, therefore, increasing audit quality 
(Becker et al. 1998). However, the large fees paid to auditors make auditors more 
economically dependent on their clients if those large fees are related to nonaudit services. 
If this financial reliance exists auditors will compromise their audit quality. For instance, 
Frankel et al. (2002) find a positive association between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of 
reporting income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals. However, Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) find no association between firms’ total fees and discretionary current accruals, nor 
any association between income increasing-accruals and client fees.     
 
Actual fees paid to auditors consist of two parts, namely: (1) normal fees that reflect 
auditors’ effort costs and litigation risk; and (2) abnormal fees that are specific to 
contractual relationships between auditors and their clients. Normal fees are determined by 
predicting auditor clients’ size, complexity, and risk. However, abnormal fees are the 
residual of actual fees and normal fees. According to Kinney and Libby (2002), abnormal 
fees can be considered to capture the influence of economic bonding of auditor clients on 
their auditors. 
 
A number of papers have addressed the relationship between audit quality and the 
abnormal fees paid to auditors, and the results are mixed (Frankel et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 
2002; Kinney and Libby 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003). For instance, Frankel et al. (2002) 
estimate unexpected fee ratios but do not link unexpected fees to earnings quality. DeFond 
et al. (2002) predict abnormal fees and the ratio of non-audit to total fees, and find no 
association between going concern opinions and either abnormal fees or abnormal audit 
fees. Whisenant et al. (2003) also use abnormal fee ratio and abnormal total fees and 
compared them between 110 restating firms and the Compustat universe of non-restating 
firms. They find no significant differences in abnormal fees between the two groups. 
  
As previously mentioned, PCAOB inspections replaced peer reviews under AICPA 
because of the concern that peer reviews failed to deliver high audit quality. Therefore, the 
relation between audit quality and auditor independence is a concern for regulators, 
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investors and policy makers. Even SOX banned most nonaudit services. However, 
according to Kinney and Libby (2002), the economic bonding makes auditors more reliant 
on their clients. They believe that abnormal fees paid to auditors can accurately capture the 
relation between audit quality and auditor independence. However, it can be also argued 
that it depends on how many clients the auditors have and the importance of clients to 
auditors.  
 
Further, auditors may get involved with the choice between the cost and benefit obtained 
from their clients. Audit quality in this study is measured by PCAOB inspection outcomes. 
A favourable inspection report indicates high audit quality provided by auditors. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis focuses on the audit quality from the auditors and the abnormal fees 
paid to the client firms. It assumes that if the abnormal audit fees obtained from auditors’ 
clients are much higher than the normal audit fees, then auditors are more likely to be 
financially reliant on those clients. Therefore, this financial reliance can cause a decrease 
of audit quality of auditors. So the first hypothesis will be:  
 
H1: A favourable PCAOB inspection outcome is negatively related to abnormal audit fees 
paid to auditors.  
 
3.3.2  Audit quality and internal controls 
Internal control over financial reporting is defined as “a process… to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting” (PCAOB 2004). The purpose of 
internal control is to prevent and/or detect errors or fraud that could result in a 
misstatement of financial statements. SOX Section 302 and 404 require that management 
must provide an assessment of internal controls, and requires the auditor to provide an 
opinion on management’s assessment as well. The external auditors evaluate an 
organisation’s internal controls through understanding their clients’ organisation culture 
during the audit. According to Arens et al. (2007), the internal control structure, including 
both the control environment and control procedures, is considered to be more important. 
This also can be verified from the Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004). It 
acknowledges that the control environment is a very important component of internal 
control structure, and requires auditors to assess the control environment without relying 
on management’s assessment. The reason for going beyond managements’ arrangement is 
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that management is responsible for making relevant control policies and providing controls 
to be implemented. 
 
As mentioned, the purpose of PCAOB inspections is to oversee the auditors of public 
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and prepare informative, fair and 
independent audit reports. However, the PCAOB does not inspect every audit and adopts a 
risk-based approach and selects audit engagements based on their own criteria. This is also 
consistent with the findings of Hermanson et al. (2007). Their results show that the 
majority of the deficiencies are related to substantive testing (407 out of 510 deficiencies, 
80 percent). Their results also show that 260 deficiencies of accounting issues are related 
to the balance sheet. These 260 deficiencies came out of 510 total deficiencies (60 percent) 
between 2004 and 2005. The prior research also finds that internal controls and substantive 
testing could be substitutes in producing high –quality accruals (Wright and Wright 1996). 
Mayper et al. (1989) find low consensus among auditors in materiality judgements based 
on internal control weaknesses, Earley et al. (2008) find that severity classifications of 
control deficiencies on auditors’ judgment are influenced by managers’ knowledge scope.  
  
It is well established that the client firms’ internal control is quite important to an external 
audit. The knowledge of auditor clients’ internal control stems from the control policies 
and control environment, which is one of management’s responsibilities. It could also 
argue that the auditors could rely on themselves, rather than management. However, 
considering the limitation of time and costs facing the audit procedures, somehow they 
have to rely on clients’ internal control system. Further, the information about internal 
controls is also used by external auditors to assess the potential audit risks, which could 
affect planned detection risk and planned audit evidence. This is important because if the 
audit risks appear low or acceptable, auditors could reduce the relevant substantive tests, 
they could allocate staff to other assignments in order to increase the audit efficiency. The 
prior research has already confirmed the relationship between internal control and 
substantive testings. A proxy for the effectiveness of internal controls could be measured 
from the detailed disclosures under ITEM 9A in Form 10-K filing on SEC’s EDGAR 
database. Therefore, the second hypothesis will be: 
 
H2: A favourable PCAOB inspection outcome is positively related to the effectiveness of 
client firms’ internal control system. 
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3.3.3 Audit quality and corporate governance 
SOX authorizes PCAOB legal permission to conduct investigations and access all client 
information, including the interview of client’s audit committee members and directors. 
PCAOB targets the most challenging audit issues and evaluate financial reporting risks 
applying a risk model and other tools. Because financial statements are a joint work 
between managers and auditors, so it requires efforts from both sides. Board and audit 
committee are positioned to monitor management’s opportunistic behaviour. An effective 
audit committee is more likely to question whether management has exercised sufficient 
diligence in ensuring proper controls.  
 
Prior research on corporate governance is focused on the composition, expertise, and 
activity of the board of directors (BOD) and its audit committee (AC). The finding of Fama 
and Jensen (1983) indicates that the board of directors is considered as the most important 
management control mechanism. Beasley (1996) states that from an agent perspective the 
role of the board, particularly the independence of the board plays critically in overseeing 
corporation’s management. Prior research by Beasley et al. (2000) on fraudulent financial 
reporting and corporate governance, particularly independent boards and audit committees 
audit committee meetings, shows that companies that have financial statement fraud from 
technology and financial industries have fewer audit committees compared to companies 
that have financial statement fraud from technology, health care and finance industries, 
have less independent audit committees and less independent boards. 
 
Furthermore, they find that the fraud companies from the technology and health care 
industries have fewer audit committee meetings as well. Prior research (Beasley 1996; 
Klein 2002) on board’s independence shows that there is significant negative relationship 
between earnings management and increased BOD independence measured by the 
proportion of outside or independent directors on the board. Jiraporn et al. (2008) 
investigate the impact of multiple directorships on corporate diversification. The authors 
find that directors’ business is inversely related to firm value. Rutherford and Buchholtz 
(2007) examine the relation between board characteristics and board information 
asymmetries and find that an increase in the proportion of independent directors on the 
board reduced information asymmetries. 
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Carcello et al. (2002) examine the relation between three board characteristics, such as 
independence, diligence and expertise and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. 
This result indicates that a more independent, diligent and expert board demands higher 
audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit 
firms normally provide due to the concern of its reputation, the avoidance of legal liability 
and the promotion of shareholders’ interests. Faleye (2007) examines the determinants of 
CEO duality. The finding shows that organizational complexity, CEO reputation and 
managerial ownership increase the probability of CEO duality.  Prior studies also find that 
staggered boards impair firm value, deter proxy contests and reduce the likelihood of 
involuntary executive turnover (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007). Zhao and Chen 
(2008) find that staggered boards are associated with lower likelihood of committing fraud 
and smaller magnitudes of absolute unexpected accruals. Further, they also find that 
staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value.  
 
Meanwhile, the board of directors often delegates the responsibility for overseeing 
financial reporting to an audit committee in order to efficiently improve the board’s 
performance (Lin and Hwang 2010). Studies conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Jaggi 
and Leung (2007) conclude the significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and the existence of an audit committee. Further, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) 
suggest that audit committee member diligence is a major component of effective audit 
committees. It is consistent by Stewart and Munro (2007) who design an experiment to 
examine the impact of audit committee existence, the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings on the external auditors. They find that 
the audit committee, the frequency of committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at 
meetings are significantly associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. Cohen et al. 
(2010) find that audit committees in the post-SOX period are perceived to have more 
knowledge and authority as well as being more diligent and active.  
 
One of audit committee’s functions is to provide its members with sufficient time to 
perform their duties of monitoring their firm’s financial reporting process. The BRC (1999) 
recommends that audit committees meet at least once quarterly and discuss financial 
reporting quality with the external auditor. According to Menon and Williams (1994) the 
number of meetings measured as a proxy for audit committees’ diligence is used in prior 
research. However, prior research on audit committees’ meeting provides mixed results. 
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For example, Xie et al. (2003) report a negative association between earnings management 
and the number of AC meetings. On the other hand, Bedard et al. (2004) and Yang and 
Krishnan (2006) did not find such an association. Stewart and Munro (2007) find that the 
audit committee, the frequency of committee meetings and the auditor’s attendance at 
meetings are significantly associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. Raghunandan 
and Rama (2007) find that the following factors, such as the size of firms, outsider block-
holdings, litigious industries and the frequency of board meetings, could have an influence 
on the determination of the number of audit committee meetings.  
 
BRC (1999) and the SEC (1999) both mention the number of audit committees, 
particularly the SEC mandates that audit committees consist of a minimum of four 
directors. A larger audit committee represents greater resources and talents to rely on in 
overseeing the financial reporting process (Lin and Hwang 2010). Xie et al. (2003) failed 
to find significant association between the number of directors on the audit committee and 
earnings management. However, Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that audit committee size 
is negatively related to earnings management. In addition, the SEC (1999) requires the 
minimum qualified as ‘financial expert’ for every audit committee and the necessary 
financial knowledge that all committee members must have. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
state that the audit committee’s financial expertise (specially auditing knowledge) 
increases the likelihood that detected material misstatements and will report to the audit 
committee and correct in a short term.  
 
However, Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) document a negative association 
between the audit committee’s financial expertise and occurrence of earnings management. 
Williams (2005) examines the characteristics of financial experts designated by companies 
following the requirement under Section 407 of SOX. The result shows that almost all 
companies have a financial expert, and some of these companies even have more than one 
financial expert. Later, Carcello et al. (2006) find that most of companies comply with the 
SEC’s requirement regarding financial expert disclosure and most of them have a financial 
expert on the audit committee, however the actually quality of these disclosures is low. 
Zhang et al. (2007) provide evidence that firms are more likely to be identified with an 
internal control weakness under SOX if their audit committees have less accounting 
financial expertise. Additionally, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accruals quality is 
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positively related to accounting expertise on the audit committee, particularly when 
accounting expertise and financial expertise are both presented.  
 
Therefore, the third hypothesis assumes that if the audit clients’ corporate governance is 
strong, then the external auditors can rely on it because management knows more about the 
company’s transactions and related assets, liabilities and equity than external auditors. 
According to results by Hermanson et al. (2007), their study found that 365 deficiencies 
related to company’s assets, liabilities and equity (85 percent of total deficiencies). A 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is created to test the third hypothesis adapted from 
previous studies (Menon and Williams 1994; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000; 
Carcello et al. 2002; Cassell et al. 2012). 
 
H3: A favourable PCAOB inspection outcome is positively related to client firms’ strong 
internal corporate governance.  
 
3.4    Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks of the study and both agency theory and 
signalling theory are applied in this study. Then, three hypotheses are developed to be 
tested in this study. The first hypothesis is developed based on testing the association 
between the abnormal audit fees obtained from auditors’ client firms and audit quality 
delivered to client firms. The second hypothesis is developed based on examining the 
relation between client firms’ effectiveness of internal controls and audit quality provided 
by audit firms. The third hypothesis is developed based on investigating the association 
between audit quality provided to client firms by audit firms and the internal corporate 
governance of those client firms.         
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CHAPTER 4.   Research method 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research method used in this study. This chapter also provides 
an explanation of data collection and quantitative method used in this study.  This chapter 
is divided into the following sections. The first section briefly discusses the research 
method applied in this study. The second section provides a detailed discussion on data 
collection. The third section includes a discussion on research models and variable 
measurement in this study followed by conclusion. 
4.2 Philosophical stance underlying the methods in this study 
The philosophical stance concerning assumptions about the nature of knowledge will 
underpin the choices of the researcher about how to conduct a research study and interpret 
the findings. Two main stances in social science research are positivist and 
phenomenological. These terms are also interchangeable with several alternative terms; 
quantitative and qualitative; objectivist and subjectivist; scientific and humanistic; and 
experimentalist and interpretivist (Collis and Hussey 2003). From an ontological 
perspective, the positivist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and exists apart from 
the researcher. In contrast, the phenomenological paradigm assumes that reality is 
subjective and pluralistic as identified through different cognitions of participants under a 
study. 
 
Under a positivistic stance, research usually starts with a thorough literature review and 
then establishes appropriate theory followed by the construction of hypotheses. Eventually, 
these research hypotheses are tested by statistical inference. This deductive process also 
can be described as a hypo-theoretic-deductive process (Saunders et al. 2003). By 
comparison, under a phenomenological stance, there may be no relevant existing theory or 
the researcher may not wish to be restricted by existing theory (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
 
This study falls under the hypo-theoretic-deductive approach from the positivist 
philosophical stance. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that reality can be examined 
objectively and the construction of hypotheses, sample selection and statistical 
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interpretation are essential components of the construction of a research design and the 
choice of research methods.  
4.3 Sampling 
The sampling in this study involves three sets of data, collected from different sources. The 
first source involves collecting the PCAOB inspection reports within the period defined in 
this study. The next sample involves selection of audit firms’ client firms that have 
financial data. The third sample entails the selection of client firms’ internal control data 
and corporate governance data. After matching client firms’ financial data internal control 
data and corporate governance data, the final sample consist of 1,567 client-year 
observations. 
4.3.1 PCAOB inspection report selection 
The initial sample of 806 PCAOB inspection reports within two rounds was obtained from 
the PCAOB’s official website between August 2004 and December 2010. These PCAOB 
inspection reports are only for audit firms inspected triennially by the PCAOB based on the 
fact that this study is only focused on small audit firms. These PCAOB inspection reports 
contain the following information: auditors’ name, dates of issuance of the PCAOB 
inspection reports, dates when the field work was conducted as well as the inspection 
outcomes. The inspection outcomes are classified into deficiency and non-deficiency. Non-
deficiency reports are described in the PCAOB inspection reports as follows: 
The inspection team did not discover anything that it considered to be an audit deficiency 
that warrants discussion in a Board inspection report.     
 
Alternatively, the deficiency reports are described either as: 
The inspection team identified what it considered to be audit deficiencies. The deficiencies 
identified in one of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of such significance that it 
appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer's financial statements. 
Those deficiencies were –   
 (1)  the failure to perform sufficient procedures related to the impairment of oil and gas 
properties; and  
 (2)  the failure to perform sufficient procedures related to revenue recognition. or 
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The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified included deficiencies of such significance that it appeared to the 
inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to 
support its opinion on the issuer's financial statements. Those deficiencies included –  
(1) the Firm's failure to identify, or to address appropriately, departures from GAAP that 
related to potentially material misstatements in the audited financial statements, 
concerning the failure to  determine appropriately the fair value of securities received in 
an exchange;  
(2) the failure to evaluate the issuer's accounting for certain induced conversions of 
convertible debt; and the failure to evaluate the issuer's accounting for stock warrants. 
 
The Appendix A shows the details regarding the assessment of audit deficiencies.  
 
4.3.2 Audit firm selection 
The audit firms are selected based on the fact that within the two rounds of the PCAOB 
inspections the audit firm actually has one inspection in each round. Audit firms and their 
inspection reports by the PCAOB were downloaded from the PCAOB’s website and thus 
created a sample consisting of 403 audit firms and 806 inspection reports. Appendix B 
shows the details of PCAOB’s two round outcomes, including auditor ID, auditor name, 
dates of the issuance of inspection reports and outcomes.   
 
In the first round of PCAOB inspection, 189 inspection reports did not report any 
deficiencies while 214 inspection reports discovered deficiencies. However, in the second 
round of PCAOB inspection 279 inspection reports did not discover any deficiencies 
compared to 124 deficiencies reports. Compared to the first round of the PCAOB 
inspections the results of the second round have been improved by a decline of deficiencies 
from 53.1% to 30.8%. Table 27 below provides the details on inspection results of two 
rounds issued by the PCAOB.   
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Table 27: Details of the PCAOB two rounds of inspections 
Outcomes Deficiency Non-deficiency Total Deficiency 
percentage 
     Round 1          214           189        403             53.1% 
     Round 2          124           279        403             30.8% 
 
4.3.3 Client firm selection 
The selection of client firms is based on the analysis of audit firms’ inspection reports. 
Auditors’ Annual Reports (Form 2) were collected through PCAOB’s inspection reports 
and used to identify auditors’ clients. In this form, Part I describes the general information 
of auditors. Part IV provides the detailed information on auditors’ issuers also known as 
client firms. This information includes issuers’ name, Central Index Key (CIK) and the 
dates of the audit reports.  
 
Client firms’ fees including audit fees, non-audit fees and total fees were gathered from 
Form DEF14A (Definitive proxy statements) on the market brief’s official website 
(Marketbrief.com). Client firms’ financial data, such as total assets, return of assets, profit 
or loss and so on, are collected from the OSIRIS database. Moreover, the internal control 
data were obtained from the Form 10-K through EDGAR database on the U. S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s official website. In Form 10-K, the auditors are required to 
issue opinions regarding the effectiveness of client firms’ internal control over financial 
reporting under ITEM 9A. Client firms’ corporate governance data were also collected 
through Form DEF14A (Definitive proxy statements) on the market brief’s website 
(Marketbrief.com). Client firms’ corporate governance data conclude the expertise for the 
audit committee, the number of audit committee members, the number of audit committee 
meetings, the number of independent directors, the number of total directors, board duality, 
the number of board meetings, board attendance and board continuity.  
 
Finally, the audit tenure data are collected from either the company’s proxy statement or 
EDGAR filing descriptions. The audit specialists are defined as computing the percentage 
of audit fees earned from one industry by an auditor to all of the audit fees earned by that 
auditors per annum (Gunny et al. 2007). Firm age is obtained from both NYSE and 
Bloomberg BusinessWeek.  
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4.4 Research models 
 
4.4.1  Introduction 
Both an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model and a logistic regression model are 
combined to test the three hypotheses in this study. The audit fee OLS regression model is 
mainly engaged in the estimation of normal audit fees through controlling for risk, audit 
effort and industry as well. The main purpose of audit fee OLS regression model known as 
Model 1, is to estimate normal audit fees in order to calculate abnormal audit fees, one of 
the three independent variables in the main logistic regression model also called Model 2. 
A logistic regression model (Model 2) considered as the main model in this study, is 
applied to test the three main hypotheses through testing the relations between the PCAOB 
inspection outcomes and three independent variables, namely abnormal audit fees, the 
effectiveness of internal controls and corporate governance index (CGI). 
 
4.4.2 Audit quality and audit fees 
Model 1 is used to estimate audit fees paid to audit firms by client firms. The audit fee 
OLS regression model applied in this study is drawn from prior research (e.g., Craswell et 
al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Chaney et al. 2004; Francis and Wang 
2005; Krishnan et al. 2005; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2005; Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz 2009; Choi, et al. 2010; Krishnan et al. 2010; Blankley et al. 2012). Further, the 
OLS regression model is used to estimate the normal audit fees in order to calculate the 
abnormal audit fees that are the residual of the actual audit fees and expected (normal) 
audit fees. The audit fee OLS regression framework is summarized as follows: 
 
Model 1 
The OLS regression model was developed as follows: 
 LAFEE=β0 + β1LTA + β2 ROA + β3 LOSS + β4 SEG + β5 LEVE + β6 LIQUID  
                + β7 INVREC + β8FOREIGN + β9 CATA+ β10MATERIAL + β11 GC 
                 + industry and year dummies +ε 
 
The dependent variable LAFEE in model 1 is measured by logging audit fees. Consistent 
with prior research, there are several control variables included in this model. To control 
for audit effort, I include logarithm of total assets (LTA); foreign operations (FOREIGN); 
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the number of business segments (SEG) and the issuance of a going concern opinion (GC). 
To control for audit risk, I include return of assets (ROA); profit or loss (LOSS); current 
assets divided by current liabilities (LIQUID); sum of accounts receivable and inventory 
divided by total assets (INVREC) and current asset divided by total assets (CATA). 
Further, I include total liabilities divided by total assets (LEVE) to control firms with high 
leverage that can have incentives to boost reported earnings due to their concerns over debt 
covenant or private lending agreement violations (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). To control for internal control quality, I include a variable (MATERIAL) 
defined as the presence of a material weakness opinion in the current year. This proxy is 
consistent with Ettredge et al.’s (2006), Doyle et al.’s (2007) and Blankkley et al.’s (2012) 
proxies for internal control problems. Finally, I include industry and year dummy variables 
consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003) due to the fact that audit fees may vary by industry.  
 
The industry membership is consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003) as follows: agriculture 
(0100-0999), mining and construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-
2111), textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals (2800-2824; 2840-2899), 
pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399; 2900-2999), durable manufactures 
(3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), retail 
(5000-5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), computers (3570-3579; 3670-
3679; 7370-7379), and utilities (4900-4999). The fiscal year variable, including fiscal year 
of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, is to control the impact on audit fees 
because of varied regulations issued by the PCAOB within the study period, such as 
Section 302 and Section 404. 
 
4.4.3 Inspection outcomes and three hypotheses  
Model 2 examines the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and the three 
independent variables, such as abnormal audit fees, the effectiveness of client firms’ 
internal controls and the client firms’ corporate governance. These three independent 
variables are also associated with the three hypotheses in this study. To test all three 
hypotheses, a logistic regression model is applied drawn from prior research (Myers et al. 
2003; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Francis et al. 2005; Solomon et al. 1999). The logistic 
regression framework is summarized as follows:  
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 Model 2 
The logistic regression model was developed as follows:           
            OUTCOME =β0 + β1 TENURE+ β2 SPEC+ β3 AGE+ β4 ABNAFEES 
                                   +β5 INTC + β6 CGI+ Industry and year dummies +ε,         
 
The dependent variable (OUTCOME) in model 2 is an indicator variable. I control for 
auditor tenure (TENURE), auditor specialist (SPEC) and audit firm age (AGE) because the 
evidence from prior research has shown that these variables are significant. The three 
independent variables are abnormal audit fees (ABNAFEES), the effectiveness of client 
firms’ internal controls (INTC) and client firms’ corporate governance index (CGI) 
respectively. These three independent variables are related to my three hypotheses in this 
study. Finally, I include industry and year dummy variables which are already described in 
detail in Model 1 to control the difference across industries and fiscal years respectively. 
  
4.4.4  Empirical Schema 
The two models are set out in my study. These two models specifications are framed 
within the development of an empirical schema. The empirical schema (Figure 2) below is 
shown the detail regarding the association between the dependent variable and three 
independent variables related to my three hypotheses. 
 
4.5 Variable definitions and measurements  
This study intends to provide evidence on the association between the PCAOB inspection 
outcomes and client firms’ abnormal audit fees, internal control systems and corporate 
governance. To test these three aspects, three hypotheses are developed and two regression 
models are defined. These two models are detailed in Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. as well. The 
specific dependent and independent variables in this study are described in the following 
sections.  
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4.5.1 Dependent variables 
There are two dependent variables used in this study. The definitions and measurements 
for these dependent variables are set out below: 
 
Audit fees 
In Model 1, the dependent variable measured by logarithm of audit fees (LAFEE) is 
consistent with the following prior research (Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2002; 
Whisenant et al. 2003; Chaney et al. 2004; Francis and Wang 2005; Francis et al. 2005; 
Krishnan et al. 2005; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2005; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 
2009; Choi, et al. 2010; Krishnan et al. 2010; Blankley et al. 2012). To estimate the audit 
fees, I regress logged audit fees (LAFEE) on variables by controlling for risk, audit effort 
and industry.  
 
PCAOB inspection outcomes 
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the PCAOB inspection outcomes. The PCAOB 
inspection outcomes are measured as 1 if audit firms receive deficiency inspections and 0 
if these audit firms receive non-deficiency reports in the study period. The outcomes of the 
PCAOB inspections are obtained through assessing the descriptions in the PCAOB 
inspection reports. The details are described in section 4.3.1.  
  
4.5.2 Test variables 
The three independent variables related to the three different hypotheses are intended to 
examine the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and the following: (i) 
client firms’ abnormal audit fees paid to audit firms, (ii) the effectiveness of client firms’ 
internal control systems and (iii) the internal corporate governance of client firms. The 
definitions and measures of these independent variables are set out below. 
 
Abnormal Audit fees 
The abnormal audit fees are measured by the difference between the actual audit fees and 
the normal audit fees also called the expected audit fees (DeAngelo 1981b; DeFond et al. 
2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Kinney and Libby 2002; Sankaraguruswamy and 
Whisenant 2005; Choi et al. 2010; Blankley et al. 2012). The normal audit fees are 
estimated through the OLS regression model 1 in this study. The abnormal audit fees are 
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defined as what DeAngelo (1981) called “client-specific quasi-rents.” The existence of 
(positive) client-specific quasi-rents creates an incentive for the auditor to compromise 
independence with respect to a specific client (DeAngelo 1981; DeFond et al. 2002; Chung 
and Kallapur 2003).  
 
According to Choi et al. (2010) when auditors receive unusually high audit fees from a 
client, abnormal audit fees are positive, thus the auditor can allow the client to engage in 
opportunistic earnings management. This is confirmed by the finding of the study by 
Kinney and Libby (2002). A study conducted by Kinney and Libby (2002) shows that 
Enron’s actual audit fee in year 2000 was 250 percent of the estimated normal audit fee. 
They suggest that abnormal audit fees are a very good measure for estimating the degree of 
the economic bond between the auditor and the client compared with other measures used 
in prior research. However, Higgs and Skantz (2006) disagree with Kinney and Libby 
(2002). They argue that abnormally high fees can represent a firm’s intention to signal high 
earnings quality by purchasing more audit services than expected. They find evidence to 
support their finding that there is a positive relation between the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) and positive abnormal audit fees while they did not find such relation 
between the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and negative abnormal audit fees.                   
 
However, DeAngelo (1981) also states that if the abnormal audit fees paid to auditors are 
negative then auditors have few incentives to compromise audit quality by acquiescing to 
client pressure for substandard reporting. Choi et al. (2010) believe there is a possibility 
that the abnormal audit fees are negative than auditor have the less incentives to 
compromise independence and consequently the higher audit quality auditors can provide 
by measuring the smaller the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Finally, the negative 
abnormal audit fees can be interpreted as auditors’ initial fee discount behaviour. Auditors 
are considered to bear low audit fees in anticipation of high audit fees from future 
profitable engagements and therefore abnormal audit fees are negative in the current period 
(Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2005). Due to the mixed results in prior research it is 
necessary to examine the relation between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and abnormal 
audit fees paid to auditors. 
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The effectiveness of client firms’ internal control systems 
Internal control over financial reporting has been considered as an important feature of a 
company (Kinney et al. 1990; Kinney 2000, 2001). The SEC defines internal control as “a 
process affected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting.”  
 
Prior to SOX, standards of regulating internal control are limited. Under Section 404 of 
SOX managers are required to provide an annual report on their internal controls, 
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures. Prior to 
Section 404 of SOX, Section 302 of SOX also requires firms to disclose material weakness 
in their controls, furthermore company executives are required to certify in the periodic 
reports. Both Section 302 and 404 use definition of “effective” internal control which is 
similar to those developed in 1992 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 
of the Treadway Commission. 
 
Prior research has been focused on the relation between the internal control and audit 
clients through examining whether the audit clients’ attributes are associated with the 
incidence of accounting-specific material weaknesses and the relation between account-
specific deficiencies and the risk assessment over financial reporting used by auditors (Ge 
and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a; Bedard and Graham 2011; Morris 2011). Moreover, 
prior research also examines the internal control deficiencies disclosed under SOX (Collins 
and Kinney 2007; Doyle et al. 2007a; Doyle et al. 2007b; Masli et al. 2010; Hoag and 
Hollingsworth 2011; Lin et al. 2011; Bedard et al. 2012; Hammersley et al. 2012). Since 
the role of internal control in providing an assurance services to client firms is so important, 
in particularly under section 302 and section 404 of SOX there may have an association 
between the PCAOB inspection outcomes issued to audit firms by the PCAOB and the 
effectiveness of client firms’ internal control systems. 
 
In this study, the effectiveness of internal controls could be measured from the detailed 
disclosures under ITEM 9A in Form 10-K filing on SEC’s EDGAR database. The 
following is an example of the detailed description on the assessment of 1ST 
CENTENNIAL BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARY’s internal control over financial reporting:     
 
191 
 
Management assessed the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting 
as of December 31, 2007. This assessment was based on criteria for effective internal control over 
financial reporting described in “Internal Control—Integrated Framework” published by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Based on this assessment, 
Management believes that the Company maintained effective internal control over financial 
reporting as of December 31, 2007.  
The effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 
2007 has been audited by Hutchinson and Bloodgood LLP, an independent registered public 
accounting firm, as stated in their report appearing in Item 8.  
Therefore, the measurement is set out as follows: 
The effectiveness of internal controls is defined as 1 if management assesses the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting in the financial 
year and this effectiveness of internal control is also audited by the independent audit 
firms, otherwise I define the effectiveness of internal control as 0.   
 
The effectiveness of client firms’ internal corporate governance 
Client firms’ effective internal corporate governance is measured by corporate governance 
index (CGI). CGI consists of several characteristics of board and audit committees to 
assess the quality of a company’s governance mechanisms drawn from the following 
researches (Menon and Williams 1994; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000b; Carcello 
et al. 2002; Cassell et al. 2012). Specifically, the CGI is comprised of the following 
attributes used to capture the independence, diligence, and financial expertise of both board 
and audit committees. The data are collected from company proxy statements (DEF14A) 
downloaded from the market brief’s website. The detailed measurements are consistent 
with prior research (Cassell et al. 2012) and set out as follows: 
 
Board independence-1 if firms have more than 70 percent of independent directors to total 
directors (median percentage of independent directors), 0 otherwise. 
Board meetings-1 if firms have at least 8.5 board meetings (median board meetings) 0 
otherwise. 
Board duality-1 if firms have a separation between chairman and CEO and 0, otherwise. 
Board attendance-1 if firms have more than 75% attendance of the Board of Directors’ 
meeting and 0, otherwise. 
Board continuity-1 if firms have staggered election and 0, otherwise. 
Audit committee members-1 if firms have more than 3 members (median audit committee 
members) and 0, otherwise. 
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Audit committee meetings-1 if firms have more than 5 (median audit committee meeting 
frequency) and 0, otherwise. 
Audit committee financial experts-1 if firms have at least one financial expert (median 
audit committee financial expert) and 0, otherwise. 
 
Board independence 
I include the percentage of independent directors to total directors as a measurement of 
board independence based on the fact that independent directors should perform well on 
monitoring management than non-independent directors (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 
1996; Klein 2002; Dechow et al. 2010 and Cassell et al. 2012). 
  
Board meetings 
Board meeting plays an important role in improving directors’ advisory role to 
management (Adams and Ferreirs 2007) because directors could access relevant 
information during board and audit committee meetings. 
 
Board duality 
Board duality is included as an indicator variable to measure the association between the 
separation of the CEO-Chairman duality and financial reporting quality (Dechow et al. 
1996; Imhoff 2003 and Farber 2005).   
 
Board attendance 
Prior study conducted by Xie et al. (2003) finds a negative association between board and 
audit committee meeting frequency and the magnitude of discretionary current accurals. 
Further, Abbott et al. (2004) find a negative association between audit committee meeting 
frequency and financial statement restatement. Therefore, I include an indictor variable of 
board attendance and collect the data through company proxy statements. In company 
proxy statements if they document 75 percent of attendance of the board meeting I define it 
as 1 and otherwise 0. 
 
Board continuity  
Board continuity is included as an indicator variable to measure the effect of board 
structure on overall governance quality drawn from prior studies (Gompers et al. 2003; 
Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007; and Zhao and Chen 2008). 
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Audit committee members 
Studies conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Jaggi and Leung (2007) conclude the 
significant negative relationship between earnings management and the existence of an 
audit committee. Further, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) suggest that audit committee 
member diligence is a major component of effective audit committees. Cohen et al. (2010) 
find that audit committees in the post-SOX period are perceived to have more knowledge 
and authority as well as being more diligent and active.  
 
Audit committee meeting 
Stewart and Munro (2007) find that the audit committee, the frequency of committee 
meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly associated with a 
reduction in perceived audit risk. 
 
Audit committee financial experts 
The definition of audit committee financial experts is based on results in DeFond et al. 
(2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008). If the description in company proxy 
statements discloses at least one audit committee member has relevant financial experience 
then I define it as 1 otherwise 0.      
 
Finally, the CGI is added up by the scores of both board and audit committee categories. 
This CGI is applied in this study to examine the association between the PCAOB 
inspection outcomes and client firms’ corporate governance measured by this CGI.   
     
4.5.3 Control variables 
The control variables are included in the regression models to control for other factors 
which may be expected to have a potential effect on the dependent variables. The 
definitions and measures for these control variables are set out below. 
 
Control variables for Model 1  
To control for audit effort, the following variables are drawn from past research (DeFond 
et al. 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Francis and Wang 2005; Krishnan et 
al. 2005; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009; Choi et al. 2010), such as logarithm of total assets 
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(LTA), foreign operations (FOREIGN), the number of business segments (SEG) and the 
issuance of a going concern opinion (GC).  
 
To control for audit risk, the following variables are included (DeFond et al. 2002; 
Whisenant et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Francis and Wang 2005; Krishnan et al. 2005; 
Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009; Choi et al. 2010), such as return of assets (ROA), profit or 
loss (LOSS), current assets divided by current liabilities (LIQUID), sum of accounts 
receivable and inventory divided by total assets (INVREC) and current assets divided by 
total assets (CATA).  
 
Further, total liabilities divided by total assets (LEVE) is controlled for firms with high 
leverage that can have incentives to boost reported earnings due to their concerns over debt 
covenant or private lending agreement violations (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). To control for internal control quality, the presence of a material 
weakness (MATERIAL) in the current year is added. This proxy is consistent with 
Ettredge et al.’s (2006), Doyle et al.’s (2007) and Blankley et al.’s (2012) proxies for 
internal control problems.  
 
Finally, the industry and year dummy variables are included to control for the varied audit 
fees across different industries which is consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Choi et al. 
(2010) and Blankley et al. (2012). A summary of the definitions and measurements of the 
control variables in Model 1 is presented in Table 28. 
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Table 28: Definitions and measures of the control variables in Model 1 
 
Control variables Definition Measurement 
LTA logarithm of total assets logarithm of end of year total assets; 
ROA return of assets earnings before interest and  taxes divided 
by total assets 
LOSS profit or loss equals 1 if the company has  made a loss in 
the current financial year, and 0 otherwise 
SEG business segment number of business segments 
LEVE leverage total liabilities divided by total assets 
LIQUID liquidity current assets divided by current liabilities 
INVREC inventory and receivables ratio inventory and receivables divided by total 
assets 
FOREIGN foreign operations equals 1 if firm has any foreign operations, 
0 otherwise 
CATA current total assets ratio current assets divided by total assets 
MATERIAL a material weakness equals 1 if client firms have a material 
weakness, 0 otherwise 
GC auditor going concern opinion equals 1 if the auditor issues a going 
concern audit opinion, 0 otherwise 
Industry dummies industry control variables industry membership follows Ashbaugh et 
al. (2003) determined by SIC code as 
follows: 
Agriculture (0100-0999), mining and 
construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-
1399), food (2000-2111), textiles and 
print/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals 
(2800-2824: 2840-2899), pharmaceuticals 
(2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399: 2900-
2999), durable manufactures(3000-3999, 
excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), 
transportation (4000-4899), retail (5000-
5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 
7370-7379), computers (3570-3579: 3670-
3679: 7370-7379), and utilities (4900-
4999) 
Year dummies fiscal year control variables fiscal year 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009 & 2010 
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Control variables for Model 2 
The following control variables, including auditor tenure (TENURE), auditor specialist 
(SPEC) and audit firm age (AGE) are included in Model 2 because all of these variables 
have shown significance in prior research (Johnson et al. 2002; Ghosh and Moon 2005; 
Myers et al. 2003; Chi and Huang 2005; Gul et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Boone et al. 
2008; Davis et al. 2009 and Gul et al. 2009). Further, these variables are used to control 
varied audit quality across audit firms. In this study, tenure is defined as the duration of the 
audit-client relationship and measured in years and is consistent with prior study conducted 
by Ghosh and Moon (2005). Prior research finds that longer audit firm tenure has a 
negative impact on audit quality provided because auditors’ independence is compromised 
through allowing management to manipulate the financial reporting (Mautz and Sharaf 
1961; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Chen et al. 2008). 
However, the following studies (Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Chi and 
Huang 2005; Gul et al. 2007) find a positive relation between audit quality and tenure and 
show that auditors with shorter tenure are related to lower earnings quality compared to 
auditors with longer tenure. 
 
In this study, tenure is considered as an indicator variable because I expect there is an 
association between audit-client relationship (tenure) and audit quality measured by the 
PCAOB inspection outcomes without deficiencies. The positive relationship between 
tenure and audit quality could be interpreted as auditors provide higher audit quality when 
tenure is longer because audit firms have a good understanding of client firms’ both 
internal and external auditing environment. Auditors issue clean audit reports based on true 
and fair facts they have understood. Therefore, these auditors obtain favourable outcomes 
issued by the PCAOB based on the investigation of those auditors’ auditing engagements.   
Alternatively, the negative relationship between tenure and audit quality could be 
explained by compromising auditor independence when auditing client firms’ financial 
reporting by auditors because auditors are intended to remain the client firms due to the 
financial pressures. Consequently, those auditors are most likely to obtain deficiency 
reports from the PCAOB because of allowing client firms’ management to manipulate the 
financial reporting.    
 
In this study, tenure is measured in years and collected through company proxy statements 
and Form 8K (auditor change) on SEC’s EDGAR data base. Company proxy statements 
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actually describe the detailed information regarding audit firms, such as the name of audit 
firms of current financial year as well previous financial years. Since company proxy 
statements are collected by hand through marketbrief’s website the alternative source of 
seeking auditor change history is obtained from Form 8K (auditor change) on SEC’s 
EDGAR data base. Finally, tenure is calculated by subtracting the beginning of the 
financial year from the last financial year that auditors audit client firms’ financial 
reporting. The final sample consists of 1567 observations, the minimum and maximum of 
tenure are 1 year and 12 years respectively. The mean of tenure in this study is 3.56 years 
compared to the median which is 3 years.      
 
In this study, auditor specialist is considered as an indicator variable to control audit 
quality and measured as the top three percentage of audit fees earned from one industry by 
an auditor to all of the audit fees earned by that auditor’s per annum (Krishnan 2003; 
Gunny et al. 2007). This is drawn from prior findings, for instance, Bonner and Lewis 
(1990) find that industry-specific experience is considered as a significant predictor of 
auditor performance in tasks, particularly in a specific industry. As the outcomes of the 
PCAOB inspections are based on the performance of auditors when conducting their 
auditing work on their client firms. Consequently, the inspection outcomes issued by the 
PCAOB are the results of auditors’ auditing work, and the results are reports of 
deficiencies and without deficiencies. As audit quality is unobservable therefore audit fee 
charged by auditors is considered as one of the proxies of audit quality. Prior studies also 
find an association between audit fee premium and higher audit quality (Ferguson and 
Stokes 2002; Ferguson et al. 2003; Ferguson et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2005; Basioudis and 
Francis 2007; Carson and Fargher 2007 and Carson 2009).   
     
Further, the following studies examine the relation between audit fees and auditor industry 
expertise and find a premium associated with industry expertise in Australia, the US and 
the UK respectively (Ferguson et al. 2003; Carson and Fargher 2007; Francis et al. 2005; 
Basioudis and Francis 2007). Later, Carson (2009) introduces the global audit firm 
networks and examines industry specialization of global audit firm networks and the 
association between national and global industry specialization. The result shows that 
global industry specialists have a highly significant and positive premium over audit fees. 
Consequently, this study assumes auditor industry expertise charge higher audit fees 
because of the higher audit quality provided to their client firms compared to other 
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nonexpertise auditors. Additionally, this study is focused on the U.S. audit firms that have 
specific audit industry experience which is also confirmed by prior research. 
 
In this study, audit specialist is measured by having the top three percentage of audit fees 
earned from one industry by an auditor to all of the audit fees earned by that auditor’s per 
annum (Krishnan 2003; Gunny et al. 2007). The details of industry distribution can be 
found in Table 33. The number of firms in each SIC sector ranges from 26 to 390. In this 
study, the industries most represented are durable manufactures (24.89%), computers 
(15.51%) and services (13.40%), while textiles and print/publishing (1.66%), utilities 
(2.17%) and food (2.62%) are under-represented. The classification of different industries 
is drawn from prior research conducted by Ashbaugh et al. (2003). The details are 
presented in Table 29 below. Therefore, industries such as durable manufactures, 
computers and services have more companies than others because companies from these 
industries have the same percentage. To calculate the percentage, audit fees earned in each 
industry by an auditor are used to divide by the whole year total audit fees earned by that 
auditor. Then, the top three percentages are selected in each industry between 2004 and 
2010. If two or more companies have the same percentage then those companies are both 
or all chosen.         
     
Firm age (AGE) is drawn from prior research (Ghosh and Moon 2005) and measured in 
years based on the following reasons: First, older firms are more likely to be stable with 
less information asymmetry problem. This is because these firms are concerned about audit 
quality provided to their client firms in order to survive the competitions. Further, these 
firms may have more transparency compared to others therefore they are more stable by 
reducing the information asymmetry issues. Alternatively, these firms are most likely 
aligned with regulations. Second, tenure and firm age are positively correlated. This is 
because client firms intend to choose older audit firms due to the fact that those older audit 
firms are most likely to provide higher audit quality. To measure firm age, the beginning 
and end dates are collected through both NYSE and Bloomberg BusinessWeek and 
subtract the beginning dates from the end dates in years. Because these data are collected 
by hand therefore the data are limited.    
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Finally, the industry and year dummy variables are included to control for the varied audit 
quality across different industries which is consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Choi et 
al. (2010) and Blankley et al. (2012). The purpose of inserting industry and year indicator 
variables is to control audit quality and different periods. A summary of the definitions and 
measurements of the control variables in Model 2 are presented in Table 29.  
    
 Table 29: Definitions and measures of the control variables in Model 2  
Control 
variables
  
Definition Measurement 
TENURE auditor tenure the duration of the current auditor with the auditor client firms 
SPEC auditor specialists equals 1 if the auditors are specialists, 0 otherwise 
The audit specialists are defined as computing the percentage of 
audit fees earned by this auditor from one industry to all of the 
audit fees earned by that auditor every year. Then I code an 
auditor’s top three portfolio shares as the auditor’s specialty and 
the remaining industries as nonspecialty (Krishnan 2003; Gunny 
et al. 2007).  
 
AGE Firm age the time firm listed on the stock market 
Industry 
dummies 
Industry control 
variables 
industry membership follows Ashbaugh et al. (2003) determined 
by SIC code as follows: 
Agriculture (0100-0999), mining and construction (1000-1999, 
excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-2111), textiles and 
print/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals (2800-2824: 2840-
2899), pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399: 
2900-2999), durable manufactures(3000-3999, excluding 3570-
3579 and 3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), retail (5000-
5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), computers 
(3570-3579: 3670-3679: 7370-7379), and utilities (4900-4999); 
Year dummies fiscal year control 
variables 
fiscal year 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the research method used in this study to investigate the association 
between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ abnormal audit fees paid to 
audit firms, the effectiveness of client firms’ internal controls and the internal corporate 
governance of client firms. This chapter also discusses sample size, data sources, variables 
as well as the research models applied in this study. Finally, this chapter provides an 
empirical schema to explain in detail on testing three hypotheses using two regression 
models in this study.   
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Figure 2: Empirical schema   
 
 
 
  
                                                                                              
                                                                            
                                                                                        H1                           
 
                                                                                                         
                                                                                             H2 
 
                                                                               
 
 
                                                                                                  H3 
                                                                                     
PCAOB inspection report 
outcomes: 
Deficiencies &  
No deficiencies 
Dependant Variable 
Independent Variable 
External auditors 
Independent external monitoring mechanism 
* Two tests are applied: 
OLS regression for normal audit fees 
A logistic regression model for abnormal audit 
fees 
Internal control system 
Internally monitoring financial reporting 
quality, 
* One test is applied:  
A logistic regression model 
Internal corporate governance 
Internally monitoring both management and 
financial reporting quality, 
* One test is applied:  
A logistic regression model 
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CHAPTER 5. Empirical results and analysis  
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of tests of the three hypotheses as set 
out in Chapter 3. Further, this chapter also provides some descriptive statistics, including 
correlation analysis for variables included in both Model 1 and Model 2 and the 
regression results.   
5.2 Sample descriptions and results 
5.2.1 Sample of Audit fee model  
The initial sample consists of 806 PCAOB inspection reports related to 403 audit firms 
from 2004 to 2010 based on the fact that this study intends to examine the association 
between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and abnormal audit fees, client firms’ internal 
control system and internal corporate governance. Further, this study could examine 
whether there is an association between the change of the PCAOB inspection outcomes 
within two rounds and client firms’ abnormal audit fees, client firms’ internal control and 
internal corporate governance. Client firms are identified through auditors’ Annual 
Reports (Form 2) and the fees including audit fees, nonaudit fees and total fees paid to 
audit firms by client firms, are collected through DEF 14A (proxy statements). After 
matching audit fees, nonaudit fees and total fees paid by client firms and client firms’ 
auditors, the sample contains 17,086 client firm year observations. The average of audit 
fees in the study period is $96,571.25. The highest averages of audit fees and total fees 
between 2004 and 2010 are $108,819.29 and $127,672.53 respectively. In 2004, the 
lowest averages of audit fees and total fees are $63,850.78 and $80,018.83 respectively. 
The Table 30 below shows the details regarding the fees paid to auditors by their client 
firms between 2004 and 2010.     
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Table 30: Descriptive statistics for sample of audit fee model 
 
Fiscal year 
 
Audit fees Nonaudit fees Total fees 
2004 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
63850.78 
2000 
95309.37 
0 
2241000 
39966.00 
16168.05 
2000 
35226.83 
0 
441000 
3090.50 
80018.83 
2000 
113145.23 
0 
2260000 
46976.00 
2005 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
84128.53 
2355 
131245.41 
0 
1727000 
44150.00 
17363.76 
2355 
40002.12 
0 
713000 
3440.00 
101492.28 
2355 
151644.77 
0 
1774000 
53400.00 
2006 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
101684.34 
2665 
200943.07 
0 
4504000 
50000.00 
18989.71 
2665 
50347.26 
0 
1113070 
2500.00 
120674.04 
2665 
219320.78 
0 
4624000 
59273.00 
2007 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
101395.11 
2859 
171551.88 
0 
2824000 
47500.00 
17967.76 
2859 
42375.96 
0 
737315 
2000.00 
119362.87 
2859 
192606.39 
0 
2844000 
56271.00 
2008 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
105202.47 
2685 
170587.02 
0 
2150940 
50000.00 
17526.27 
2685 
49058.52 
0 
1000000 
1550.00 
122728.75 
2685 
196307.93 
0 
2676000 
58255.00 
2009 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
108819.29 
2467 
166781.72 
0 
2731550 
57500.00 
18853.23 
2467 
47067.08 
0 
849625 
2000.00 
127672.53 
2467 
189574.77 
0 
2734000 
65000.00 
2010 Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
103352.31 
2055 
139285.52 
0 
1516000 
60000.00 
18481.23 
2055 
40809.95 
0 
571014 
2500.00 
121833.54 
2055 
161943.68 
0 
1953000 
67820.00 
Total Mean 
 N 
 Std. Deviation 
 Minimum 
 Maximum 
 Median 
96571.25 
17086 
160522.92 
0 
4504000 
49000.00 
17953.47 
17086 
44273.49 
0 
1113070 
2500.00 
114524.73 
17086 
181606.87 
0 
4624000 
57405.00 
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Figure 3: Fee distribution of audit fee sample  
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3, the mean of audit fees increased from 63,850.78 in 2004 to 101,684.34 in 
2006. Then, the mean increased again in fiscal year of 2008 and 2009 respectively. This 
indicates that the implementation of SOX increases costs complying with the 
requirements by the PCAOB. Regarding nonaudit fees, the average of nonaudit fees 
slightly increased from 2004 to 2006. Then, it dropped off slightly in the following two 
years and slightly increased again after 2009. Overall, the average of nonaudit fees did 
not change much. This result is consistent with banning most of nonaudit services in the 
post-SOX period. Finally, the trend of total fees shows the similar pattern as audit fees 
in Figure 3 and is only slightly higher than the audit fee trend. After matching client 
firms’ financial data collected through OSIRIS database and internal control data 
obtained from EDGAR database, the sample reduced to 1,567 client-year observations. 
The Table 31 below shows the composition of the audit fee sample. 
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 Table 31: Audit fee sample composition 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of  client firms  2,000 2,355 2,665 2,859 2,685 2,467 2,055 
Less: 
       
No financial data  (1,037) (1,236) (1,444) (1,620) (1,520) (1,279) (1,011) 
No material weakness data  (290) (156) (259) (159) (175) (189) (152) 
No industry classification  (245) (354) (152) (366) (354) (352) (324) 
No business segments (209) (264) (399) (229) (244) (261) (261) 
No foreign operations (107) (190) (153) (135) (110) (141) (142) 
Sample observations 112 155 258 350 282 245 165 
 
5.2.2  Descriptive statistics for variables in Audit fee model  
The descriptive statistics for variables in audit fee model is presented in Table 32. Panel 
A of Table 32 reports statistics for continuous variables while Panel B reports statistics 
for dichotomous variables. In terms of control variables, Table 32 shows the diversity in 
audit fee sample. In Panel A, company size in terms of total assets (TA) ranges from a 
minimum of $0.01 million to a maximum of $2.95 billion, with a mean of $56.17million. 
Return of assets (ROA) ranges from -402% to 68%, with a mean of -37%; the number of 
segments (SEG) in this model ranges from 1.00 to 10.00 with a mean of 1.50 segments. 
Leverage (LEVE) and liquidity (LIQUID) ratios display means of 186% and 380% 
respectively; while inventory and receivable ratio (INVREC) shows an average of 23% 
compared to a mean of 58% of current total assets ratio (CATA). Finally, Panel B in 
Table 32 shows that in this audit fee sample 15 percent of companies that have foreign 
operations (FOREIGN), 66 percent that have a net loss in current financial years (LOSS), 
3 percent of the companies that have received material weakness opinions (MATERIAL), 
and 33 percent that receive a going concern opinion (GC) from their auditors. In Panel C, 
the dependent variable is audit fees paid to audit firms measured by an audit fee 
regression model after controlling audit efforts, risk and complexity. The audit fees paid 
to audit firms (AFEE) range from a minimum of $ 3,090.30 to a maximum of 
$ 891,250.90 with a mean of $ 116,431.80. 
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Compared to prior study conducted by Blankley et al. (2012), the total observations in 
this study only consists of 1567 observations while their sample consists of 5978 
observations. This is because the sample in this study is collected by hand therefore this 
study has limited data. The means of SEG, LEVE, LIQUID, CATA and INVREC in this 
study are higher than prior research by Blankley et al. (2012). Regarding the indicator 
variables in audit fee model, FOREIGN and MATERIAL are less than prior study while 
LOSS and GC are much larger than prior research (Blankley et al. 2012). The other 
variable, such as TA, ROA and AFEE are much less than the above mentioned study.              
  
Table 32: Descriptive statistics of variables in audit fee model 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable name     Mean      Median 
           
Minimum 
               
Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
TA 56.17M 14.79M 0.01M 2.95B 170.91M 
ROA -0.37 -0.08 -4.02 0.68 0.75 
SEG 1.50 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.05  
LEVE 1.86 0.46 0.00 78.46 6.04 
LIQUID 3.80 1.66 0.00 95.38 8.73 
INVREC 0.23 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.23 
CATA 0.58 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.29 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
Variable name        Mean       Median 
Number of firms 
coded “0”` 
Number of firms 
coded “1” 
FOREIGN 0.15 0.00 1326 241 
LOSS 0.66 1.00 525 1042         
MATERIAL  0.03 0.00 1518 49 
GC 0.33 0.00 1056 511 
 
Panel C: Dependent variables 
Variable name Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
AFEE 116431.8 87096.36 3090.3 891250.9 105786.40 
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Note: TA is logarithm of end of year total assets; ROA is return of assets measured by earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets; SEG is the number of business segments; 
LEVE is leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; LIQUID is measured by 
current assets divided by current liabilities; INVREC is ratio of inventory and receivables to 
total assets; CATA is ratio of current assets to total assets; FOREIGN is equal to the value of 
“ 1” if firm has any foreign operations and “0” otherwise; LOSS is equal to the value of “1” if 
the company has made a loss in the current financial year and “0” otherwise; MATERIAL is 
equal to the value of “1” if client firms have received material weakness opinions and “0” 
otherwise; GC is equal to the value of “1” if the auditor issues a going concern audit opinion 
and “0” otherwise; AFEE is total audit fees paid to audit firms.  
 
5.2.3 Industry distribution  
The industry distribution of client firms in audit fee sample is provided in Table 33. The 
number of firms in each SIC sector ranges from 26 to 390. The industries most 
represented are durable manufactures (24.89%), computers (15.51%) and services 
(13.40%), while textiles and print/publishing (1.66%), utilities (2.17%) and food (2.62%) 
are under-represented.    
 
Table 33: Industry distribution (n=1,567) 
SIC industry sector Number of companies Percentage (%) 
Mining and construction 55 3.51 
Food 41 2.62 
Textiles and print/publishing 26 1.66 
Chemicals 64 4.08 
Pharmaceuticals 104 6.64 
Extractive 115 7.33 
Durable manufactures 390 24.89 
Transportation 68 4.34 
Retail 102 6.51 
Services 210 13.40 
Computers 243 15.51 
Utilities 34 2.17 
Others 115 7.34 
Total 1567 100 
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5.2.4 Correlation analysis for audit fee model  
Table 34 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in audit fee model. 
The correlation matrix in Table 37 indicates high significant correlations between total 
audit fees (LAFEE) and total assets (LTA) (0.678) and total assets (LTA) and going 
concern opinions (GC) (-0.564). The correlation between total audit fees (LAFEE) and 
total assets (LTA) is what I expected because this reflects the influence of size of client 
firms on fees paid to their auditors and the audit effort during the audit work. The 
correlation between total assets (LTA) and going concern opinions (GC) shows that there 
is a significant negative relation between these two variables indicating that larger client 
firms have strong internal control systems therefore reducing going concern opinions. 
Prior research indicates that larger firms may be subject to closer scrutiny by regulatory 
agencies and have stronger internal controls (Balsam et al. 2003; Richardson et al. 2002).  
 
As shown in Table 37 there is also a significant positive relation between total assets 
(LTA) and material weakness opinions (MATERIAL) (0.375), between inventory and 
receivable ratio (INVREC) and current total assets ratio (CATA) (0.360) and between a 
loss in the current financial year (LOSS) and going concern opinions (GC) (0.352). In 
addition, in Table 34 some control variables have shown that there may have some 
correlations with each other, however these correlations do not necessarily indicate that 
muliticolinearity needs to be concerned for further analysis.  
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Table 34: Correlation analysis for variables in audit fee model 
  LAFEE LTA ROA LOSS SEG LEVE LIQUID INVREC FOREIGN CATA MATERIAL GC 
LAFEE 1 .678** .125** -.136** .168** -.089** -.104** .143** .385** -.073** .374** -.317** 
LTA   1 .300** -.329** .179** -.224** -0.013 .113** .334** -.182** .375** -.564** 
ROA     1 -.067** 0.027 -.317** 0.012 .083** 0.045 0.009 0.041 -.129** 
LOSS       1 -.068** 0.018 0.042 -.213** -.226** -0.031 -.098** .352** 
SEG         1 -0.017 -0.022 .073** .146** -0.037 .124** -.107** 
LEVE           1 -0.008 -.053* -0.028 0.043 -0.028 .094** 
LIQUID             1 -.089** -0.033 .110** -0.021 -.056* 
INVREC               1 .169** .360** -0.036 -.132** 
FOREIGN                 1 .067** .250** -.202** 
CATA                   1 -0.023 -.094** 
MATERIAL                     1 -.191** 
GC                       1 
Note: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5.2.5 Regression analysis for audit fee model  
  Table 35 and Table 36 together provide the detailed results after regressing the audit fee 
model with inserting the industry and year control variables and is consistent with prior 
research (Choi et al. 2010). Panel A of Table 35 shows the audit fee regression model 
summary, the explanatory power of this model is 57.9% (R2=0.579), indicating that the 
audit fee determinants as a whole account for 57.9% of the variation in this model. Panel B 
of Table 35 presents the regression coefficients. As shown in Panel B, most variables in 
audit fee model are significant except for SEG, LEVE, INVREC, and CATA. Additionally, 
all significant control variables are positive except for return of assets (ROA) which is 
negative and significant at 0.001 (t=-3.303, p<0.05).  
    
Moreover, as shown in Table 36 the year controls are all positive and significant for each 
year following 2004 except for fiscal year of 2005 and 2010. Fiscal year of 2005 is positive 
but insignificant. Fiscal year of 2010 is negative but significant. According to Blankley et al. 
(2012), the negative coefficient on the year dummy may indicate that auditors became more 
effective at pricing risk after 2004. Alternatively, the effect may be related to a reduction of 
labour constrains induced by SOX in auditing market. The positive coefficients on the year 
dummies could be associated to the increased costs through implementing the requirements 
under section 404 of SOX. Most industry variables are positive and significant except for 
mining and construction (sic2), food (sic3), textiles and print/publishing (sic4) and 
extractive (sic7). Mining and construction (sic2) is negative and insignificant while food 
(sic3), textiles and print/publishing (sic4) and extractive (sic7) are all positive and 
insignificant. This indicates that these industries may not have an influence on the 
estimation of audit fees. To test the problem of mutlicolinearity, variance inflation factor 
(VIF) and tolerance statistics are calculated and the results indicate that tolerance is above 
0.5 and VIF is less than 4 suggested by prior research (Pan and Jackson 2008).  
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Table 35: Regression results for audit fee model 
Panel A: Model summary 
R R Square        Adjusted R Square    Std. Error of the Estimate       F-ratio Sig. 
0.761 0.579 0.571 0.307 72.786 0.000 
 
Panel B: Regression coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients 
LAFEE B Std. Error Beta t-value Sig. 
Intercept 4.247 0.044  96.579 0.000 
Control 
Variables 
     
LTA 0.327 0.012 0.674 26.624 0.000 
ROA -0.001 0.000 -0.060 -3.303 0.001 
LOSS 0.107 0.019 0.108 5.726 0.000 
SEG 0.058 0.033 0.030 1.728 0.084 
LEVE 0.000 0.000 0.034 1.902 0.057 
LIQUID 0.000 0.000 -0.072 -4.195 0.000 
INVREC 0.067 0.040 0.034 1.697 0.090 
FOREIGN 0.158 0.025 0.122 6.441 0.000 
CATA 0.035 0.032 0.022 1.100 0.271 
INTC 0.135 0.024 0.103 5.560 0.000 
GC 0.067 0.022 0.067 3.121 0.002 
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Table 36: Regression coefficients of audit fee model 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients 
LAFEE B Std. Error Beta t-value Sig. 
Intercept 4.247 0.044  96.579 0.000 
Control 
Variables 
     
Year 2005 0.041 0.026 0.038 1.554             0.120 
Year 2006   0.346        0.128  0.046 2.703               0.007 
Year 2007 0.079 0.025       0.081 3.146             0.002 
Year 2008 0.117 0.029 0.095 4.089 0.000       
Year 2009 0.189 0.042 0.086  4.485             0.000 
Year 2010 -0.662 0.221 -0.050 -2.994             0.003 
Sic 2 -0.092 0.051 -0.036 -1.800             0.072 
Sic 3  0.097 0.057 0.033 1.704             0.089 
Sic 4   0.078  0.069 0.021 1.136             0.256 
Sic 5 0.128 0.049 0.054 2.623             0.009 
Sic 6 0.155 0.043 0.082 3.652             0.000 
Sic 7 0.061  0.042 0.034     1.454             0.146 
Sic 8 0.177  0.034 0.163 5.221             0.000 
Sic 9   0.310         0.048 0.134  6.451             0.000 
Sic 10 0.156 0.043 0.082 3.621             0.000 
Sic 11 0.182 0.036 0.132 5.029             0.000 
Sic 12 0.245 0.036 0.190  6.812             0.000 
Sic 13 0.146 0.061 0.045 2.409             0.016 
 
5.3 Abnormal audit fees  
To test the first hypothesis, it is necessary to estimate abnormal audit fees. Abnormal audit 
fees are the residuals of actual audit fees paid to audit firms by client firms and normal audit 
fees estimated by audit fee model also called Model 1 in this study. Using the estimated 
coefficients of the variables included in audit fee model, I compute the fitted values of the 
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audit fee (LAFEE) and use them as “normal audit fees”. Then, I compare the difference 
between the actual audit fees and normal audit fees. To calculate normal audit fees, I insert 
the significant B values of the variables in both Table 35 and Table 36 and the intercept into 
audit fee regression model (Model 1) in this study. Then, the results of regressing audit fee 
model (Model 1) again are the normal audit fees. Therefore, abnormal audit fees are the 
comparison of actual audit fees and normal audit fees.        
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics for abnormal audit fees 
Descriptive statistics for audit fees, normal audit fees and abnormal audit fees are presented 
in Table 37 below. As shown the actual audit fees paid to auditors range from a minimum of 
$1,000 to a maximum of $ 2,585 million, with a mean of $167,800.13. While the normal 
audit fees estimated by the regression model 1 after controlling audit risk, effort and 
complexity range from a minimum of $3,090.30 to a maximum of $ 891,250.94 million, 
with a mean of $116,431.85. Finally, the abnormal audit fees obtained from comparing the 
actual audit fees paid to auditors and normal audit fees estimated from the regression model 
1, range widely from a minimum of -$335,869.38 to a maximum of $ 1.89 million, with a 
mean of $51,368.28.  
 
Table 37: Descriptive statistics for audit fees, normal and abnormal audit fees  
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Audit fees 167800.13 92550.00 1000.00 2585000 218562.47   
Normal audit fees 116431.85 87096.36 3090.30 891250.94 105786.40 
Abnormal audit fees 51368.28 11159.69 -335869.38 1893169.03 162345.78 
 
5.3.2 Distribution of abnormal audit fees 
Figure 4 below shows the mean distribution of abnormal audit fees from 2004 to 2010. As 
shown in Figure 4, the mean of abnormal audit fees increased sharply from over $20,000 in 
2004 and reached the top of over $80,000 in 2006. This indicates that the costs associated 
with implementing section 302 and section 404 of SOX that take effectively in 2004, are 
sharply increased because auditors have to put more effort and more time on preparing the 
documents requested by SOX. Consequence, auditors charge more audit fees by passing this 
cost to their client firms. Thus, this incurs a sharp increase in abnormal audit fees. Further, 
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the average of abnormal audit fees declined after 2006 then decreased again after 2007. 
Moreover, there was a slightly decline between 2008 and 2009. Finally, after 2009 there was 
a sharp decline again. This indicates that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) may have an 
impact on auditing service market and auditors have to charge their client firms less in order 
to retain their client firms in future. Therefore, the abnormal audit fees estimated by the 
difference between the actual audit fees and normal audit fees, are continuously declined. 
Alternatively, the normal audit fees estimated from the regression model 1 in this study after 
controlling the audit effort, risk and complexity, are increased based on the adjustments to 
the implementation of section 302 and section 404 of SOX due to the complains of increased 
costs associated with these implementation by those client firms. In conclusion, this decline 
reflects either the economic impact from the GFC, the adjustments after the implementation 
of section 302 and section 404, or both. 
 
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of abnormal audit fees from fiscal year 2004 to 2010 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of abnormal audit fees from fiscal year 2004 to 2010 
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5.3.3 Industry specialists 
Industry-specific experience is considered as a significant predictor of auditor performance 
in tasks, particularly in a specific industry. The following studies examine the relation 
between audit fees and auditor industry expertise and find a premium associated with 
industry expertise in Australia, the US and the UK respectively (Ferguson et al. 2003; 
Carson and Fargher 2007; Francis et al. 2005; Basioudis and Francis 2007). The audit 
specialists are defined as computing the percentage of audit fees earned by this auditor from 
one industry to all of the audit fees earned by that auditor every year. Then I code an 
auditor’s top three portfolio shares as the auditor’s specialty and the remaining industries as 
nonspecialty (Krishnan 2003; Gunny et al. 2007). The Table 38 below provides the details 
regarding the industry specialists from 2004 to 2010. 
 
Table 38: Client firms audited by industry specialists from 2004 to 2010 
SIC Industry Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining and 
construction 
8 12 1 20 12 2 1 
Food 3 12 1 17 7 1 2 
Textiles and 
print/publishing 
2 7 5 5 6 0 3 
Chemicals 7 13 12 12 14 6 5 
Pharmaceuticals 14 27 16 20 22 4 15 
Extractive 17 12 20 25 18 4 15 
Durable manufactures 47 36 50 47 76 29 30 
Transportation 11 18 9 24 11 4 5 
Retail 17 25 20 44 14 2 10 
Services 28 57 25 61 34 10 15 
Computers 33 51 40 48 44 5 10 
Utilities 5 8 3 14 5 2 5 
Total 192 277 202 337 263 69 111 
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5.3.4 Descriptive statistics for variables in abnormal audit fee model 
The descriptive statistics for variables in abnormal audit fee model is presented in Table 39. 
Panel A of Table 39 reports statistics for continuous variables while Panel B reports 
statistics for dichotomous variables. In Panel A, the relation between auditors and client 
firms (TENURE) ranges from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 12 years, with a mean 
of 3.56 years. Firm age (AGE) ranges from 1 year to 49 years listed on the stock market, 
with a mean of 14.92 years. The details regarding the measurement of control variables in 
this model could be found in Section 4.5.3. Panel B in Table 39 shows that in this sample 8 
percent of firms is considered as industry specialists (SPEC). In Panel C, the independent 
variable is abnormal audit fees. The abnormal audit fees (ABNAFEES) range from a 
minimum of 1.64 to a maximum of 6.22 with a mean of 4.60. Finally, Panel D shows that in 
this sample 48 percent of inspection outcome has deficiencies. The dependent variable is 
inspection outcome (OUTCOME). The total observations in this model are 1567.       
 
Table 39: Descriptive statistics for variables in abnormal audit fee model  
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable 
name 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
TENURE  3.56 3.00 1.00 12.00   2.20 
AGE 14.92 15.50 1.00 49.00   10.92 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
SPEC 
Industry and year 
0.08    0.00     1438      129 
     included 
 
Panel C: Independent variables 
Variable 
name 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
 
ABNFEES    4.60       4.62   1.64    6.22           0.66  
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Panel D: Dependent variable 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
OUTCOME 
Total observations    
0.48    0.00      809       758 
  1567 
5.3.5 Correlation analysis for abnormal audit fee model 
Table 40 below reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in abnormal 
audit fee model. The correlation matrix in Table 40 indicates that there is a significant 
correlation between the dependent variable (OUTCOME) and the independent variable 
abnormal audit fees (ABNAFEES) and most control variables auditor tenure (TENURE) and 
auditor experts (SPEC) except for firm age (AGE) at the p<0.01 level. This result implies 
that the independent variable and most control variables have a significant influence on the 
dependent variable (OUTCOME).    
 
Table 40: Correlation analysis for variables in abnormal audit fee model  
 
 Outcome  ABNAFEES SPEC TENURE AGE 
Outcome 
 1 -.090** -.104** -.104** -.019 
     
      
ABNAFEES 
  1 -.015 -.098** -.065 
      
      
SPEC 
   1 .092** .142** 
      
      
TENURE 
    1 .177** 
      
      
AGE 
     1 
      
      
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5.4 Hypothesis one testing 
5.4.1 Normality of the data 
The initial descriptive statistics for the variables in abnormal audit fee model show that the 
variables are not normally distributed in this study because the mean of abnormal audit fees 
which is $ 51,368.28, is greater than the median of abnormal audit fees which is $ 11,159.69 
in Table 37. Therefore, the distribution of abnormal audit fees is skewed to the right. Further, 
according to Gravetter and Wallnau (2000), normality requires the data frequency to be 
distributed in the shape of symmetrical and bell shaped curve. Alternatively, mean and 
median should be the same if the distribution is normalized.  To test the normality of 
abnormal audit fees, both the histogram and normal probability plot approaches are 
employed in this study. The results show that the distribution of abnormal audit fees is 
skewed to the right. Due to one of the requirements applying logistic regression model, 
normality of data should be met. To achieve improved normality, transforming data 
approach is used in this study, particularly using logarithm of abnormal audit fees. This is 
also consistent with prior studies (Kinney and Libby 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Choi 
et al. 2010; Blankley et al. 2012). 
   
5.4.2 Regression analysis 
The Omnibus tests of model coefficients are also referred to as a ‘goodness of fit’ test. The 
results of Panel A in Table 41 show that the model containing all predictors is statistically 
significant and is able to distinguish between the deficiency reports and non-deficiency 
reports. The result shown in Panel B provide an indication of the amount of variation in the 
dependent variable (OUTCOME) explained by abnormal audit fee model. The Cox & Snell 
R Square and Nagelkerke R Square are described as pseudo R square statistics instead of the 
true R square values provided in the regression output. As shown in Panel B the values of 
Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square are 0.136 and 0.183 respectively. This 
indicates that the variables in abnormal audit fee regression model can be explained between 
13.6 and 18.3 percent of the variability. While the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test 
indicates that the Chi-square value for the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 13.303 with a 
significance level of 0.102 which is larger than 0.05 suggesting support for abnormal audit 
fee regression model.  
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Table 41: Regression results for abnormal audit fee  
  
Panel A: Omnibus Tests of abnormal audit fee model Coefficients 
 
Step 1    Step                        78.665                          20                        0.000  
              Block                      78.665                          20                        0.000 
              Model                     78.665                          20                        0.000  
 
 
Panel B: Abnormal audit fee model summary 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 658.367   0.136   0.183 
 
 
Panel C: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
 
     1                               13.303                             8                       0.102                
 
 
5.4.3 Discussion of findings on abnormal audit fee model  
The value of Wald test in Table 42 below is used to test the first hypothesis in this study. As 
shown in Table 42, the independent variables abnormal audit fees (ABNAFEES) is 
significant because the P value 0.037 which is less than 0.05. Further, the B value of 0.050 
regarding abnormal audit fess indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
abnormal audit fees paid to auditors and the deficiency outcomes. This result suggests if 
there is an increase in abnormal audit fees then there will be an increased probability of 
obtaining a deficiency report, thus there is a chance of reducing a probability of obtaining a 
favourable PCAOB inspection report. This result is fully supported the first hypothesis that a 
                                          Chi-square                  df                        Sig.    
 
Step                            Chi-square                   df                        Sig. 
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favourable PCAOB inspection outcome is negatively related to abnormal audit fees paid to 
auditors. Additionally, the odds ratio of abnormal audit fees is 1.100 indicating that for 
auditors who have positive abnormal audit fees have 1.1 times to receive the deficiency 
outcomes than auditors who do not have positive abnormal audit fees, all other factors being 
equal.   
 
This result is consistent with prior research (DeAngelo 1981b; DeFond et al. 2002; Kinney 
and Libby 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Choi et al. 2010). Kinney and Libby (2002) 
suggest that abnormal audit fees are a very good measure for estimating the degree of the 
economic bond between the auditor and the client compared with other measures. Moreover, 
according to Choi et al. (2010) when auditor receive unusually high audit fees from a client 
thus abnormal audit fees are positive, the auditor can allow the client to engage in 
opportunistic earnings management. Consequence, the existence of positive abnormal audit 
fees creates an incentive for the auditor to compromise independence with respect to their 
client firms.  
 
Table 42: Output of abnormal audit fee regression model  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df ρ 
Odds 
Ratio 
95.0% C.I for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
TENURE -0.070 0.047          2.214           1 0.137        0.932              0.850         1.023 
AGE  0.007 0.010 0.522     1 0.470        1.007              0.988         1.026 
SPEC -2.259        0.522         18.728          1 0.000 0.104 0.038 0.291 
ABNFEES  0.050 0.312 4.359     1 0.037 1.100 1.080 1.212 
 
5.5 Internal controls model 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics for variables in internal controls model 
Panel A of Table 43 reports statistics for continuous variables while Panel B reports 
statistics for dichotomous variables. In Panel A, the relation between auditors and client 
firms (TENURE) ranges from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 12 years, with a mean 
of 3.56 years. Firm age (AGE) ranges from 1 year to 49 years listed on the stock market, 
with a mean of 14.92 years. Panel B in Table 43 shows that in this sample 8 percent of firms 
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is considered as industry specialists (SPEC). In Panel C, the independent variable is the 
effectiveness of internal control (INTC) and shows that only 15 percent of client firms that 
have an effective internal control system. Finally, Panel D shows that in this sample 48 
percent of inspection outcome has deficiencies. The dependent variable is inspection 
outcome (OUTCOME). The total observations in this model are 1567.     
 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics for variables in internal controls model  
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable 
name 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
TENURE      3.56      3.00    1.00 12.00   2.20 
AGE     14.92     15.50    1.00 49.00   10.92 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
SPEC 
Industry and year 
0.08    0.00     1438       129 
      included 
 
Panel C: Independent variables 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
INTC  0.15    0.00       1326        241 
 
 
Panel D: Dependent variable 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
OUTCOME 
Total observations                                                      
 0.48    0.00    809     758 
    1567 
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5.5.2 Correlation analysis for internal controls model 
Table 44 below reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in internal 
controls model. The correlation matrix in Table 44 indicates that there is a significant 
correlation between the dependent variable (OUTCOME) and the independent variable the 
effectiveness of internal controls (INTC) and most control variables auditor tenure 
(TENURE) and auditor experts (SPEC) except for firm age (AGE) at the p<0.01 level. This 
result implies that the independent variable and most control variables have a significant 
influence on the dependent variable (OUTCOME).    
 
Table 44: Correlation analysis for variables in internal controls model 
 
 Outcome  INTC SPEC TENURE AGE 
Outcome 
 1 -.112** -.104** -.104** -.019 
      
      
INTC 
  1 -.057* .024 -.023 
      
      
SPEC 
   1 .092** .142** 
      
      
TENURE 
    1 .177** 
      
      
AGE 
     1 
      
      
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.5.3 Hypothesis two testing 
5.5.3.1 Normality of the data 
The initial descriptive statistics for the variables in internal controls model show that the 
variables are not normally distributed in this study. Both the histogram and normal 
probability plot approaches are employed in this study to test the normality of data for 
variables. A small number of outliers of the variables were detected and removed from the 
data in order to improve normality of data.  
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5.5.3.2 Regression analysis 
The results of Omnibus test in Panel A of Table 45 show that the model containing all 
predictors is statistically significant and is able to distinguish between the deficiency reports 
and non-deficiency reports. Further, the results shown in Panel B provide an indication of 
the amount of variation in the dependent variable (OUTCOME) explained by internal 
controls model. The Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square are described as 
pseudo R square statistics instead of the true R square values provided in the regression 
output. As shown in Panel B the values of Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square 
are 0.143 and 0.191 respectively. This indicates that the variables in internal controls 
regression model can be explained between 14.3 and 19.1 percent of the variability. While 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test indicates that the Chi-square value for the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 2.227 with a significance level of 0.973 which is larger than 0.05 
suggesting support for internal controls regression model.  
 
Table 45: Regression results for internal controls model   
Panel A: Omnibus Tests of internal controls model Coefficients 
 
Step 1    Step                        82.597                          20                        0.000  
              Block                      82.597                          20                        0.000 
              Model                     82.597                          20                        0.000  
 
Panel B: Internal control model summary 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1  654.435   0.143  0.191 
 
Panel C: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
     1                               2.227                             8                          0.973                
 
                                                                    
                                           Chi-square                  df                        Sig. 
   
 
Step                            Chi-square                   df                        Sig. 
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5.5.3.3 Discussion of findings on internal controls model  
The value of Wald test in Table 46 below is used to test the second hypothesis in this study. 
As shown in Table 46, the independent variable of the effectiveness of internal controls 
(INTC) is significant because the P values 0.004 which is less than 0.05. Further, the B 
value of -0.635 of the effectiveness of internal controls (INTC) indicates that there is a 
negative relationship between the effectiveness of client firms’ internal controls and the 
deficiency outcomes. This result suggests if there is an improvement in client firms’ internal 
controls then auditors will have a decreased chance of obtaining a deficiency report. 
Alternatively, if client firms’ internal control system is effective then auditors are more 
likely to have a favourable PCAOB inspection outcome. Therefore, this result indicates that 
the second hypothesis in this study is accepted.  Additionally, the odds ratio of the 
effectiveness of internal controls (INTC) is 0.530 indicating that if the effectiveness of client 
firms’ internal control increases every extra unit then auditors receiving deficiency outcomes 
will decrease by a factor of 0.530, all other factors being equal.   
 
The finding regarding client firms’ internal controls in this study is consistent with prior 
research conducted by Doyle et al. (2007b) indicating that there is an association between 
weak internal controls and lower accruals quality. Moreover, these weaknesses are 
considered as more difficult to audit. As audit firms in this study are all small and have less 
professional staff as well as less auditing resources, if client firms’ internal control system is 
effective then these auditors can rely on their client firms’ effective internal control system. 
Therefore, auditors could improve the efficiency and accuracy by assigning their staff to 
perform other necessary substantive testings.  
 
The result is also consistent with another prior research by Doyle et al. (2007a) indicating 
that the account-specific material weaknesses result in complex operating environments and 
the entity-level material weaknesses are more related to lack of staffing and expertise. The 
findings of Doyle et al. (2007a) suggest that client firms’ internal control is weak due to lack 
of staffing and expertise and the complexity of operating environments therefore auditors 
could not rely on their client firms’ internal control system. Thus, audit efficiency is reduced 
by performing additional testings on client firms’ internal control system. If auditors rely on 
their client firms’ weak internal control system then auditors are most likely to receive the 
deficiency outcomes from the PCAOB.    
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Table 46: Output of internal controls regression model  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df ρ 
Odds 
Ratio 
95.0% C.I for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
TENURE -0.044   0.047  0.891    1 0.345 0.957 0.873 1.049 
AGE  0.008   0.010  0.642    1 0.423 1.008 0.989 1.027 
SPEC -2.333   0.522  20.003    1 0.000 0.097 0.035 0.270 
INTC -0.635  0.218  8.468    1 0.004 0.530 0.346 0.813 
 
5.6 Corporate governance model 
Client firms’ effectiveness of corporate governance is measured by their corporate 
governance index (CGI). This CGI is comprised of board and audit committes’ attributes 
and used to capture the independence, diligence, and financial expertise of both board and 
audit committees. CGI is calculated by adding the scores from different categories of board 
and audit committees defined in this study. This measurement is consistent with prior 
studies (Menon and Williams 1994; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000b; Carcello et 
al. 2002; Cassell et al. 2012). This CGI is applied in this study to test my third hypothesis 
if there is an association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ 
effectiveness of corporate governance.   
5.6.1 Descriptive statistics of CGI components 
The data of CGI components are collected through company proxy statements (DEF14A) 
which could be downloaded from the market brief’s website. The detailed measurements 
are drawn from prior study conducted by Cassell et al. (2012) and set out as follows: 
 
Board independence-1 if firms have more than 70 percent of independent directors to total 
directors (median percentage of independent directors), 0 otherwise. 
Board meetings-1 if firms have at least 8.5 board meetings (median board meetings) 0 
otherwise. 
Board duality-1 if firms have a separation between chairman and CEO and 0, otherwise. 
Board attendance-1 if firms have more than 75% attendance of the Board of Directors’ 
meeting and 0, otherwise. 
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Board continuity-1 if firms have staggered election and 0, otherwise. 
Audit committee members-1 if firms have more than 3 members (median audit committee 
members) and 0, otherwise. 
Audit committee meetings-1 if firms have more than 5 (median audit committee meeting 
frequency) and 0, otherwise. 
Audit committee financial experts-1 if firms have at least one financial expert (median 
audit committee financial expert) and 0, otherwise. 
 
The descriptive statistics for CGI components is presented in Table 47. As shown in Table 
47, the number of audit committees (AC) expertise ranges from a minimum of 0 to a 
maximum of 3, with a mean of 0.81. AC members and AC meetings range from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8 and from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 21 
respectively. The means for AC members and AC meetings are 3.44 and 5.56 respectively. 
Corporate governance index (CGI) ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8 with a 
mean of 4.07. The median of CGI for client firms is 4. The average CGI is 4.07 indicating 
most firms have their scores from the following categories of board and audit committees. 
These categories are included board independence, board meeting, and board attendance 
and audit committee financial expert. Furthermore, these areas are also mandatory 
requirement by SOX.   
 
Board independence 
In terms of board of directors, the average of independent directors and total directors are 
5.86 and 8.06 respectively compared to the medians of independent directors and total 
directors which are 5 and 7 respectively. Therefore, the median percentage of independent 
directors to total directors (70%) is considered as a cut-off when measuring the indicator 
variable of board independence. This is also consistent with the finding of prior research 
that independent directors should perform well on monitoring management than non-
independent directors (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Klein 2002; Dechow et al. 2010 
and Cassell et al. 2012). The purpose of selecting median as a cut-off when calculating 
CGI is to avoid some changes in a specific year, such as an increase in the frequency of 
audit committee meetings. 
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Board duality 
Board duality is included as an indicator variable to measure the association between the 
separation of the CEO-Chairman duality and financial reporting quality (Dechow et al. 
1996; Imhoff 2003 and Farber 2005). The result of board duality shows that only one third 
of those firms that have a separation between chairman and CEO.  
 
Board meeting 
Board meeting plays an important role in improving directors’ advisory role to 
management (Adams and Ferreirs 2007) because directors could access relevant 
information during board and audit committee meetings. Median board meeting of 8.5 is 
used to measure this indicator variable with a purpose of avoiding the sudden increase in a 
year or years.  
 
Board attendance 
Prior study by Xie et al. (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004) find an association between audit 
committee meeting frequency and audit quality. The indictor variable of board attendance 
is collected through company proxy statements. In company proxy statements, 75 percent 
of attendance of the board meeting is described and used to measure this indicator variable 
in this study.  
 
Board continuity 
Board continuity is included as an indicator variable to measure the effect of board 
structure on overall governance quality drawn from prior studies (Gompers et al. 2003; 
Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007; and Zhao and Chen 2008). In this study, board 
continuity is measured by having a staggered election or not.  
 
Audit committee members 
Studies conducted by Bedard et al. (2004) and Jaggi and Leung (2007) conclude the 
significant negative relationship between earnings management and the existence of an 
audit committee. Cohen et al. (2010) find that audit committees in the post-SOX period are 
perceived to have more knowledge and authority as well as being more diligent and active. 
In this study, the indicator variable of audit committee members is measured by the median 
audit committee members which is 3 due to the fact that in the beginning of SOX most 
firms had less audit committee members than current firms in this study.  
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Audit committee meeting 
Stewart and Munro (2007) find that the audit committee, the frequency of committee 
meetings and the auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly associated with a 
reduction in perceived audit risk. In this study, median audit committee meeting is also 
used to eliminate the effect that most firms had more audit committee meetings due to the 
requirement by SOX. 
 
Audit committee financial experts 
The definition of audit committee financial experts is based on results in DeFond et al. 
(2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008). In this study, median audit committee 
financial expert is used to measure this indicator variable because most firms in this study 
are small audit firms therefore they should have at least one financial expert required by 
SOX.   
 
Table 47: Descriptive statistics for CGI components  
CGI components Mean        Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Number of AC expertise 0.81 1 0 3 0.63 
AC members 3.44 3 0 8 1.41 
AC diligence (meeting) 5.56 5 0 21 3.53 
Independent director 5.86 5 0 17 3.18 
Total director 8.06 7 0 19 3.23 
Board duality 0.33 0 0 1 0.47 
Board meeting 9.36 8.5 0 32 5.24 
Board attendance 0.97 1 0 1 0.17 
Board continuity 0.40 0 0 1 0.49 
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5.6.2 Descriptive statistics for variables in corporate governance model 
Panel A of Table 48 reports statistics for continuous variables while Panel B reports 
statistics for dichotomous variables. In Panel A, the relation between auditors and client 
firms (TENURE) ranges from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 12 years, with a mean 
of 3.56 years. Firm age (AGE) ranges from 1 year to 49 years listed on the stock market, 
with a mean of 14.92 years. While corporate governance index (CGI) ranges from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8 with a mean of 4.07. Panel B in Table 48 shows that in 
this sample 8 percent of firms is considered as industry specialists (SPEC). Panel C shows 
48 percent of inspection outcome has deficiencies. The dependent variable is inspection 
outcome (OUTCOME). The total observations in this model are 1567.         
 
Table 48: Descriptive statistics for variables in corporate governance model  
 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable 
name 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
TENURE    3.56  3.00 1.00 12.00   2.20 
AGE    14.92  15.50 1.00 49.00   10.92 
CGI    4.07  4.00 0.00 8.00   1.50 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
SPEC 
Industry and year 
0.08   0.00       1438    129 
   included 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable 
Variable name Mean Median 
Number of 
firms coded 
“0” 
Number of 
firms coded 
“1” 
OUTCOME 
Total observations  
0.48    0.00        809    758 
   1567 
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5.6.2.1 Correlation analysis for corporate governance model 
Table 49 below reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in corporate 
governance model. The correlation matrix in Table 49 indicates that there is a significant 
correlation between the dependent variable (OUTCOME) and the independent variable the 
effectiveness of internal controls (INTC) and most control variables auditor tenure 
(TENURE) and auditor experts (SPEC) except for firm age (AGE) at the p<0.01 level. This 
result implies that the independent variable and most control variables have a significant 
influence on the dependent variable (OUTCOME).    
 
Table 49: Correlation analysis for variables in corporate governance model  
 
 Outcome  CGI SPEC TENURE AGE 
Outcome 
 1 -.112** -.104** -.104** -.019 
      
      
CGI 
  1 -.057* .024 -.023 
      
      
SPEC 
   1 .092** .142** 
      
      
TENURE 
    1 .177** 
      
      
AGE 
     1 
      
      
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.6.3 Hypothesis three testing 
5.6.3.1 Normality of the data 
The initial descriptive statistics for the variables in internal controls model show that the 
variables are not normally distributed in this study. Both the histogram and normal 
probability plot approaches are employed in this study to test the normality of data for 
variables. A small number of outliers of the variables were detected and removed from the 
data in order to improve normality of data.  
5.6.3.2 Regression analysis 
The results of Omnibus test in Panel A of Table 50 show that the model containing all 
predictors is statistically significant and is able to distinguish between the deficiency reports 
and non-deficiency reports. Further, the results shown in Panel B provide an indication of 
the amount of variation in the dependent variable (OUTCOME) explained by corporate 
governance model. The Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square are described as 
pseudo R square statistics instead of the true R square values provided in the regression 
output. As shown in Panel B the values of Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square 
are 0.159 and 0.212 respectively. This indicates that the variables in internal controls 
regression model can be explained between 15.9 and 21.2 percent of the variability. While 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test indicates that the Chi-square value for the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 3.597 with a significance level of 0.892 which is larger than 0.05 
suggesting support for corporate governance regression model.  
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Table 50: Regression results for internal controls model  
Panel A: Omnibus Tests of corporate governance model coefficients 
 
Step 1    Step                        53.274                          20                        0.000  
              Block                      53.274                          20                        0.000 
              Model                     53.274                          20                        0.000  
 
 
Panel B: Corporate governance model summary 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 372.159 0.159 0.212 
 
Panel C: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
     1                               3.597                             8                          0.892                
 
 
5.6.3.3 Discussion of findings on corporate governance model  
The value of Wald test in Table 51 below is used to test the second hypothesis in this study. 
As shown in Table 51, the independent variable of corporate governance index (CGI) is 
insignificant because the P value 0.166 which is more than 0.05. Further, the B value of -
0.125 of CGI (CGI) indicates that there is a negative relationship between the client firms’ 
effectiveness of internal corporate governance and the deficiency outcomes. This indicates 
that if client firms’ internal corporate governance is stronger measured by higher CGI then 
auditors are less likely to receive a deficiency report. Alternatively, if client firms’ internal 
corporate governance is stronger then auditors are more likely to have a favourable PCAOB 
                                                                                                                   
                                           Chi-square                  df                        Sig. 
   
 
Step                            Chi-square                   df                        Sig. 
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inspection outcome. However, the result is insignificant. Therefore, the result is not 
supported my third hypothesis.  
In this study, the CGI is lack of significance due to the following reasons. According to 
Brown et al. (2011), audit committee is the governance mechanism that is most likely to 
influence the entirety of the external audit function. The independent variable of corporate 
governance index (CGI) used to test my third hypothesis becomes improved from 0.166 (P 
value) to 0.102 (P value) after running the main model again with only audit committee 
components suggested by Brown et al. (2012). However, the result is still insignificant. This 
is because the sample in this study is limited based on the fact that the data of audit 
committee are hand collected due to a limitation of access some databases. For instance, 
some researchers rely upon proprietary indices created by firms that rate firms’ CG. These 
indices include Audit Integrity’s Accounting and Governance Risk (AGR), the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) from ISS, the CG rating from Governance Metrics Interna- 
tional (GMI), the rating from the Corporate Library (TCL) and the Standard & Poor’s 
Corporate Governance Score (CGS).  
Alternatively, there is a chance of a causality that has a potential effect on corporate 
governance. In particular, better governance firms are more likely to be concerned about 
having high quality auditors. This may be driven directly by the CEO, audit committee or 
board or in fact both audit quality and governance could be driven by strong institutional 
shareholders or similar external factors. To eliminate this causality, an instrument variable is 
needed, such as a measurement of ownership structure of the firms or other factors, such as 
outside investors when constructing the components of corporate governance index (CGI). 
However, this study is subject to lack of those data. Consequently, the reasons mentioned 
above could be explained why the results on client firms’ internal corporate governance are 
insignificant.       
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Table 51: Output of corporate governance regression model  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df ρ 
Odds 
Ratio 
95.0% C.I for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
TENURE -0.024 0.063 0.143    1 0.705 0.976 0.863 1.105 
AGE 0.020 0.013 2.368    1 0.124 1.020 0.995 1.046 
SPEC -1.957 0.576 11.562    1 0.001 0.141 00.46 0.436 
CGI -0.125 0.090 1.915    1 0.166 0.882 0.739 1.053 
 
 
5.7 Additional and robustness checks 
The purpose of doing an alternative test is to concern that the results in this study are 
contingent upon our specific audit fee model. To alleviate these concerns, I have replicated 
all of my results using abnormal audit fees derived from the audit fee model used in Choi 
et al. (2010) and abnormal fees derived from the model used in Blankley et al. (2012). The 
results are slightly different from the result regressing my own audit fee model (Model 1). 
Additionally, I regressed the major model 2 in this study separately by using abnormal 
audit fees, the effectiveness of internal controls and client firms’ effectiveness of corporate 
governance. The results are quite similar and significant for abnormal audit fees and the 
effectiveness of client firms’ internal controls while the client firms’ CGI is still 
insignificant. By performing this it intends to reduce the joint effect of client firms’ 
effectiveness of internal controls and corporate governance on audit quality. Finally, I 
conduct additional tests on the estimation of abnormal audit fees. Since abnormal audit 
fees are the residuals of the actual audit fees and normal audit fees estimated through the 
audit fee model (Model 1) in this study.  
 
Consistent with prior research Petersen (2009), I also performed a clustered, robust 
regression since I have multiple observations of individual firms within the data because 
audit fees paid to auditors by client firms are collected from 2004 to 2010. I use both 
auditors’ size and audit fees as a standard to perform the cluster analysis. The results are 
slightly different from the result of regressing Model 1 in my study. The explanatory 
power increased from 57.9% (R2=0.579) to 60.8% (R2=0.608). Most variables in audit fee 
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model are significant except for SEG, LEVE, INVREC, and CATA. Additionally, all 
significant control variables are positive except for return of assets (ROA). Regarding the 
year control variables, all years are positive and significant except for fiscal year of 2005 
and 2010. Fiscal year of 2005 is positive but insignificant. Fiscal year of 2010 is negative 
but significant. These results are consistent with my results in Model 1. Moreover, most 
industry variables are positive and significant except for mining and construction (sic2), 
food (sic3), textiles and print/publishing (sic4) and extractive (sic7). Mining and 
construction (sic2) is negative and insignificant while food (sic3), textiles and 
print/publishing (sic4) and extractive (sic7) are all positive and insignificant.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the research findings of tests of the three hypotheses as set out in 
Chapter 3 in this study. Moreover, this chapter also provides some descriptive statistics, 
including correlation analysis for variables included in both Model 1 and Model 2 and the 
regression results. The regression results indicate that there is an association between the 
PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ abnormal audit fees paid to audit firms and 
the effectiveness of client firms’ internal controls. Regarding the third hypothesis in this 
study, the result is insignificant due to the following certain reasons, including lack of data 
of components of corporate governance index (CGI) because of lack of some CGI 
databases and the elimination of causality because of lack of access ownership structure 
database as well.       
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusions, limitations, implications and future 
research 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section will reiterate the purpose, 
rationale and approach applied in this study and conclude the finding as well. The 
second section indicates the limitations of this study. The third section discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications of this study. The final section offers some 
suggestions for future research. 
6.2 Summary of the study 
This has been a study on the quality of the work of external auditors as part of the 
broader corporate governance frame. It has contributed new evidence to the PCAOB 
inspection research literature on the association between the PCAOB inspection 
outcomes and audit quality, as well as between PCAOB inspection outcomes and client 
firms’ internal control systems and internal corporate governance. In hypothesising 
these relationships, agency theory and signalling theory have been invoked.  
 
No prior research has directly tested the above associations with PCAOB inspection 
outcomes. This study has focused on two rounds of PCAOB inspections to identify 
change that has occurred in these inspection outcomes and their practical implications 
for medium-to-small auditor firms and their business clients’ managers and investors. A 
motivation for this study is the new regulatory requirements imposed on audit firms in 
the U.S. audit market. These requirements include the creation of PCAOB, the 
requirement for all auditors of public companies to register with the PCAOB and the 
conduct of inspections by the PCAOB annually or triennially. These mandatory 
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regulations affect both U.S.-based and foreign accounting firms who intend to issue 
their audit reports to client firms. These mandatory regulations are considered to 
improve auditor independence and audit quality after numerous high profile accounting 
scandals. 
 
This study is conceptually underpinned by both agency theory and signalling theory. 
From the agency theory perspective, investors in client firms are principals and client 
firms’ managers act as the agents on behalf of the principals. Managers in client firms 
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of client firms. Auditors considered as 
monitors of the client firm’s management are responsible for giving assurance to 
investors that true and fair financial statements are reported. The quality of the auditor, 
therefore, is a critical factor in this monitoring process. Hence, the independent 
government body, the PCAOB, has become a new player in the monitoring process by 
conducting inspections on audit firms to ensure audit quality and auditor independence 
when auditors provide auditing assurance to their client firms. Since audit quality has 
been difficult for investors to observe, therefore, from a signalling theory perspective 
the PCAOB inspection reports are considered as an important signal to the market for 
evaluating audit firms’ quality delivered to their client firms. 
 
Three sets of hypotheses are generated in this study. Hypothesis one examines the 
association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and abnormal audit fees paid to 
auditors by client firms measured by the difference between the actual audit fees and 
estimated audit fee. Hypothesis two tests the association between the PCAOB 
inspection outcomes and client firms’ effective internal controls. Lastly, hypothesis 
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three investigates the association between the PCAOB inspection outcomes and client 
firms’ internal corporate governance. 
 
A quantitative research method is applied in this study. The final sample in this study 
consists of 1567 observations and is drawn from different populations and data is 
collected from different sources. The first sample is drawn from the PCAOB inspection 
reports available between August 2004 and December 2010. The next sample involves 
matching client firms’ financial data with their auditors’ inspection reports. The final 
stage of data collection involves various data sources for information about the audit 
firms named in the sampled inspection reports and their sampled clients.  This data 
ranges from audit fees, internal control opinions and client firms’ corporate governance 
data. The three hypotheses of this study are tested using both an OLS regression model 
and a logistic regression model.  
6.3 Findings of the study 
Abnormal audit fees are used in the model that tests the first hypothesis. The result 
shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between abnormal audit fees 
paid to auditors and the deficiency outcomes issued to those auditors by the PCAOB. 
This result suggests if there is an increase in abnormal audit fees then there will be an 
increased probability of obtaining a deficiency report. Thus there is a chance of 
reducing the probability of obtaining a favourable PCAOB inspection outcome. 
Consequence, this result supports the first hypothesis in the study.  
 
The inference of this result is that an agency theory perspective is supported rather than 
a signalling theory perspective. Thus, agency theory would reason that the client’s 
management is willing to offer a premium (abnormal) fee to the auditor as a ‘bonding’ 
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cost which can make the auditor more ‘reliant’ on the client firm. This reliance would 
compromise the auditor’s independence and result in a poorer quality audit, thus 
resulting in a higher probability of obtaining a deficiency report from the PCAOB. The 
finding in this study supports this line of reasoning. On the other hand, signalling theory 
would contend that an unfavourable inspection outcome for an auditor would signal to 
the market the lower quality of the auditor. This signal should result in lower audit fees 
being offered by clients because the PCAOB’s negative signal can potentially cause the 
audit firm to lose its clients or not retain existing clients in the future. It could also 
convey a negative signal to the client’s investors. However, the results in this study do 
not give support to this signalling theory argument. 
    
To test the second hypothesis, client firms’ effectiveness of internal control is applied in 
this study. The finding indicates that there is a negative and significant relationship 
between the effectiveness of client firms’ internal control system and the deficiency 
outcomes issued to client firms’ auditors. This result suggests if there is an 
improvement in client firms’ internal controls then auditors will have a decreased 
chance of obtaining a deficiency report. In other words, if client firms’ internal control 
system is effective then client firms’ auditors are more likely to have a favourable 
PCAOB inspection outcome. Therefore, this result indicates that the second hypothesis 
in this study is also accepted.  The validity of this result for agency and signalling 
theory arguments, respectively, is discussed below in conjunction with the results of the 
third hypothesis. 
 
In relation to the third hypothesis in this study, the client firms’ corporate governance 
index (CGI) is applied to test the impact of internal corporate governance quality on the 
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PCAOB inspection report outcome. The higher the CGI, the stronger the client firms’ 
internal corporate governance is expected to be. The result indicates that there is a 
negative relationship between the client firms’ strong internal corporate governance and 
the deficiency outcomes issued to client firms’ auditors by the PCAOB. However, the 
result is insignificant. Although not statistically significant, the direction of this result 
does suggest that if client firms’ internal corporate governance is stronger then the client 
firms’ auditors are less likely to receive a deficiency outcome. In other words, if the 
client firms’ internal corporate governance is sound, the auditor will tend to receive a 
favourable PCAOB inspection outcome. Therefore, while the result is unable to claim 
support for the third hypothesis, it is heading in the direction of finding support with 
further sampling as more PCAOB data become available in the future. 
 
The inference of the result for hypothesis two (and to a less probable extent for 
hypothesis three) is that the reasoning of both an agency theory perspective and a 
signalling theory perspective are confirmed.  From an agency theory perspective, higher 
quality internal controls and corporate governance mechanisms would mean that the 
client is willing to incur higher monitoring costs. Agency theory would suggest that the 
client will weigh up these costs, together with the auditors fees, and compare them to 
the benefits that can be generated for the firm’s investors.  This is where the reasoning 
would turn to signalling theory. The benefits to the firm’s investors expected by 
management from incurring higher monitoring costs would have been enhanced by the 
existence of the PCAOB.   
 
The PCAOB, by publishing its audit inspection reports, has provided a new way of 
directly signalling the quality of the firm’s auditor and indirectly signalling the quality 
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of the firm’s internal controls and corporate governance systems to investors. The 
benefits of a ‘good news’ signal to investors regarding the quality of the firm’s agency 
monitoring systems has been perceived by client firms as enhanced due to the PCAOB. 
Hence, the results in this study confirm that firms are willing to incur higher agency 
monitoring costs because they believe the benefits of higher quality internal controls 
(and maybe internal governance mechanisms) have been enhanced by the PCAOB’s 
signalling effect.       
6.4 Limitations of the study 
This study is subject to several limitations. The limitations are associated with data, 
including missing variables in two regression models, on the generation of the result. 
First, the data used in this study are collected from different sources. After matching the 
PCAOB inspection outcomes and client firms’ financial data the sample reduced 
sharply. In terms of the effectiveness of client firms’ internal control system and internal 
corporate governance measured by a corporate governance index (CGI), the usable data 
in this study declined further. Moreover, the data regarding client firms’ internal 
controls and the corporate governance index components are hand collected from the 
annual reports and the proxy statements. Therefore, the data could be subjected to error 
and bias. 
 
Second, the models employed in this study are drawn from prior research. The variables 
applied in these models could be omitted or there are some useful control variables that 
have not been applied in this study. 
 
Third, the scope to generalization of the result is limited. The results can be generalized 
only to the population from which the sample is drawn. The sample in this study is 
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based on 806 PCAOB inspection reports from 2004 to 2010. Further, the auditor-client 
firm observations are limited within the study period, therefore the sample in this study 
may not be representative of the population of PCAOB inspection reports. 
6.5 Implications of the study 
The implications of the findings for the application of agency theory’s concepts of 
monitoring and bonding cost and signalling theory’s concept of market information 
about the quality of a firm and its auditor have been considered in section 6.3 above.  
This section considers the practical implications of the findings for regulators, investors 
and managers through addressing the impact of PCAOB inspection reports on client 
firms, or the investors in those client firms and the audit firm itself. 
 
The findings of the study have implications for regulators in terms of auditor 
independence and audit quality. The creation of the PCAOB conducts inspections on 
auditors because of the concerns about auditor independence and audit quality delivered 
by the AICPA peer review. The prior research has also shown that abnormal audit fees 
have an influence on auditor independence and audit quality. However, the results are 
mixed. This study provides new evidence of the existence of positive abnormal audit 
fees paid to auditors on the inspection outcomes issued to auditors by the PCAOB. This 
result indicates that positive abnormal audit fees paid to auditors are considered to be 
associated with the compromise of auditor independence. 
 
Additionally, this study has implications for regulators and managers from client firms. 
Regulators particularly policy makers should emphasise and enhance the requirements 
on client firms’ internal controls because the finding in this study on internal controls 
shows that client firms’ internal control is effective thus auditors could rely on it in 
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order to improve the auditing efficiency and effectiveness. Although the finding on the 
association between client firms’ internal corporate governance and auditors’ inspection 
outcomes is insignificant managers of client firms may also consider the influence of 
client firms’ internal corporate governance on auditors’ inspection outcomes. This 
insignificance may cause by lack of data or error and bias of data. 
 
Finally, this study also has some implications for investors. Previous studies have 
debated for a while on whether the PCAOB inspection reports are considered as a signal 
of audit quality. This study also provides some evidence on audit quality delivered by 
the PCAOB inspection reports to investors. The finding indicates that management of 
client firms and auditors jointly provide auditing assurance on client firms’ financial 
reporting. The PCAOB inspection provides additionally assurance in its process of 
auditing auditors and thereby delivering extra assurance on client firms’ financial 
reporting. The inspection reports issued by the PCAOB are believed to provide an 
objective and accurate signal of audit quality. 
6.6 Suggestions for future research 
This study generates some opportunities for future research. First, future research could 
examine similar research questions when there are more inspection reports released. 
Second, further research could investigate the association between the PCAOB 
inspection outcomes and larger audit firms’ abnormal audit fees paid to their auditors, 
their client firms’ internal controls and internal corporate governance. Third, further 
study could also conduct an analysis of the comparison between larger audit firms and 
small audit firms in terms of the PCAOB inspection outcomes and a signal of audit 
quality to investors and financial reporting users.                                      
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Appendix A 
 
According to PCAOB, no deficiency is described in the inspection report as follows, for 
instance the inspection team did not discover anything that it considered to be an audit 
deficiency that warrants discussion in a Board inspection report. The following 
examples are provided further details: 
 
Example one 
PCAOB Release No. 104-2005-004 
Inspection of Moore Stephens Frost, PLC 
January 21, 2005 
Page 3 
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagements  
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The scope of the inspection procedures performed included reviews of certain aspects of 
the performance of the Firm's audits of the financial statements of its two issuer audit 
clients.  The inspection team did not discover anything that it considered to be an audit 
deficiency that warrants discussion in a Board inspection report. 
 
Example two 
PCAOB Release No. 104-2007-074  
Inspection of L J Soldinger Associates, LLC  
June 14, 2007  
Page 3  
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagements  
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm's auditing of 
financial statements of three issuers.  The scope of this review was determined 
according to the Board's criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit 
or influence the scope.  This review did not identify any audit performance issues that, 
in the inspection team's view, resulted in the Firm failing to obtain sufficient competent 
evidential matter to support its opinion on the relevant financial statements.   
 
A deficiency is defined as a failure to perform and document sufficient substantive 
procedures and a failure to obtain and evaluate evidential matter. The following 
examples provide further details: 
 
Example one 
PCAOB Release No. 104-2010-099  
Inspection of Padgett, Stratemann  
& Co., L.L.P.  
July 2, 2010  
Page 3 
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagements  
  
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm's auditing of 
financial statements of two issuers. The scope of this review was determined according 
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to the Board's criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence 
the scope.    
The inspection team identified what it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified in one of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of such 
significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain 
sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer's financial 
statements. 
   
Those deficiencies were –   
 (1)  the failure to perform sufficient procedures related to the impairment of oil and gas 
properties; and  
 (2)  the failure to perform sufficient procedures related to revenue recognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example two 
PCAOB Release No. 104-2009-176  
Inspection of Lane Gorman Trubitt, L.L.P.  
November 19, 2009  
Page 3 
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagements  
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm's auditing of 
financial statements of three issuers.  The scope of this review was determined 
according to the Board's criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit 
or influence the scope.    
The inspection team identified what it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified in one of the audits reviewed included a deficiency of such 
significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain 
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sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer's financial 
statements. 
That deficiency was the failure to perform sufficient audit procedures to evaluate 
intangible assets for impairment. The deficiency described above related to auditing an 
aspect of an issuer's financial statements that the issuer announced its intent to restate. 
 
Example three 
PCAOB Release No. 104-2011-243  
Inspection of Rehmann Accounting LLC  
August 3, 2011  
Page 3 
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagements  
The inspection procedures included a review of aspects of the Firm's auditing of 
financial statements of two issuers.  The scope of this review was determined according 
to the Board's criteria, and the Firm was not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence 
the scope.    
The inspection team identified what it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified in one of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of such 
significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not obtain 
sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuer's financial 
statements. 
   
Those deficiencies were –   
1)  The Firm's failure to identify, or to address appropriately, departures from GAAP 
that related to a potentially material misstatement in the audited financial statements 
concerning costs of sales; and   
2)  The Firm’s failure to identify, or to address appropriately, departures from GAAP 
that related to a potentially material misstatement in the audited financial statements 
concerning allowances for future sales returns and expenses attributable to actual sales 
returns.  
 
Example four  
PCAOB Release No. 104-2005-025 
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Inspection of Carter, Cartier, Melby  
& Guarino, C.P.A.’s, P.A. 
July 25, 2005 
Page 3 
 
A.  Review of Audit Engagement  
The scope of the inspection procedures performed included review of aspects of the 
performance of the Firm's audit of the financial statements of its issuer audit client.  
Those aspects were selected according to the Board's own criteria, and the Firm was not 
allowed an opportunity to limit or influence the selection process.    
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies. The 
deficiencies identified included deficiencies of such significance that it appeared to the 
inspection team that the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to 
support its opinion on the issuer's financial statements. Those deficiencies included –   
 (1)  the Firm's failure to identify, or  to address appropriately, departures from GAAP 
that related to potentially material misstatements in the audited financial statements, 
concerning the failure to  determine appropriately the fair value of securities received in 
an exchange;  
 (2)  the failure to evaluate the issuer's accounting for certain induced conversions of 
convertible debt; and  
(3) the failure to evaluate the issuer's accounting for stock warrants. 
 
Following the inspection fieldwork and the inspection team's discussion with the Firm 
of the matters identified above, the Firm performed additional audit procedures and 
identified misstatements in the issuer's financial statements.  The issuer's 2004 Form10-
KSB, filed on March 31, 2005, included 2003 financial statements that had been 
adjusted to address the misstatements discussed above.          
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Appendix B 
Auditor ID              Auditor name  Month 1 Month 2  Year 1 Year 2 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
899 Aaron Stein                                         Nov  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
2396 Abrams, Foster, Nole & Williams, P.A                Nov  Dec  2008 2010 2 2 
113 Ahearn Jasco + Company, P.A.                        Jun  Sep  2005 2007 2 1 
129 AJ Robbins, PC                                      Dec  Mar  2008 2010 2 2 
297 Akin, Doherty, Klein & Feuge, P.C.                  Apr  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
210 Alexander Thompson Arnold PLLC                      Dec  Oct  2005 2008 1 1 
614 Amper,Politziner&Mattia, P.C.                       Sep  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
168 Anchin, Block &Anchin LLP                           Jan  Apr  2007 2009 1 1 
422 Anton Collins Mitchell                              June Apr  2005 2008 1 1 
2351 Arik Eshel, CPA Assoc., PC                          Oct  Dec  2009 2010 2 1 
32 Armanino McKenna                                    Apr  Mar  2009 2010 2 1 
86 Arnett & Foster, PLLC                               July Mar  2006 2008 1 1 
517 Aronson LLC                                         Mar  Apr  2007 2009 2 1 
160 Ary Roepcke Mulchaey                                Feb  May  2006 2008 2 1 
974 Austin,Niester,Beauchamp,and Finnegan,P. C.         Feb  Jun  2006 2008 1 2 
53 Bagell,Josephs, Levien &Company, LLC                Jun  Nov  2008 2009 2 1 
231 Baker Newman & Noyes P.A.                           Sep  May  2005 2008 1 1 
546 Banks, Finley, White & Co., CPA                     Mar  Mar  2008 2011 1 1 
123 Barfield,Murphy,Shank &Smith, P C.                  Apr  Jul  2006 2010 2 2 
598 Bateman & Co., Inc                                  Nov  June 2006 2009 1 1 
277 Battelle & Battelle LLP                             Jan  Mar  2005 2008 1 1 
795 Baum&Company,P.A.                                   Sep  Jan  2005 2009 2 2 
712 Baumann,Raymondo &Company P A                       Jun  Dec  2008 2010 2 2 
167 Beard MillerCompany LLP                             Sep  Jul  2008 2010 2 2 
1167 Becher, Della Torre, Gitto & Company                Sep  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
599 Bedinger and Company                                Apr  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
635 BehlerMick PS                                       Apr  Jul  2008 2010 2 2 
420 Bella, Hermida, Gillman & Associate                 Feb  Apr  2006 2008 2 1 
2240 Bencivenga Ward & Company,CPA's , P. C.             Sep  Dec  2007 2010 1 1 
1975 Berard & Donahue CPA, P. C.                         Nov  May  2007 2010 1 1 
174 Berenfeld Spritzer Shechter &Sheer, LLP             Feb  Jul  2008 2010 2 2 
898 Berman Hopkins Wright and LaHam CPAs                Nov  Oct  2005 2009 1 2 
653 Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP                             Apr  Jan  2006 2009 2 1 
136 Berry, Dunn, McNeil & Parker                        Feb  Apr  2006 2008 2 1 
686 BKD, LLP                                            Nov  Dec  2006 2010 1 2 
433 Blackman Kallick LLP                                Dec  Nov  2005 2008 2 1 
306 Blanchfield, Kober & Company CPA                    Nov  June 2005 2008 2 1 
1117 Blue & Co., LLC                                     Sep  July 2007 2010 1 1 
515 Bobbitt, Pittenger & Company                        Oct  May  2005 2008 1 1 
1172 Bober, Markey, Fedorovich & Company                 Nov  Jul  2005 2009 1 1 
454 Bongiovanni & Associates, CPAs                      Nov  Oct  2006 2010 1 1 
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905 Borland, Benefield, Crawford, Webster, P C          Oct  Jun  2005 2009 1 1 
641 Brad A. Kinder CPA                                  July May  2005 2008 1 1 
83 Brady, Martz & Associates, P. C                     Jul  May  2007 2009 1 1 
95 Braverman Inter PC                                  Mar  Mar  2006 2008 1 1 
552 Briggs, Bunting & Dougherty, LLP                    Nov  Nov  2006 2008 1 1 
586 Brimmer,Burek &Keelan LLP                           Apr  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
237 Brown Armstrong Accountancy Corporation             Oct  Feb  2006 2010 2 2 
423 Brown, Edwards & Company , LLP                      Oct  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
643 Brown,Smith , Wallace, LLC                          Oct  Dec  2006 2010 2 2 
901 Buckno Lisicky & Company, P. C.                     Jan  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
1006 Burnham & Schumm, P. C.                             Dec  Oct  2005 2008 2 1 
207 Burr Pilger Mayer, Inc                              Jun  Sep  2008 2009 2 1 
384 Burton McCumber & Cortez                            Nov  May  2005 2008 1 1 
634 Cacciamatta Accountancy Corp                        Sep  Apr  2007 2011 1 2 
213 Carr, Riggs & Ingram LLC                            Oct  Apr  2006 2009 1 1 
62 Carson & Co, LLC                                    Jun  May  2006 2008 2 1 
447 Castaing, Hussey & Lolan, LLC                       Oct  Jun  2006 2009 1 1 
647 Causey Demgen & Moore Inc                           Feb  Dec  2006 2008 2 1 
239 CCR LLP                                             Apr  Jun  2007 2009 1 1 
676 CF & Co., L.L.P.                                    Sep  Jun  2005 2009 2 2 
1121 Chapman, Hext & Co., P. C.                          Nov  Jan  2007 2011 1 1 
677 Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, LLP                      Sep  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
2237 Child, Van Wagoner & Bradshaw, PLLC                 Jan  Jul  2009 2010 2 2 
667 Chisholm, Bierwolf, Nilson & Morrill, LLC           Jul  Jun  2005 2009 2 2 
1011 Ciuni & Panichi, Inc                                Mar  Feb  2007 2010 1 1 
690 Clancy and Co, PLLC                                 Mar  Dec  2006 2009 2 1 
655 Clifton Gunderson LLP                               Mar  Dec  2008 2010 1 1 
925 Cohen Fund Audit Services, Ltd                      Jun  Feb  2005 2008 1 1 
353 Cole & Reed, P.C.                                   Mar  Oct  2006 2008 1 1 
692 Coleman & Williams, Ltd                             Jan  May  2007 2009 1 1 
742 Comiskey & Company Professional Corporation         Jun  Sep  2007 2008 2 1 
1807 Conner & Associates, P. C.                          Dec  Apr  2007 2011 1 2 
1537 CONNOLLY,GRADY & CHA, P.C.                          Jan  Jul  2009 2010 2 2 
439 Cordovano and Honeck LLP                            Apr  Jun  2006 2009 2 2 
254 Cornick, Garber & Sandler, LLP                      Jun  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
1301 Cornwell, Jackson & Co., PC                         Feb  Dec  2008 2010 1 2 
430 Coulter & Justus, PC                                Dec  June 2005 2008 1 1 
648 Cowan, Gunteski, & Co., P.A.                        Jun  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
1148 Craine, thompson & Jones, PC                        Mar  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
484 Cross, Fernandez & Riley,LLP                        Jun  Mar  2005 2008 2 1 
528 Dannible & McKee, LLP                               May  Oct  2006 2008 2 1 
465 D'Arcangelo & Co., LLP                              Feb  Sep  2006 2008 1 1 
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229 Daszkal Bolton LLP                                  Feb  Oct  2008 2009 2 2 
986 Davie Kaplan Chapman & Braveman, P. C.              Jul  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
700 Davis Kinard & Co, PC                               May  Dec  2006 2009 2 2 
756 DE LEON & COMPANY, P.A.                             Dec  Sep  2005 2008 2 1 
491 De Meo, Young, McGrath & Co., P.A.                  Mar  Sep  2006 2010 2 2 
444 DeCoria, Maichel & Teague, PS                       Apr  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
217 Demetrius & Company, L.L.C.                         May  Oct  2008 2009 2 1 
57 Dixon Hughes Goodman LLP                            Oct  Dec  2008 2009 2 1 
493 Dohan and Company CPA's, P.A.                       Apr  Sep  2009 2010 2 2 
987 Donahue Associates LLC                              Dec  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
693 Drakeford & Drakeford, LLC.                         Mar  Jan  2006 2009 2 2 
562 Dudley Hopton-Jones Sims & Freeman PLLP             Jan  Feb  2005 2008 2 1 
307 Dworken, Hillman, LaMorte & Sterczala P.C.          Mar  Feb  2006 2009 2 1 
25 EARL M. COHEN, C.P.A., P.A                          Aug  Nov  2005 2008 2 2 
656 Ehrhardt, Keefe, Steiner & Hottman, P.C             May  Dec  2008 2010 2 2 
274 Eisner LLP                                          Feb  June 2006 2008 2 1 
60 Eisner Lubin LLP                                    Feb  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
149 Elliott Davis, LLC                                  Feb  Feb  2008 2010 2 2 
809 Faircloth & Associates P.A.                         Mar  Nov  2006 2009 2 1 
223 Farber Hass Hurley LLP                              Dec  Jul  2007 2010 2 1 
782 Farmer, Fuqua & Huff, P.C.                          Oct  Mar  2006 2010 1 2 
232 Ferlita, Walsh & Gonzalez, P.A.                     Aug  Oct  2005 2009 1 2 
2230 Fiondella, Milone & LaSaracina LLP                  Jun  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
1940 Fischer Cunnane & Associates Ltd                    Jun  May  2007 2010 1 1 
152 Fitts,Roberts & Co., P.C.                           Nov  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
58 Fitzgerald & Co., CPAS, P.C.                        Oct  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
573 Fontanella and Babitts CPAs                         Feb  May  2006 2008 2 1 
807 Francis & Company, CPAs                             May  Jun  2006 2009 2 2 
215 Frazier & deeter LLC                                Mar  Feb  2008 2011 1 1 
317 Freed Maxick & Battaglia, CPAs, P. C.               Mar  Oct  2007 2009 1 1 
381 Freedman & Goldberg, C.P.A.'s, P.C                  Nov  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
711 Friedman LLP                                        Nov  Mar  2008 2010 2 1 
296 George Stewart, CPA                                 Jul  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
31 GHP Horwath, P.C.                                   Feb  Jan  2005 2009 1 1 
107 Gibbons & Kawash, A.C                               Oct  Jan  2005 2009 1 1 
154 Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen, LLP                 Nov  Apr  2006 2009 1 1 
222 Goff Backa Alfera & Company, LLC                    Feb  Jan  2006 2009 1 1 
36 GOLDSTEIN, LEWIN & COMPANY, P.A                     Nov  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
511 Goodman & Company, LLP                              Apr  Jan  2007 2011 1 2 
889 Gray, Gray & Gray, LLP                              Sep  Jan  2007 2010 1 1 
79 Greenberg & Company LLC                             Nov  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
890 Gregory, Sharer & Stuart, PA                        Nov  Apr  2005 2008 1 1 
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1279 Gruber & Company, LLC                               Jul  Jan  2006 2010 2 2 
285 Gumbiner Savett Inc. CPA                            Feb  Feb  2006 2008 1 1 
400 Hacker, Johnson & Smith, PA                         Mar  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
176 Haefele, Flanagan & Co., p.c                        Apr  Jul  2006 2008 1 1 
535 Hall, Kistler & Company LLP                         Jul  Oct  2006 2010 2 1 
298 Ham, Langston & Brezina, LLP                        Jun  Nov  2007 2008 2 1 
794 Hancock, Askew & Co, LLP                            Feb  Mar  2006 2008 1 1 
165 Hannis T. Bourgeois, LLP                            Mar  Feb  2006 2009 2 1 
431 Harper & Pearson Company, P.C                       Apr  Jul  2009 2010 2 1 
200 Haskell & White LLP                                 Jul  Dec  2005 2007 2 1 
457 Haynie & Company                                    Apr  May  2006 2010 1 2 
467 Hazlett, Lewis & Bieter, PLLC                       Aug  May  2006 2009 1 1 
480 Heard, McElroy & Vestal, LLP                        Feb  Jul  2006 2008 1 1 
301 Hein + Associates LLP                               Nov  Dec  2007 2008 2 1 
622 Henderson Hutcherson & McCullough, PLLC             Nov  Mar  2005 2008 1 1 
108 Henjes, Conner & Williams, P. C.                    Nov  June 2006 2009 1 1 
1482 Hill, Taylor LLC                                    Sep  Jul  2005 2009 1 2 
183 HJ & Associates, LLC                                Oct  Jul  2006 2009 2 1 
126 Hobe & Lucas Certified Public Accountants Inc       Feb  Apr  2006 2009 1 1 
694 Hoberman, Miller, Goldstein & Lesser, P.C.          Nov  Feb  2005 2009 2 1 
483 HoganTaylor LLP                                     Nov  Dec  2007 2010 1 2 
204 Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP                       Jul  Dec  2008 2009 2 1 
829 Hood Sutton Robinson & Freeman CPAs, PC             Jul  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
171 Horne LLP                                           Nov  Sep  2007 2010 1 1 
921 Horowitz & Ullmann, P.C                             Nov  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
261 Hutchinson and Bloodgood LLP                        Nov  Nov  2006 2008 2 1 
805 Insero & Company CPAs, P.C                          Dec  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
915 IRON DUKE CORPORATION                               Nov  Dec  2005 2010 2 2 
211 J. H. Williams & Co., LLP                           May  Feb  2006 2009 1 1 
224 J.D. Cloud & Co. L.L.P.                             Feb  Dec  2006 2008 2 1 
596 J.H. Cohn LLP                                       Mar  May  2007 2009 2 1 
397 J.W. Hunt and Company, LLP                          Sep  Feb  2008 2010 2 2 
645 Jeffrey & Company                                   Aug  Jul  2005 2009 2 2 
70 Jeffrey S. Gilbert, CPA                             Oct  Oct  2005 2010 1 2 
814 JEROME ROSENBERG CPA, P.C                           Feb  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
489 Jewett, Schwartz, Wolfe & Associates, P.L.          Nov  Oct  2008 2010 2 2 
262 Johnson Lambert & Co. LLP                           Dec  Apr  2005 2009 1 1 
458 Johnson, Miller & Co., Certified Public 
Accountants 
Nov  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
933 Jonathon P. Reuben CPA an Accountancy               Apr  Dec  2006 2009 2 1 
411 Jones & Kirkpatrick, P.C.                           Nov  Feb  2005 2009 1 1 
326 Jones Simkins, P.C.                                 Jan  Dec  2007 2010 2 2 
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772 JonesBaggett, LLP                                   Dec  Oct  2005 2009 1 2 
228 Joseph Decosimo and Company                         Apr  Feb  2007 2010 1 1 
47 Kabani & Company, Inc                               Feb  Jul  2008 2010 2 2 
137 Kaufman, Rossin & Co.,                              Jan  May  2007 2009 1 1 
475 KBA Group LLP                                       Jun  Feb  2006 2009 2 2 
80 Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves, P.C       Oct  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
92 Kelly & Company An Accountancy Corporation          Oct  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
623 Kemp & Company, A Professional Association          Jul  Aug  2006 2009 2 1 
718 Kerber, Eck & Braeckel LLP                          Dec  May  2005 2009 1 1 
142 Kiesling Associates LLP                             Nov  May  2006 2008 1 1 
674 Killman, Murrel & Company PC                        Apr  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
540 King + Company, PSC                                 Sep  May  2005 2009 1 2 
774 KINGERY & CROUSE, P.A.                              Jun  Apr  2008 2009 2 1 
354 KIRKLAND, RUSS, MURPHY & TAPP, PA                   May  Oct  2006 2008 1 1 
170 KMJ Corbin & Company LLP                            Apr  Sep  2006 2010 1 2 
379 Kraft CPAs PLLC                                     Apr  Oct  2007 2009 1 1 
448 Kronick Kalada Berdy & Co, P.C.                     Jul  Apr  2006 2009 2 1 
872 Kyle L. Tingle, CPA, LLC                            Jul  Apr  2005 2009 2 2 
318 L J Soldinger Associates, LLC                       Jun  Nov  2007 2009 1 1 
366 L J Sullivan Certified Public Accountant, LLC       Nov  Sep  2005 2010 1 2 
192 L.L. Bradford & Company, LLC                        Jan  Jun  2007 2009 2 1 
508 Lane Gorman Trubitt, PLLC                           Apr  Nov  2007 2009 1 2 
601 Laporte, Sehrt, Romig and Hand                      Sep  Feb  2007 2011 1 1 
699 Larry O'Donnell, CPA, P.C.                          Jun  Jul  2005 2009 2 2 
684 Larry Wolfe, CPA                                    Aug  Feb  2005 2008 2 1 
364 LaRue, Corrigan, McCormick & Teasdale LLP           Mar  Apr  2006 2010 2 2 
450 Lattimore, Black, Morgan & Cain, P. C.              Nov  May  2006 2009 1 1 
120 Lazar Levine & Felix                                Aug  Apr  2005 2008 2 1 
135 Lefkowitz, Garfinkel, Champi & DeRienzo P.C.        Jun  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
335 LeMaster & Daniels PLLC                             Nov  Jul  2005 2008 1 1 
867 Lesley, Thomas, Schwarz & Postma, Inc.              Apr  Jul  2006 2008 1 1 
485 LevitZacks, Certified Public Accountants            Sep  Jul  2005 2008 1 1 
347 Lieberman & Associates, P.A.                        Feb  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
473 LIEBMAN GOLDBERG & HYMOWITZ LLP                     Oct  May  2005 2010 2 2 
375 Lightfoot Guest Moore & Company                     Jan  Apr  2007 2010 1 2 
874 Livingston & Haynes, P.C.                           Mar  Jun  2006 2008 2 1 
2200 LJ Mosby, P. C.                                     Jun  Apr  2007 2010 1 1 
429 Louis Plung & Company, LLP                          Mar  Oct  2006 2008 2 1 
337 Lucas, Horsfall, Murphy & Pindroh, LLP              Aug  Dec  2005 2007 1 1 
130 Lumsden & McCormick                                 Feb  May  2006 2008 2 1 
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101 Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Company, LLP                Apr  Jul  2007 2010 2 1 
896 LWBJ Finan, LLC                                     Feb  Mar  2006 2008 1 1 
1269 Lynda R. Keeton CPA, LLC                            Mar  Jul  2006 2009 2 2 
825 M.D. Sassi Company                                  Dec  Oct  2005 2009 2 2 
763 Maggart & Associates, P.C                           Feb  Jul  2008 2010 1 1 
177 Mah & Associates, LLP                               Aug  Jun  2005 2009 1 1 
264 Mahoney Sabol & Company, LLP                        Feb  Oct  2006 2008 2 1 
190 Malin, Bergquist & Company, LLP                     Sep  Sep  2005 2010 1 2 
320 Maloney + Novotny LLC                               Dec  May  2007 2010 2 2 
476 Mantyla McReynolds, LLC                             Sep  Jul  2007 2008 2 1 
688 Marcum & Kliegman LLP                               Mar  Apr  2006 2008 2 1 
332 Margolin, Winer & Evens LLP                         Oct  Jul  2005 2008 1 1 
334 MARGOLIS & COMPANY P.C.                             Jul  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
970 Mark Bailey & Company, CPA's, Ltd.                  May  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
709 Marks Paneth & Shron LLP                            Apr  Oct  2006 2008 1 1 
722 MARMANN & ASSOCIATES, P. C.                         Nov  Sep  2007 2009 2 1 
669 Mauldin & Jenkins, CPA, LLC                         Nov  Nov  2006 2009 1 2 
199 Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C.                           Aug  Dec  2005 2008 2 2 
408 McBride Shopa & Company, P. A.                      Jun  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
869 McConnell & Jones, LLP                              Feb  Dec  2008 2010 1 1 
904 McCrory & McDowell, LLC                             Apr  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
849 McElroy, Quirk & Burch (APC)                        Oct  Feb  2005 2010 1 1 
256 McGrail, Merkel, Quinn & Associates                 Apr  Jan  2006 2009 2 1 
404 McNair, McLemore, Middlebrooks & Co., LLP           Nov  Dec  2007 2010 1 1 
803 McSoley McCoy & Co                                  Nov  Jun  2005 2008 1 1 
314 Meaden & Moore, Ltd.                                Feb  Jan  2006 2009 1 1 
417 Melby & Guarino, CPA's  P. A.                       Jul  Dec  2005 2007 2 1 
777 Melton & Melton, L.L.P.                             Oct  Apr  2006 2009 1 1 
284 Mendoza Berger & Company, LLP                       Jul  Jan  2008 2011 2 2 
557 Mengel, Metzger, Barr & Co. LLP                     Mar  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
744 Mercadien, PC CPA                                   Mar  Feb  2008 2011 1 1 
888 Meyler & Company, LLC                               Apr  Oct  2008 2009 2 2 
582 MFR, P.C.                                           Oct  Jul  2006 2009 1 1 
858 Michael F. Cronin                                   Mar  May  2006 2008 2 1 
822 Michael T. Studer CPA P.C.                          May  Mar  2006 2009 2 2 
543 Michael Trokey & Company, P. C.                     Jun  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
566 Miller Wachman LLP                                  Nov  Feb  2005 2009 1 1 
523 Mitchell & Titus, LLP                               June Jan  2008 2011 1 2 
728 MOE O'SHAUGHNESSY & ASSOCIATES, 
P.S.                
Feb  Jul  2006 2008 1 1 
39 Mohler, Nixon & Williams Accountancy Corp           Jan  July 2007 2010 1 1 
590 Monroe Shine & Co., Inc.                            Dec  May  2005 2009 1 1 
2398 Moody, Famiglietti & Andronico, LLP                 Jul  May  2007 2010 1 1 
1981 MOORE& ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED                       Oct  Oct  2005 2008 2 2 
593 Moore Stephens Frost, PLC                           Jan  Nov  2005 2007 1 1 
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569 Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A                        Jan  May  2007 2009 2 1 
1102 Moquist Thorvilson Kaufmann Kennedy & 
Pieper LLC    
Dec  Apr  2007 2010 1 1 
536 Morison Cogen LLP                                   Feb  Jul  2008 2010 2 1 
82 MORRIS, DAVIS & CHAN LLP                            Jul  Jan  2006 2009 2 1 
659 Moss Adams LLP                                      June Nov  2008 2009 1 2 
2276 Mountjoy Chilton Medley LLP                         Jun  Jan  2006 2008 2 1 
281 Nichols, Cauley & Associates, LLC                   Aug  May  2006 2008 2 1 
103 Nussbaum Yates Berg Klein & Wolpow, LLP             Jul  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
252 Odenberg, Ullakko, muranishi & Co. LLP              Jan  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
251 Olsen Thielen & Co., Ltd                            Dec  Jan  2005 2009 1 1 
451 Padgett, Stratemann & Co. LLP                       Nov  July 2006 2010 1 2 
342 Pannell Kerr Forster of Texas, P.C                  Jul  Jul  2007 2010 2 2 
834 Parent, McLaughlin & Nangle CPA                     Feb  June 2006 2008 2 1 
852 Parente Randolph, LLC                               Jan  Sep  2007 2010 1 2 
678 Paritz and Company P.A.                             Dec  Jul  2005 2009 1 2 
227 Pattillo, Brown & Hill, LLP                         Nov  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
87 Pender Newkirk & Company LLP                        Jun  Nov  2007 2008 1 1 
441 Perry - Smith LLP                                   Mar  Nov  2007 2009 2 2 
739 Peter C. Cosmas Co.                                 Aug  June 2005 2008 2 1 
749 Peterson Sullivan LLP                               Sep  Mar  2008 2010 2 2 
125 Philip Vogel & Co. PC                               Jul  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
624 Piercy, Bowler, Taylor & Kern CPA                   Jan  Dec  2007 2008 2 1 
166 Plante & Moran, PLLC                                Mar  Nov  2007 2009 2 2 
73 PMB Helin Donovan, LLP                              Jul  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
91 Porter Keadle Moore, LLP                            Jan  Mar  2007 2010 1 1 
360 Pressman Ciocca Smith                               Oct  May  2005 2008 2 1 
746 Pritchett, Siler & Hardy, P.C.                      Apr  Jul  2008 2010 2 2 
956 PS Stephenson & Co., P.C.                           May  Jul  2006 2008 2 1 
61 Pustorino, Puglisi & Co., LLP                       Jun  Sep  2007 2009 1 1 
346 Quick & McFarlin, P.C.                              Oct  Nov  2005 2008 2 1 
636 R. E. BASSIE & CO.                                  May  Jan  2008 2011 2 2 
812 R. J. Clark & Associates, Inc                       Oct  Jul  2005 2009 2 2 
20 Radin, Glass & Co., CPA, LLP                        Jan  Dec  2007 2009 2 1 
50 Raich Ende Malter & Co. LLP                         Sep  Aug  2008 2011 2 2 
570 Raimondo Pettit Group                               Sep  Oct  2005 2008 1 1 
820 Ramirez Jimenez International CPA's                 Feb  Dec  2005 2007 1 1 
67 Rayburn, Bates & Fitzgerald, P.C.                   Nov  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
587 RBSM LLP                                            Feb  Nov  2008 2009 2 2 
2483 REDW Business & Finan Resource, LLC                 Mar  Oct  2008 2010 1 2 
175 Reeves Evans McBride & Zhang, LLP                   Sep  Apr  2005 2009 1 2 
263 Rehmann Accounting LLC                              Nov  Aug  2007 2011 1 2 
525 Reilly, Penner & Benton LLP                         Apr  Jan  2006 2009 2 1 
927 Reuben E. Price & Co. Public Accountancy Corp       Jul  Apr  2005 2009 2 2 
313 Reznick Group, P.C                                  Apr  Jun  2007 2009 1 1 
651 Richard L. Brown & Company, P. A                    Feb  May  2005 2009 1 2 
705 Richardson & Company                                May  Jun  2006 2009 2 1 
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673 Richey, May & Co., LLP                              Sep  May  2005 2008 1 1 
151 Robison, Hill & Co., APC                            Jan  Apr  2009 2011 2 2 
910 Rodefer Moss & Co, PLLC                             Feb  Sep  2006 2009 1 1 
218 RONALD R. CHADWICK, P.C                             Apr  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
468 Rose, Snyder & Jacobs                               Apr  Jun  2008 2009 2 1 
679 Rosen Seymour Shapss Martin & Company               Feb  Oct  2006 2009 2 1 
89 Rosenberg Rich Baker Berman                         Jun  May  2008 2009 2 1 
361 Rotenberg Meril Solomon Bertiger & Guttilla         Nov  Nov  2005 2008 2 1 
94 Rothstein Kass & Company                            Nov  Mar  2008 2010 2 1 
492 Rowbotham & Company LLP                             Apr  Mar  2006 2010 2 2 
345 Rowles & Company, LLP                               Mar  Jan  2007 2011 1 2 
41 RubinBrown LLP                                      Jan  Dec  2007 2009 1 1 
791 Russell, Brier & Co. LLP                            Oct  May  2005 2008 2 1 
74 S. R. Snodgrass, AC                                 Nov  Apr  2006 2010 1 1 
785 S. W. Hatfield, CPA                                 Sep  Nov  2005 2008 2 2 
356 S.E. Clark & Company, P.C                           Feb  Oct  2006 2009 1 2 
843 Saddington Shusko LLP                               Jul  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
106 Salberg & Company, PA                               Jun  Feb  2005 2008 2 1 
169 Sanville & Company                                  Jun  Apr  2007 2009 2 1 
932 Sarna & Company, CPA                                Jun  Feb  2005 2008 2 1 
203 Sartain Fischbein & Co                              May  Nov  2006 2008 2 1 
29 Sassetti LLC                                        Nov  Dec  2006 2008 2 1 
28 Scharf Pera & Co., PLLC                             Jun  Nov  2006 2009 2 2 
776 Schauer, Taylor, Cox & Edward, PC                   Feb  Mar  2006 2008 2 1 
494 Schechter Dokken Kanter Andrews & Selcer Ltd        May  Apr  2006 2009 1 1 
358 Schneider Downs & Co., Inc                          Sep  Feb  2005 2009 1 2 
225 Schoonover Boyer + Associates                       Feb  Dec  2006 2008 1 1 
209 Schumacher & Associates, Inc                        Aug  Apr  2005 2008 2 1 
117 Scott McElveen, LLP                                 Nov  May  2005 2008 1 1 
759 Seligson & Giannattasio, LLP                        May  Nov  2006 2008 2 1 
178 Semple, Marchal & Cooper, LLP                       Jul  May  2007 2009 2 1 
111 Shatswell, MacLeod & Company, PC                    Feb  Jan  2008 2010 1 1 
240 Shelley International CPA                           Nov  Sep  2006 2010 2 1 
548 SHERB & CO., LLP                                    Jun  Apr  2007 2011 2 2 
421 Simontacchi & Company                               Dec  June 2005 2008 2 1 
367 SingerLewak LLP                                     Sep  Apr  2008 2011 2 2 
800 Smith and Howard, P. C.                             Nov  Oct  2007 2010 1 1 
266 Smith Elliott Kearns & Company, LLC                 Mar  Jan  2007 2010 1 2 
26 SMITH, CARNEY & CO, PC                              Feb  Oct  2006 2008 1 1 
436 Snead and Williams, P.L.L.C                         Aug  May  2005 2008 1 1 
500 Sobel & Co., LLC                                    Jul  Oct  2005 2008 1 1 
752 Somerset CPAs, P.C                                  Feb  Jan  2006 2009 1 1 
903 Spector & Associates, LLP                           Feb  Oct  2006 2008 2 2 
349 Spicer Jeffries LLP                                 Oct  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
402 Squar, Milner, Miranda and Williamson, CPA, 
LLP     
Jan  Mar  2007 2010 1 1 
507 Squire & Company, PC                                Jul  Feb  2005 2008 2 1 
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98 SS&G Finan Services, Inc                            Jun  May  2006 2008 2 1 
153 StarkSchenkein, LLP                                 Dec  Jan  2008 2011 2 2 
490 Stegman & Company                                   Oct  May  2006 2010 1 2 
276 Stevens, Powell & Company                           Nov  May  2005 2008 1 1 
868 STOCKTON BATES, LLP                                 Oct  Dec  2005 2008 2 2 
585 Stonefield Josephson, Inc.                          Mar  Oct  2007 2009 2 2 
72 Stoveall, Grandey & Allen, LLP                      Feb  Jul  2008 2010 1 1 
577 Stowe & Degon LLC                                   Jun  Oct  2006 2008 1 1 
280 Sullivan Bille, PC                                  May  July 2006 2008 2 1 
244 Summers, Spencer & Company, P.A.                    Oct  Mar  2005 2010 2 2 
148 Sutton Frost Cary LLP                               May  Jul  2006 2009 2 2 
1820 Swalm & Associates, P.C.                            Aug  Dec  2006 2009 2 1 
84 Sweeney, Matz & Co., LLC                            Jun  Dec  2006 2009 2 2 
545 Swenson Advisors, LLP                               Mar  Mar  2007 2010 1 2 
116 Symonds, Evans & Company                            Mar  Apr  2006 2008 1 1 
114 T.E. Lott and Company                               Jul  Dec  2007 2010 1 2 
595 Tabriztchi & Co, CPA                                Dec  Mar  2007 2010 2 1 
445 Tait, Weller & Baker                                Sep  Dec  2007 2011 1 1 
270 Tanner LC                                           Jan  Apr  2007 2009 1 1 
141 TGM Group LLC                                       Dec  Feb  2005 2009 2 1 
527 Thigpen, Jones, Seaton & Co., P.C.                  May  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
329 Thomas W. Klash, CPA                                Jul  Sep  2005 2008 1 1 
65 Thompson, Greenspon & Co., P.C.                     Sep  Feb  2005 2008 1 1 
821 Todman & Co., CPA's, P.C.                           Aug  Sep  2005 2008 2 1 
1207 Traci Jo Anderson                                   Apr  Jun  2008 2009 2 2 
521 Travis Wolff, LLP                                   Oct  Sep  2006 2008 2 1 
182 Trien Rosenberg Rosenberg Weiberg ciullo & 
Fazzari  
Apr  Dec  2008 2010 1 1 
128 Turlington and Company, L.L.P                       Dec  Dec  2008 2010 2 1 
616 Turner, Jones and Company PLLC                      May  Sep  2006 2010 2 1 
76 Turner, Stone & Company, LLP                        Jul  Dec  2005 2007 2 1 
1195 UHY LLP                                             Oct  Aug  2009 2011 1 1 
715 Vasquez & Company LLP                               Mar  Oct  2006 2008 2 1 
45 Vavrinek, Trine, Day & Co., LLP                     Sep  Dec  2007 2008 2 1 
1059 VB&T Certified Public Accountants, PLLC             Dec  Jan  2007 2011 1 1 
2343 Velma Butler & Company, Ltd                         Sep  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
2234 Vestal & Wiler, PA                                  Oct  May  2008 2011 1 1 
371 Vitale, Caturano & Company, Ltd                     Feb  Apr  2006 2008 2 1 
519 Walsh, Jastrem & Browne LLP                         Jul  May  2007 2010 1 1 
683 Washington, Pittman & McKeever LLC                  Mar  Jul  2007 2010 1 1 
513 Waters, Vollmering & Associates, LLP                Jan  May  2007 2009 1 1 
193 Weaver & Martin LLC                                 Dec  Jan  2007 2009 2 1 
410 Weaver and Tidwell, L.L.P.                          Dec  Nov  2007 2009 2 1 
287 WEBB & COMPANY, P.A.                                Oct  Jan  2008 2011 2 2 
572 Weinberg & Company, P.A.                            Dec  Mar  2007 2011 2 1 
352 Weinstein Spira & Company, P.C.                     Feb  May  2006 2008 1 1 
339 WeiserMazars LLP                                    Dec  Feb  2007 2009 2 2 
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2 Deficiencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor ID              Auditor name  Month 1 Month 2  Year 1 Year 2 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
972 Weismann Associates LLC                             Aug  Nov  2005 2008 2 1 
726 Whitley Penn LLP                                    Mar  Dec  2007 2008 2 1 
471 Wiener, Goodman & Company, P.C.                     May  Sep  2006 2008 2 2 
597 Williams Benator & Libby, LLP                       Dec  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
118 WilsonMorgan LLP                                    Feb  Oct  2006 2009 2 2 
571 Windes & McClaughry Accountancy 
Corporation         
Jun  Jan  2005 2009 2 2 
617 Windham Brannon, PC                                 Sep  Aug  2008 2011 1 1 
344 Wipfli LLP                                          Nov  Apr  2006 2011 1 2 
374 Wisan Smith Racker & Prescott, LLP                  Dec  Oct  2005 2009 1 2 
100 WithumSmith+Brown                                   Feb  June 2006 2008 2 1 
698 Witt Mares, PLC                                     Dec  Nov  2005 2008 1 1 
392 Wolf & Company, PC                                  Apr  July 2006 2008 2 1 
959 Wolfe, McDuff & Oppie                               Mar  Feb  2007 2010 2 1 
837 Wolinetz, Lafazan & Company CPA, P. C.              Mar  Dec  2007 2010 1 2 
613 Yount, Hyde & Barbour, P C.                         Mar  Nov  2007 2009 1 1 
